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Abstract




The primary goal of this dissertation is the study and measurement of the effect of gender in
the process of financial decision making and investment decision making in particular, under
uncertainty. In terms of investment decisions, researchers have linked investors’ risk aversion
to several individual characteristics of theirs, such as their age, their income or their finan-
cial knowledge. However, an investor’s characteristic, somehow overlooked or not properly
investigated, has been the investor’s gender, and the latter’s bearing on investment decision
making. Research from the 1990s suggested that once individuals are called to allocate their
wealth and make investment decisions, women are more conservative investors than men
manifesting greater relative financial risk aversion than men. The gender argument contin-
ued, and highlighted the repercussions of this behavior on women’s long-term investment
goals, with most prominent here, the accumulation of adequate retirement wealth. Studying
the above argument, and investigating the over time pattern and current trend of individual
investors’ in financial risk taking, especially in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 financial crisis
v
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constitutes the main goal of the current dissertation. More specifically, the current work
aspires to provide the latest trend on risk taking behavior of individual investors, and to
add to the relevant gender literature by empirically comparing the risk taking of female and
male investors. The dissertation consists of three essays. In the first essay, gender differences
in relative financial risk aversion over time are measured. To that effect, the 1998 seminal
work by Jianakoplos and Bernasek [30] (JB) is studied and reexamined. The essay starts
with a presentation of the Friend and Blume theoretical framework on which the JB work is
based, and subsequently, the analysis is done in two different directions. First, the JB work
for the Survey of Consumer Finances of 1989 is replicated, employing Repeated-Imputation
Inference techniques, and thereafter, the JB model is tested on the most recent Survey of
Consumer Finances of 2013, with the two data sets being treated as two independent cross-
sections. Second, the two independent cross-sections are pooled together, and by adding
time interactions, the model is studied over time, repeating the tests for gender differences.
In the second essay of the dissertation, a refinement of the JB model employed in the first
essay is attempted. More specifically, following a thorough study of the Survey of Con-
sumer Finances, and especially of its latest setup for 2013, and in accordance with other
researchers’ approaches, certain limitations of the JB model are addressed. The limitations
pertain to “left out” or mishandled categories of assets in the computation of wealth, and to
an erroneous handling and consideration of specific demographic data of the respondents. To
overcome these limitations, the dissertation proceeds first with a broader coverage of assets
that takes advantage of the latest information available in the 2013 SCF, allowing a more
nuanced split of the assets into risk-free, and risky ones, and second with a more appropriate
consideration of the available demographic information. The modified JB model is tested
again on the 1989 SCF, as well as on the 2013 SCF, and the tests of gender differences are
repeated in pursuit of a further nuanced analysis. In the third essay of the dissertation, the
interest shifts entirely to retirement assets, and to the study of gender differences in risk tak-
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ing related to the accumulation of retirement wealth. To that effect, employing again data
from the SCF, and more specifically its latest version of 2013, and taking advantage of the
availability of information related to employment and pensions for both the respondent and
the respondent’s spouse or partner, gender differences in individuals’ investment strategies in
their defined contribution plans are investigated. It is stressed that by defined contribution
plans, the work refers to employer-sponsored plans such as 401(k)s, 403(b)s, and thrift saving
accounts from current or past jobs, as well as to Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs),
Roth, and Keogh accounts. All information about the aforementioned employer-sponsored
plans, as well as about the balances of IRAs and Keogh accounts is handily available by the
SCF, while the essay builds carefully its own split into risky, and risk-free defined contribu-
tion plans. The dissertation concludes with the recording of the outcomes of the work, the
highlighting of policy implications, and the sketching of future directions of the research.
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Motivation and Structure of the Dis-
sertation
The primary goal of this dissertation is the study and measurement of the effect of gender
in the process of financial decision making under uncertainty. Below a brief background
presentation introduces the reader to the topic, and gives the structure of the project.
The presentation starts by commenting that researchers’ effort to understand the mech-
anism of individuals’ decision making under uncertainty goes far back in time, and it seeks
its foundations not only in mathematics and economics but also in psychology and in be-
haviors hardwired into the human system. Following the insightful historical perspective by
Eeckhoudt et al. [22] (p.7), and the exemplary review by Bajtelsmit and Bernasek [7] (p.2),
a brief overview is given below.
Prior to any reference, a very old research gimmick is introduced, the famous lottery, a
simple but nevertheless revelatory device of the examination of human behavior under risk,
with the individual facing every time a scenario with an uncertain event, which has various
possible outcomes (good and bad), each with a certain probability of occurrence, and where
the individual is called to make a decision.
For a very long time, scientists and mathematicians argued that the value of such a
lottery should be equal to its mathematical expectation and hence, identical for all people,
1
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independent of their risk attitude. In 1738, the Swiss mathematician, Daniel Bernoulli [13]
(p.24), gave us the breakthrough idea that two people facing the same lottery may value
it differently because of a difference in their psychology or their “moral expectation”. This
perception that individuals value more the utility or satisfaction derived from the outcomes
of some uncertain event, than the monetary value of the outcomes, was maintained for more
than 200 years, and was mathematically refined in 1953 by Von Neumann and Morgenstern
[50], in the expected utility theory, which constitutes, till today, the predominant “norma-
tive” model of rational choice under uncertainty (Schoemaker [45]). The expected utility
theory was built upon a set of axioms, and assumes that an individual’s risk preferences
can be represented by an expected utility function, with the individual’s decision under risk
dictated to be the option that provides the highest expected utility.
The expected utility theory takes into consideration that an individual may be risk averse,
a characteristic of human behavior manifested under uncertainty. Technically, risk aversion
means that “once faced with a lottery, the individual prefers receiving the expected outcome
of the lottery with certainty, rather than the lottery itself”, Eeckhoudt et al. [22] (p.7), and
practically that “the individual dislikes risk to the extent of being willing to pay to avoid
some uncertain event or requiring to be paid to participate in such an event”, Bajtelsmit
and Bernasek [7] (p.3).
Assuming that utility is a function of wealth (W), risk aversion can be further defined,
by resorting to two standard measures, the ones independently developed by Pratt [42] and






, and the coefficient






1. Following Grossman and Shiller [27] (p.224) the
relative risk aversion is a “measure of the concavity of the utility function or the disutility of
consumption fluctuations”, which may intuitively be translated, following Hanna and Chen
1 Here, it is assumed that utility always increases with wealth but the marginal utility of wealth decreases
with wealth.
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[28] (p.18) into that “the higher the relative risk aversion, the more rapidly marginal utility
decreases as consumption or wealth increases”.
The expected utility theory predicts that absolute risk aversion decreases with wealth
—the wealthier the individual is, the higher the amount he or she is willing to put at risk—,
a property known as decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA). However, any prediction
about the response of relative risk aversion to changes of wealth —either increasing relative
risk aversion (IRRA) or decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA) or constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) has proved more challenging to formulate. One of the earliest and strongly
influential empirical works studying this relationship belongs to Friend and Blume [25] who
developed their own theoretical model of measuring relative risk aversion, and by testing
it on cross sectional data from the 1962 and 1963 Federal Reserve Board Surveys of the
Financial Characteristics of Consumers and Changes in Family Finances, they concluded
with results sensitive to the definition of wealth. On the basis of the latter definition, they
found evidence of decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA), as well as evidence of constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA).
In terms of investment decisions, researchers have linked investors’ risk aversion to several
individual characteristics of theirs, such as their age, their time horizon, their liquidity needs,
their portfolio size, their income, their investment knowledge, as well as their attitude toward
price fluctuations. However, an investor’s characteristic, somehow overlooked or not properly
investigated, has been the investor’s gender, and the latter’s bearing on investment decision
making. Research from the 1990s suggested that once individuals are called to allocate their
wealth and make investment decisions, women are more conservative investors than men
manifesting greater relative financial risk aversion than men. The gender argument contin-
ued, and highlighted the repercussions of this behavior on women’s long-term investment
goals, with most prominent here, the accumulation of adequate retirement wealth. Studying
the above argument, and investigating the over time pattern and current trend of individual
4
investors’ in financial risk taking, especially in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 financial crisis
constitutes the main goal of the current dissertation. More specifically, the current work
aspires to provide the latest trend on risk taking behavior of individual investors, and to add
to the literature of gender differences in financial risk aversion by empirically comparing the
risk taking of female and male investors.
To measure risk aversion, the study works within the expected utility theory model, re-
sorting to the measure of relative risk aversion suggested by Friend and Blume [25] in their
1975 theoretical framework. The Friend and Blume framework, appropriately expanded so
as to account for several economic and demographic variables affecting households’ portfo-
lio allocation, as well as for certain methodological challenges in terms of the framework’s
definition(s) of wealth, is tested on data from the U.S. Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of
Consumer Finances, investigating the empirical relationship between changes in wealth and
relative risk aversion for all types of households with emphasis given in the study of gender
differences in the manifestation of financial risk aversion.
Analytically, the structure of the dissertation project has as following. In the first essay of
the dissertation, gender differences in relative financial risk aversion over time are measured.
To that effect, the 1998 seminal work by Jianakoplos and Bernasek [30] (JB) is studied
and reexamined. The essay starts with a presentation of the Friend and Blume theoretical
framework on which the JB work is based, and subsequently, the analysis is done in two
different directions. First, the JB work for the Survey of Consumer Finances of 1989 is
replicated, employing Repeated-Imputation Inference techniques, and thereafter, the JB
model is tested on the most recent Survey of Consumer Finances of 2013, with the two data
sets being treated as two independent cross-sections. Second, the two independent cross-
sections are pooled together, and by adding time interactions, the model is studied over
time, repeating the tests for gender differences.
In the second essay of the dissertation, a refinement of the JB model employed in the
5
first essay is attempted. More specifically, following a thorough study of the Survey of
Consumer Finances, and especially of its latest setup for 2013, and in accordance with other
researchers’ approaches, certain limitations of the JB model are addressed. The limitations
pertain to “left out” or mishandled categories of assets in the computation of wealth, and to
an erroneous handling and consideration of specific demographic data of the respondents. To
overcome these limitations, the dissertation proceeds first with a broader coverage of assets
that takes advantage of the latest information available in the 2013 SCF, allowing a more
nuanced split of the assets into risk-free, and risky ones, and second with a more appropriate
consideration of the available demographic information. The modified JB model is tested
again on the 1989 SCF, as well as on the 2013 SCF, and the tests of gender differences are
repeated in pursuit of a further nuanced analysis.
In the third essay of the dissertation, the interest shifts entirely to retirement assets,
and to the study of gender differences in risk taking related to the accumulation of retire-
ment wealth. To that effect, employing again data from the SCF, and more specifically
its latest version of 2013, and taking advantage of the availability of information related to
employment and pensions for both the respondent and the respondent’s spouse or partner,
gender differences in individuals’ investment strategies in their defined contribution plans are
investigated. It is stressed that by defined contribution plans, the work refers to employer-
sponsored plans such as 401(k)s, 403(b)s, and thrift saving accounts from current or past
jobs, as well as to Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), Roth, and Keogh accounts. All
information about the aforementioned employer-sponsored plans, as well as about the bal-
ances of IRAs and Keogh accounts is handily available by the SCF, while the essay builds
carefully its own split into risky, and risk-free defined contribution plans.
Lastly, the contribution of the dissertation lies in the use of latest data, in the over time
feature of the study, as well as in the thorough use of the data available. More specifically,
the study brings into light new important evidence about the relative risk aversion of female
6
investors working with data also reflecting the aftereffect of the period of the 2007-2008
financial crisis. The work investigates the allocation of investors’ total wealth in risky assets
in general, and in risky defined contribution plans in particular, and exploits the richness2
of the data source available in the best possible way. The latter claim is materialized first
by meticulously studying the survey, and extracting the respondents’ risk-taking in terms of
their investment strategies in a way that is more nuanced than is available in the current
literature and second by employing state-of-the-art Repeated-Imputation Inference (RII)
techniques to make valid statistical inferences from the data.
2 The Survey of Consumer Finances is considered by many researchers, as “the best available source of
individual household wealth data collected in the United States” (Bajtelsmit and Bernasek [7] (p.4)).
First Essay: Women and Financial Rel-
ative Risk Aversion: A Study Over Time
with Data from the U.S. Federal Re-
serve Board’s Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances for 1989 and 2013
2.1 Introduction
Individuals and households are called on a daily basis to take a plethora of financial decisions,
related to consumption, savings and investments. This financial decision making is plagued
by the existence of risk, “a complex, and multidimensional concept with no single measure” as
Fredman [24] comments, approached throughout the dissertation as the variance of returns.
Once faced with financial risk, individuals are exhibiting different levels of risk aversion, a
renowned characteristic of human behavior manifested under uncertainty, “synonymous with
the unwillingness to incur risk” (P̊alsson [41]).
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As already mentioned in the “Motivation of the Dissertation” in section 1, in terms of
investment decisions, researchers have linked investors’ risk aversion or risk tolerance (the
inverse of risk aversion (Barsky et al. [10]) to several individual characteristics of theirs, such
as their age, their time horizon, their liquidity needs, their portfolio size, their income, their
investment knowledge, as well as their attitude toward price fluctuations. Of course, every
investor is a unique case, hence the list of defining factors of risk tolerance or risk aversion
would be a long one. In this spirit, Sung and Hanna [49] called for the acknowledgment of
both subjective and objective factors related to risk tolerance.
An investor’s characteristic, somehow overlooked or not properly investigated, has been
the investor’s gender, and the latter’s bearing on investment decision making. In the 1990s,
a significant stream of research1 started suggesting that women are more conservative in-
vestors than men, exhibiting greater financial risk aversion. The gender argument continued,
highlighting the repercussions of this behavior on women’s long-term investment goals, with
most prominent here, the accumulation of adequate retirement wealth. Women faced with
the reality of lower average earnings than those of men, and the prospect of a longer retire-
ment period than that of men were called and strongly advised to incur higher risks in their
investment strategies so as to secure higher returns for their retirement.
With more than twenty years of empirical research voicing and articulating concerns
about women’s inadequate risk taking in their investment strategies, and with both re-
searchers and financial planners calling for public policies, and government intervention
aiming at women’s better financial briefing, and financial education, and in the aftermath
of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the first essay of the dissertation is inquisitive, about the
risk aversion of women investors of today. More specifically, the interest lies in determining
whether gender differences in financial risk aversion have been increasing or decreasing or
1 Indicatively, the exemplary literature review on gender differences in investing by Embrey and Fox [23]
is referred here.
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have stayed the same over time. To that effect, the 1998 seminal work by Jianakoplos and
Bernasek (JB from now on) [30] exploring the issue of differences in risk aversion by gender
is studied and reexamined.
In terms of the JB work, JB using data from the U.S. Federal Reserve Board’s Survey
of Consumer Finances for 1989, examined household holdings on risky assets, and tested for
gender differences, by particularly emphasizing on any differences in risky assets holdings be-
tween single women, and single men. Among others, JB concluded that as wealth increased,
the proportion of wealth held as risky assets was estimated to increase by a smaller amount
for single women than for single men, implying higher relative risk aversion for women.
In terms of this essay’s work, the analysis is run in two directions. First, the JB work for
the Survey of Consumer Finances of 1989 is replicated, while, subsequently, the JB model is
tested on the most recent Survey of Consumer Finances of 2013, with the two data sets being
treated as two independent cross-sections. Second, the two independent cross-sections from
1989, and 2013 are pooled together, and by adding time interactions, the model is studied
over time, repeating the tests of gender differences.
The contribution of this essay to the literature lies in the intertemporal feature of the
study, as well as in the thorough use of the data available. More specifically, the study brings
into light new important evidence about the relative risk aversion of female investors of today
working with data also reflecting the aftereffect of the period of the 2007-2008 financial crisis
and employing state-of-the-art Repeated-Imputation Inference (RII) techniques so as to make
valid statistical inferences from the data.
The structure of the essay has as following. Section 2.2 starts with an insight in the
relevant literature exploring gender differences in financial risk taking, including the coverage
of the JB work, which is of pivotal role for the purposes of the essay. Section 2.3 proceeds
with the presentation of the econometric model employed in the work covering both the
theoretical underpinnings, and the motivation of the variables included in the model. Section
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2.4 proceeds with the database of the essay, the SCF, and the consideration of certain
methodological issues underlying the data. Section 2.5 covers the econometric techniques
employed in the work with emphasis given on the implementation of the RII techniques.
Section 2.6 proceeds with the empirical results, and the findings of the work. Section 2.7
concludes with the recording of the outcomes of the work, the highlighting of possible caveats,
and the sketching of future directions.
2.2 Literature Review
In the literature, gender differences are encountered, examined, and measured in every pos-
sible domain of social and professional life. The spectrum of analysis is broad but for the
purposes of this essay’s work, the review that follows seeks to track the findings of other re-
searchers with regards to gender differences in risk taking related to financial and investment
decision-making. To that effect, the review resorts to findings from both experimental, and
traditional economics.
More specifically, in experimental economics, a plethora of laboratory experiments mea-
suring gender differences in financial risk taking are encountered, where the tools invoked to
elicit financial risk preferences vary from lotteries presented to subjects to real and hypothet-
ical gambles including low and high stakes decisions. In their exemplary 2009 work, Croson
and Gneezy [17], review the experimental literature on gender differences in risk preferences,
social preferences, and competitive preferences, and they report strong evidence that women
are more risk averse than men. The authors also go one step further by suggesting a list
of possible mechanisms behind the literature’s findings, including attributions to emotions,
overconfidence, and framing.
In traditional economics, there are several works examining gender differences in financial
risk, with mixed results in terms of differences between female and male investors. Below,
11
several earlier works from the 1990s along with more latest ones are briefly presented.
For instance, Bajtelsmit and VanDerhei [9] worked with a sample of 20,000 management-
level employees from data provided by a large pension plan sponsor from 1993. The employees
had the choice to direct their pension contributions to “employer stock”, “a diversified equity
portfolio”, “a government bond portfolio”, “a social choice equity funds”, or “a guaranteed
interest fund”. The authors found significant evidence that women were more likely to choose
the “guaranteed interest” fund, while men were more likely to choose “employer stock”.
Hinz et al. [29] worked with data from the federal government’s Thrift Savings Plan, and
reported evidence that a large percentage of women invested in the minimum-risk portfolio
available to them, along with evidence that married women also invested less in common
stock than married men.
Jianakoplos and Bernasek [30], in a work of vital role for the purposes of the current essay,
employed data from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) for 1989, and
found that single women are relatively more risk averse than single men and married couples.
Further, JB reported that the portfolio proportion held in risky assets was found to increase
with wealth for all household types, implying decreasing relative risk aversion but the effect
was significantly smaller for single women than for single men and married couples.
Sundén and Surette [48] worked with data from the 1992 and 1995 Survey of Consumer
Finances and examined whether workers differ systematically by gender in the allocation of
assets in defined contribution plans. The authors concluded that gender and marital status
significantly affect how individuals choose to allocate assets in defined contribution plans.
Bajtelsmit [6] employed data from the Health and Retirement Study, a nationally rep-
resentative survey of households with at least one member aged 53-63 in 1994. The author
found among others that while all individuals exhibited decreasing relative risk aversion, the
relative risk aversion of single women was significantly greater than that of married couples.
Bernasek and Shwiff [12] worked with data from a survey of faculty employed at five
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universities in Colorado. The authors found that single women are more risk averse than
single men, along with evidence of gender differences in risk taking among people who are
either married or cohabitating.
In summary, the consensus in the literature seems to be that women are more risk averse
than men in terms of their risk taking. Nevertheless, despite the substantial evidence about
women’s higher risk aversion, Nelson [40] suggests that this conclusion merits reconsidera-
tion, and further recommends improvements to how economists communicate our research
results. More specifically, after discussing the important difference between drawing conclu-
sions based on statistical inference, and generalization, Nelson employs quantitative measures
such as Cohen’s d, and the Index of Similarity on data from 35 scholarly works from eco-
nomics, finance and decision science, including also works mentioned above, e.g. the Sundén
and Surette [48] and the Bernasek and Shwiff [12] works, and concludes with considerably
more mixed results. Thus, Nelson suggests that economic research and its contributions to
public discourse could be improved with more attention to the quantitative sizes of differ-
ences and similarities (using tools such as Cohen’s d and the Index of Similarity); more care
in the interpretation and communication of results that hold only ‘on average’ and/or are
substantively small; and more attention to issues of context and framing.
Respecting all above works and considerations, the essay approaches gender differences
in risk aversion with a fresh eye, and aspires in obtaining the latest trend in financial risk
taking. The current approach is also vigilant about the aftereffect of the 2007-2008 financial
crisis in the behavior of individual investors considering it as plausible to presume that the
present is different from the past. More specifically, the 2007-2008 financial crisis may have
made people more aware of their vulnerability from their exposure to risk, and more aware
of the need to protect their financial asset holdings against the possibility of a large negative
event.
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2.3 The Essay’s Model
The work follows the econometric model suggested by JB, which in turn is based on the
theoretical framework developed by Friend and Blume [25], and their suggested measure of
relative risk aversion. Below, for the sake of a more accurate presentation, the Friend and
Blume framework is presented first, followed by the presentation of the expanded JB model
and the motivation of the variables included in its specification.
2.3.1 A Theoretical Framework To Measure Risk Aversion
More specifically, working on the grounds of the expected utility theory, Friend and Blume
[25], suggested a model in which, the allocation of an individual’s portfolio between risky
and risk-free assets, in the absence of taxes2, is given by the following relationship:
αk =
[









Here, αk is the proportion of the net worth of investor k placed in the portfolio of risky
assets. E(rm − rf ) is the expected difference between the return on the market portfolio
of risky assets (rm) and the return on the risk-free asset (rf ), and σ
2
m is the variance of




is defined as the market price of risk. Lastly, Ck is Pratt’s measure of relative
risk aversion, where Ck = −U
′′(Wk)×Wk
U ′(Wk)
, and Wk is investor k ’s wealth.
It is noted that in terms of wealth, Friend and Blume [25] (p.903), originally, refer to
investors’ liquid net worth. By net worth, they define the net value of both risky and risk-
2 Friend and Blume also suggest a tax-inclusive version of the model but based on the results by Bellante
and Saba [11] who find that taxes do not significantly affect the results, the without taxes version of
the model is preferred here.
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free assets, while by liquid, they specify that the assets, —both risk-free and risky—, can be
purchased or sold, at no cost, in any quantity. More specifically, Friend and Blume assume
a frictionless capital market, where all assets are acquired for investment purposes, can be
unambiguously dichotomized as risky or risk-free, are infinitely divisible, can be traded with
no transaction costs, and can be sold short with the proceeds available to purchase another
asset (Friend and Blume)[25](p.909).





, equation (2.1) could
be used to estimate the coefficient of relative risk aversion. More specifically, assuming that
all investors agree on the value of the market price of risk, “αk provides an estimate of C
−1
k up
to a multiplicative positive constant, so that αk can be used to assess how C
−1
k and, thereby,
how Ck varies with wealth” Friend and Blume [25](p.908). Actually, since the coefficient of
relative risk aversion, Ck is a function of wealth, inferences about the effect of changes in
wealth on Ck can be made by regressing the proportion of risky assets αk on wealth (and
more specifically, on the natural logarithm of wealth).
αk =
[











Regress αk on Wk to make inferences
about how changes in Wk affect Ck :
αk = β0 + β1ln(Wk)
It is noted here that the results are particularly sensitive to the way in which the investor
k ’s wealth, Wk is defined. It is worth repeating that by wealth, the liquid net worth of the
investor or the net value of both risky and risk-free assets is implied. Due to the assumed (by
the Friend and Blume model) indivisibility and transactability of assets, and the investment
purposes of their acquisition, this very narrow definition of wealth is justified, although it
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excludes two significant sources of investors’ wealth, namely their residential housing wealth,
and their human capital wealth. Friend and Blume, in their 1975 model acknowledged
the importance of these two latter kinds of wealth in the demand for risky assets, and
they enhanced their model to account for the nonmarketability of human capital. More
specifically, in their study, they constructed three different types of balance sheets: the first
type included all assets and associated liabilities with the exception of human wealth and
homes; the second included homes but human wealth; and the third included both homes
and an estimate of human wealth Friend and Blume [25](p.906).
2.3.2 The JB Econometric Model
In the literature measuring financial relative risk aversion, a significant number of works
follows the Friend and Blume [25] framework (presented above), with risk aversion being
manifested in the form of the proportion of households’ wealth invested in risky assets, and
relative risk aversion being interpreted as the wealth elasticity of the marginal utility of
wealth [25] (p.900).
In the majority of those works, several extensions of the Friend and Blume framework
are offered where a gamut of individual characteristics of the investors affecting financial
risk taking are controlled, varying from age and education to marital status and race. The
reported empirical evidence regarding relative risk aversion depend on nuances of definitions
of wealth with regards to the inclusion or exclusion of housing wealth, as well as the inclusion
or exclusion of human capital in the determination of wealth. Paths of decreasing relative risk
aversion (DRRA), as well as increasing (IRRA) or constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
are documented, similarly to the wealth definition sensitive original results by Friend and
Blume. In this stream of research, among others, are found the exemplary works of Morin
and Suarez [38], Bellante and Saba [11], Siegel and Hoban [47], Riley Jr and Chow [43], and
Schooley and Worden [46].
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Basing their work on the Friend and Blume theoretical framework, and in accordance
with the other researchers’ work, JB expanded the Friend and Blume model so as to control
for other economic and demographic variables, which may influence the portfolio allocation.
More specifically, their empirical representation, for any investor k, takes the following form:












RATIO is the ratio of risky assets to WEALTH (or αk from the Friend and Blume theo-
retical model).
WEALTH is the liquid net worth of the investor, i.e. the sum of the net value of risky
and risk-free assets.
RACE is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent is black and zero otherwise.
JB follow a very rough categorization here, while given the availability of information, it is
considered that they refer to the race of the designated respondent.
KIDS is the number of people 18 years or younger in the household. Apart from children,
JB are also allowing for the presence of grandchildren, younger brothers or sisters, nieces,
nephews, as well as other young people who may be dependents in a household.
HOMEOWNER is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the respondent is home-
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owner. JB do not provide further information in the construction of the variable, neverthe-
less, the SCF documentation is followed here, [15], (p.4, footnote 12) in that “a family is
considered a homeowner if at least one person in the family owns at least some part of the
family’s primary residence”.
HUMAN is the ratio of Human Capital to WEALTH. Human Capital is estimated by
assuming that wage, salary, and self-employment earnings of the household, for the SCF
year of consideration, continue until retirement. In terms of the latter, following Friend and
Blume [25](p.907), if the head of household is under 65, retirement is assumed at age 65.
If the head of household is working and aged 66 through 69, retirement is assumed in four
years; if aged 70 through 74, retirement is assumed in three years; if aged 75 through 79,
retirement is assumed in two years; and if over 79, retirement is assumed in one year. Earn-
ings are calculated separately for each spouse and are summed for married couples, while the
present discounted value of this earnings stream till retirement using a 2% discount rate (a
rate closely following the long-run growth rate of real GDP) is used as an estimate of human
capital.
AGE is a set of dummy variables indicating into which of ten age categories the house-
hold head falls. The constructed age categories are the following ones: Less than 25, 26-30,
31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46-50, 51-55, 56-60, 61-65, and Over 65.
WORK is a set of dummy variables indicating five categories of labor force status of the
household head. Following the JB classifications, the household head can be categorized as
Self-employed, as Employed by Others, as Retired, as Farmer, or finally, as Unemployed or
Not in the Labor Force.
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EDUCATION is a set of dummy variables indicating which of five levels of educational
attainment the household head has reached with the levels being related to years of school-
ing, as well as the acquisition of a diploma or a college degree, namely: Grade School or less
(6 years or less), Some High School (7 to 12 years), High School Degree, Some College, and
College Graduate (more than 16 years).
The presentation of the econometric model closes with a reference to the components of
wealth3 namely the net value of risky and risk-free assets. In terms of risky and risk-free
assets, a delicate issue arises in the available assets’ split, since the boundaries between the
two categories are not always sharply defined. Based on the 1989 SCF (the version of the
database used by JB), the JB classifications are given below.
More specifically, JB classify as risk-free assets: “dollar balances in checking accounts,
savings, and money market accounts, certificates of deposit, U.S. savings bonds, IRA bal-
ances invested in certificates of deposit or bank accounts, and the cash value of life insurance
less policy loans outstanding” [30] (p.623). Further, JB classify as risky assets: “the sum of
balances in IRAs not invested in bank deposits, stock holdings less margin loans outstanding,
bonds, trust assets, the net value of real estate owned other than residential housing, the
net value of business owned, and the net value of other miscellaneous assets (e.g. precious
metal, futures contracts, art work) reported by the household” [30] (p.623).
3 It is noted that JB adhere to the original definition of wealth by Friend and Blume, namely that
excluding residential real estate and human capital since as they document “it is unclear the extent
to which houses are owned for investment purposes in addition to consumption purposes and human
capital is certainly not infinitely divisible” Jianakoplos and Bernasek [30](p.623). Nevertheless, they
also acknowledge that holdings of residential real estate and human capital influence the allocation of
the remaining wealth of the investors between risky and risk-free assets. Thus, they include measures
of these assets as the explanatory variables, HOMEOWNER, and HUMAN in the estimating equation.
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2.4 Data
As already mentioned, the analysis is based on the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).
Before proceeding with the empirical work, several technical, and methodological concerns
underlying the data to be used need to be addressed, and subsequently accounted for. To
that effect, an Appendix dedicated to the SCF, Appendix A, is provided, while here the
major concerns affecting the empirical study are briefly presented.
More specifically, for the purposes of the analysis, both simple statistics, such as means
and medians, as well as more complex statistics, related to regressions have to be estimated.
In all computations, there are two specific kinds of errors that need to be considered in the
analysis: in particular, any possible sample variability error, and any possible imputation
error need to be accounted for.
The sample variability error is attributed to the fact that the SCF sample is not an
equal-probability design 4. To account for any sample variability error, the simple descrip-
tive statistics reported in the work such as means and medians will be sample-weighted.
Kennickell [32] (p.13) suggests that “weights are intended to compensate for unequal prob-
abilities of selection in the original design and for unit nonresponse”. With regards to more
complex statistics related to regressions, the multivariate analyses of the current work will
be also using sample weights. The use of sample weights in multivariate analyses has been
the approach of choice in the majority of works in the literature employing the SCF5. It is
worth reporting however, that there are researchers characterizing weighting in multivariate
analyses as controversial Lindamood et al. [34]; Deaton [20] (p.66) comments that “weight-
ing regression analyses when the weights are endogenous is suspect for hypothesis testing”,
and in this spirit, Deaton [20] (p.72), and Lindamood et al. [34] (p.212) suggest that the
4 The sampling procedure of the SCF is given analytically in Appendix A.1
5 With the exception of Lindamood et al. [34] the author’s literature review has not encountered any
work reporting an unweighted analysis
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multivariate analyses should be conducted both with and without sample weights. In the
current work, there is no suggestion that the SCF weights might be endogenous, hence all
multivariate analyses will be using sample weights.
Furthermore, in the multivariate analyses, the effects of possible imputation error on the
standard errors of the estimates will be accounted for. The imputation error is attributed
to the fact that missing or incomplete information in the SCF is imputed in multiple ways
6. To correct any possible imputation error, data from all five implicates provided by the
SCF will be used, employing the “repeated-imputation inference” (RII) technique, described
analytically in Rubin [44], and given from a user’s point of view in Montalto and Sung [36].
Lastly, methodologically, it is worth mentioning that given the inability to determine the
nature (either joint or individual) of financial decision-making in couples (either married or
living together as partners), and subsequently the gender of the investment decision-maker(s)
in the cases of couples, JB’s and other researchers’ approach (Embrey and Fox [23]) is shared
in that the most direct test of gender differences in portfolio allocation is between households
headed by never married females, and households headed by never married males.
2.4.1 The 1989 SCF and the 2013 SCF
For the purposes of the project, the 1989 SCF, and the most recent 2013 SCF are employed.
The 1989 SCF surveyed 3,143 households, while the 2013 SCF surveyed 6,015 households.
Below, the sample frequencies of households by marital status in each of the two surveys is
given.
6 The imputation procedure is given analytically in Appendix A.3
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Table 2.1: Sample Frequencies of Households by Marital Status
Marital Status 1989 SCF 2013 SCF
Married 2,067 65.77% 3,278 54.50%
Living with a partner 69 2.20% 491 8.16%
Separated 92 2.93% 180 2.99%
Divorced 332 10.56% 762 12.67%
Widowed 313 9.96% 431 7.17%
Never Married 262 8.34% 873 14.51%
Married but spouse in institution (nursing home/jail) 6 0.19% n/a n/a
Married but spouse not current resident of HU 2 0.06% n/a n/a
Total 3,143 6,015
In continuation of the above analysis regarding the gender of the decision maker, and the
work’s focus on never married, single-person households, it is noted from Table 2.1 that for
the 1989 SCF, the sample sizes of these subgroups are too small to allow for valid inferences.
Hence, the JB approach is followed which considers as single people not only never married
but also widowed and divorced individuals. The concern of the extent to which the latter
categories could be dealt as singles is a legitimate one, nevertheless given the considered single
nature of the decision maker for the widowed and divorced individuals, the assumption is
considered as safe one7. It is noted that for the 2013 SCF, the sample sizes of the subgroups
of never married households are bigger but for the sake of direct comparison between 1989
behavior and 2013 behavior, the same consideration of single people is followed.
7 JB themselves acknowledge the issue of the extent to which widows and/or divorced women, for instance,
continue the investment strategies begun by their late or ex-husbands but still, they allow for biased
results against finding any gender differences in financial risk taking.
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Below, the table of descriptive statistics given by JB in page 621 of their work for the 1989
SCF is replicated and the replication exercise is complemented, by deriving the corresponding
statistics for the 2013 SCF. All computations are mirroring to the best possible extent the
definitions, and sample descriptions given by JB. It is worth referring that JB work separately,
for three different household types, namely for single women, for single men, and for married
couples. Furthermore, they report weighted statistics, while they include only households
with WEALTH greater than $1,000 in all their samples. In the table that follows, the column
“JB” reports the original results for JB (for comparison purposes), while the columns “EK”
report the author’s replication results for 1989, and the corresponding results for 2013,
respectively.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics By Household Type
Descriptive Statistics by Household Type for Households with WEALTH Exceeding $1,000
JB: JB results, EK: replication for 1989, and 2013 results with RII techniques used on WEIGHTED data
Single Women Single Men Married Couples
JB EK EK JB EK EK JB EK EK
1989 1989 2013 1989 1989 2013 1989 1989 2013
RATIO 0.40 0.31 0.82 0.46 0.38 0.82 0.50 0.40 0.76
(Ratio of Risky Assets to WEALTH)
Human Capital
209,382 201,177 280,292 427,614 436,421 484,464 725,059 714,072 1,082,672
HUMAN 31.7 38.5 9.4 59.3 62.5 11.8 63.2 74.2 19.7
(Ratio of Human Capital to WEALTH)
WEALTH
Mean 67,298 59,697 106,249 121,652 106,070 219,339 202,519 199,747 440,342
Med. 18,750 13,510 23,275 17,200 12,350 24,587 32,050 27.580 41,219
AGE
(Head of Household Age Category):
≤25 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.04
26-30 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.15 0.16 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.07
31-35 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.13 0.10
36-40 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.14 0.14 0.06 0.15 0.13 0.10
41-45 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.12 0.10
46-50 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.10
51-55 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11
56-60 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.10
61-65 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.09
>65 0.39 0.39 0.34 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.18
WORK
(Labor Force Status of Household Head):
SEmp 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.12
Emp 0.51 0.52 0.48 0.54 0.55 0.51 0.61 0.61 0.60
Ret 0.25 0.25 0.28 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18
Farm 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01
Unmp 0.17 0.16 0.19 0.12 0.12 0.19 0.05 0.04 0.09
EDUCATION
(Head of Household, Years of Schooling):
≤GS 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
≤HS 0.18 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.08 0.18 0.16 0.08
HS 0.33 0.35 0.32 0.19 0.19 0.30 0.29 0.31 0.31
< College 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.19 0.23 0.20 0.16 0.16
≥ College 0.25 0.29 0.34 0.37 0.42 0.37 0.30 0.35 0.42
RACE 0.12 0.13 0.25 0.06 0.06 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.09
KIDS 0.28 0.25 0.48 0.17 0.04 0.11 1.04 0.94 0.90
HOMEOWNER 0.60 0.63 0.56 0.46 0.51 0.47 0.77 0.85 0.76
Observations 384 376 1,251 230 228 813 1,980 1,902 3,762
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2.5 Econometric Techniques: Tobit Regression(s) &
RII techniques
In the estimation of the econometric model, RATIO can only take values between zero and
one. More specifically, in the 1989 SCF, 25% of the sample has RATIO equal to zero and 1%
of the sample has RATIO equal to 1, and in the 2013 SCF, 28% of the sample has RATIO
equal to zero and 1% of the sample has RATIO equal to 1. Hence, a maximum likelihood
tobit regression procedure is used for the estimations, which allows for both an upper and
lower bound on the dependent variable.
It is worth noting that in previous research, the natural logarithm of RATIO has been
used as the dependent variable. However, such a specification would force one to exclude
households with no risky assets, hence, the use of the level of the variable RATIO as the
dependent variable is preferred.
Further, despite the nonlinear nature of the specification, RII techniques are used to
produce the estimates. More specifically, following the analysis by Montalto and Yuh [37]
(p.100), which in turn follows Rubin [44], the tobit regression analysis is conducted on each of
the five implicates separately, and the results obtained independently from the five separate
implicates are combined to obtain the RII estimates8.
Further, following JB, equation (2.2) is also estimated jointly for single women and single
8 The best estimate of every nonlinear regression coefficient is the average of the results from the five
implicates (m=5) where Qi is a 1xk vector, Qm =
∑i=m
i=1 Qi
m . The within imputation variance is the
average of the variance-covariance matrices from the five implicates where Ui is a kxk matrix, Um =∑i=m
i=1 Ui
m . The between imputation variance is the sample variance in the estimates of Qi from the five




m−1 . The total variance-covariance matrix is
given by Tm = Qm + (1 +m
−1)Bm. A Wald chi-squared statistic is used to test whether each estimated
coefficient is significantly different from zero Maddala and Lahiri [35] (pp. 120-124). The Wald chi-
squared statistic can be computed by dividing the squared parameter estimate by its variance estimate.
The Wald chi-squared statistic for testing an individual coefficient is distributed chi-square with one
degree of freedom. χ2 = (Qm)
2
Tm
. The Lee and Montalto SAS code for the RII estimation provided at
http://hec.osu.edu/people/shanna/scf/riir.htm is also employed in the current analysis.
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men including a dummy variable FEMALE, which equals one for single women, interacted
with each explanatory variable in a model of the following form:
RATIOk = β0 + δ0 ∗ FEMALE + β1FEMALE ∗ lnWEALTHk
+ β2FEMALE ∗RACEk + β3FEMALE ∗KIDSk
+ β4FEMALE ∗HOMEOWNERk












This is done in order to ascertain which coefficients are statistically different between single
women and single men. The coefficients found to be significantly different by gender in
this manner are indicated in the results, and the same exercise is also conducted for single
women, and married couples. It is noted that in these two joint specifications, with the
FEMALE dummy variable interacted with each explanatory variable, Wald tests adjusted
so as to account for the use of sample weights are performed in order to examine whether the
estimated equations are significantly different, first, between single women and single men,
and second, between single women, and married couples.
The above process is implemented separately for both the 1989 SCF, and the 2013 SCF.
As a supplementary exercise, the surveys of 1989 and 2013 are pooled into one cross section,
and by adding a time interaction, the process is repeated. In particular, and with reference
to equation (2.2), in order to reflect the fact that the US population may have different
distributions in 1989, and in 2013, the intercept is allowed to differ across time, by including
a year dummy variable, variable y13, that is equal to one for the observations coming from
the 2013 SCF, and zero for the observations coming from the 1989 SCF (1989 is the base
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year). Further, the year dummy variable is also interacted with lnWEALTH in the variable
y13*lnWEALTH to see if the effect of lnWEALTH has changed over time. More specifically,
the econometric model transforms as following:
(2.4)
RATIOk = β0 + δ0y13k + β1lnWEALTHk + δ1y13k ∗ lnWEALTHk











In the above model, the intercept for 1989 is β0, while the intercept for 2013 is β0 + δ0.
Further, the effect of lnWEALTH for 1989 is β1, while the effect for 2013 is β1 + δ1. Since
the focus is on relative risk aversion, the effect of the other explanatory variables is assumed
to have remained constant from 1989 to 20139. Moreover, because wealth is expressed in
a logarithmic form, and a dummy variable is used to account for time, there is no need to
turn nominal wealth into real wealth10. Further, because, it is also possible that the error
variance changes over time, heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, and test statistics are
employed.
9 This is an admittedly testable assumption investigated properly in the implementation part.
10 An idea also explored in Wooldridge (pp. 405-406) [51].
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2.6 Empirical Results
The analysis proceeds with the presentation of the empirical results. The analysis consists
of two parts. The first part presents the results of the replication exercise of the JB work for
the Survey of Consumer Finances of 1989, as well as the results of running the JB model on
the most recent Survey of Consumer Finances of 2013, with the two data sets being treated
as two independent cross-sections. The second part presents the results of estimating the JB
model after pooling the two independent cross-sections from 1989 and 2013, and adding the
time interaction.
2.6.1 Empirical Results I: Replication and New Results
The results of the Tobit estimations for the replication exercise for the 1989 SCF, and the
new exercise for the 2013 SCF are given in Table 2.3. For comparison purposes, the table
also includes the original JB results for the 1989 SCF. With regards to the dummy variables
of the model, it is noted that following JB, the omitted group for AGE are those less than
25, the omitted group for WORK are the self-employed ones, and the omitted group for
EDUCATION are those with 6 years or less of schooling.
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Table 2.3: Weighted Regression Results with RII techniques.
WEIGHTED Tobit Regression Results with Dependent Variable RATIO JB: JB results, EK:replication for 1989, and 2013 results
Single Women Single Men Married Couples
JB EK EK JB EK EK JB EK EK
1989 1989 2013 1989 1989 2013 1989 1989 2013
lnWEALTH 0.117*** 0.118*** -0.087*** 0.170***† 0.184***† -0.045***† 0.128*** 0.133*** -0.004†
(0.009) (0.028) (0.011) (0.010) (0.029) (0.011) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004)
AGE 26-30 0.044 -0.141 -0.038* -0.137***† -0.052 -0.036† 0.004† -0.090 -0.036*
(0.079) (0.342) (0.027) (0.047) (0.175) (0.029) (0.033) (0.150) (0.023)
AGE 31-35 0.127** 0.013 -0.001 -0.342***† -0.370** 0.022 -0.090***† -0.174 -0.050**†
(0.063) (0.204) (0.028) (0.059) (0.181) (0.030) (0.032) (0.155) (0.022)
AGE 36-40 0.381*** 0.179 0.016 -0.263***† -0.228† 0.062* -0.014† -0.100† -0.063**†
(0.066) (0.223) (0.025) (0.049) (0.163) (0.037) (0.032) (0.151) (0.024)
AGE 41-45 0.241*** 0.163 0.002 -0.252***† -0.248† 0.032 0.018† -0.062 -0.050**†
(0.062) (0.220) (0.026) (0.059) (0.190) (0.035) (0.032) (0.152) (0.023)
AGE 46-50 0.325*** 0.269 -0.011 -0.295***† -0.446***† 0.042 -0.055*† -0.086† -0.080***†
(0.066) (0.217) (0.031) (0.078) (0.180) (0.030) (0.034) (0.154) (0.023)
AGE 51-55 0.130** 0.017 0.008 -0.350***† -0.475***† 0.002 -0.059*† -0.154 -0.019
(0.064) (0.221) (0.029) (0.074) (0.177) (0.037) (0.033) (0.146) (0.023)
AGE 56-60 0.065 -0.020 -0.018 -0.322***† -0.301 -0.018 -0.078**† -0.131 -0.045**
(0.065) (0.216) (0.030) (0.065) (0.216) (0.041) (0.035) (0.151) (0.024)
AGE 61-65 0.250*** -0.014 0.035 -0.540***† -0.594**† -0.012 0.015† -0.060 -0.034†
(0.066) (0.223) (0.031) (0.077) (0.254) (0.048) (0.036) (0.157) (0.026)
Over 65 -0.232*** -0.316* -0.050* -0.668***† -0.545** -0.023 -0.122*** -0.198 -0.049
(0.061) (0.208) (0.033) (0.069) (0.252) (0.048) (0.035) (0.156) (0.029)
EmpByOth -0.262*** -0.418*** -0.183*** -0.113*** -0.175† -0.069*† -0.069***† -0.171***† -0.127***†
(0.044) (0.118) (0.033) (0.043) (0.125) (0.041) (0.013) (0.040) (0.014)
Retired -0.181*** -0.212* -0.182** -0.040 -0.209 -0.136*** -0.241***† -0.312*** -0.158***
(0.049) (0.150) (0.037) (0.057) (0.196) (0.054) (0.019) (0.065) (0.024)
Farmer -0.431*** -0.251* 0.188* 0.120† -0.020† 0.164*** 0.065**† 0.108† 0.070**
(0.165) (0.199) (0.117) (0.108***) (0.138) (0.040) (0.030) (0.042) (0.032)
Unemp/NotLF -0.395*** -0.342** -0.113* -0.222*** -0.152 0.003† -0.032† -0.123 -0.031*†
(0.051) (0.149) (0.035) (0.053) (0.164) (0.044) (0.023) (0.103) (0.020)
Some HS -0.310*** -0.187 -0.030 -0.300*** 0.040 -0.095 0.000† 0.039 -0.028
(0.066) (0.336) (0.082) (0.067) (0.204) (0.086) (0.029) (0.134) (0.030)
HS Degree -0.336*** -0.016 -0.055 -0.274*** 0.041 -0.143* -0.014† 0.023 -0.109***
(0.064) (0.326) (0.081) (0.067) (0.220) (0.082) (0.029) (0.133) (0.027)
Some Col. -0.254*** 0.007 -0.080 0.325***† -0.039 -0.155** -0.037† 0.031 -0.152***
(0.067) (0.328) (0.082) (0.070) (0.232) (0.082) (0.029) (0.136) (0.029)
Col. Grad -0.339*** 0.091 -0.091 -0.244*** -0.048 -0.221*** -0.002† 0.025 -0.199***
(0.067) (0.328) (0.082) (0.068) (0.221) (0.082) (0.029) (0.134) (0.028)
RACE 0.154*** 0.142* 0.027* -0.024† -0.078 0.042* -0.065***† -0.130*† 0.028**
(0.035) (0.118) (0.015) (0.066) (0.145) (0.024) (0.019) (0.076) (0.016)
KIDS -0.030* -0.007 0.031*** 0.034† 0.122 -0.001† 0.013***† 0.022 0.021***†
(0.016) (0.047) (0.006) (0.027) (0.110) (0.022) (0.004) (0.019) (0.004)
HOMEOWN -0.068*** -0.046 -0.066*** 0.070**† 0.012 -0.048** -0.037***† -0.072 -0.086***
(0.024) (0.071) (0.015) (0.031) (0.074) (0.021) (0.011) (0.053) (0.011)
HUMAN -0.002*** -0.002 0.0001 -0.000† 0.0002 0.0001 -0.000***† -0.0004** 0.0001
(.000) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
constant -0.244** -0.507 2.021*** -0.668***† -1.073 1.569 -0.704***† -0.746*** 1.158***
(0.121) (0.473) (0.141) (0.126) (0.338) (0.151) (0.054) (0.229) (0.056)
Sigma Hat 0.415 0.463 0.217 0.401 0.398 0.225 0.398 0.438 0.242
Observations 384 376 1,251 230 228 813 1,980 1,902 3,762
LeftCensored 123 149 0 65 57 0 450 376 0
RightCensored 2 2 134 6 4 80 17 6 139
Omitted Categories for Dummy Variables: Less than 25 for AGE, Self-employed for WORK, Grade School or less for EDUCATION.
***Significantly different from zero at the 1% significance level. **Significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level.
*Significantly different from zero at the 10% significance level.
†Significantly different from the single-female coefficients at the 10% significance level or lower.
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Comments on the Replication Results for the 1989 SCF
In terms of the replication exercise for the 1989 SCF, the most noteworthy points are the
following ones. First, and as shown in Table 2.3, all standard errors derived with RII
techniques are higher, leading to generally more “stringent” statistics. Further, the Wald test
corroborates that the estimated equations are significantly different between single women
and single men, as well as between single women and married couples.
In an effort to investigate the replication results of the estimated equations, the predicted
RATIO of the Tobit model, computed at the mean values of all three household types is given
in the following table. More specifically, the conditional mean for the RATIO, ̂RATIO|x
given by the following relationship11
(2.5)Φ(x̄β̂/σ̂)x̄β̂ + σ̂φ(x̄β̂/σ̂)
is estimated at the mean values of the corresponding samples, employing information from
Table 2.2, and Table 2.3.
Table 2.4: Evaluation of ̂RATIO|x at the means of the corresponding samples
Single Women Single Men Married Couples
JB EK JB EK JB EK
1989 1989 1989 1989 1989 1989
0.46 0.36 0.85 0.63 0.70 0.56
The above results indicate numerical discrepancies in the predicted results of the original
and replication models, which are attributed to the use of RII techniques in the replication
exercise. Nevertheless, the qualitative pattern of the result of single women taking fewer
financial risks than both single men, and married couples is retained in the computational
deviations of the replication model.
11 Greene [26], Chapter 19, p.849.
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With regards to the estimated coefficients, the observation of the replicated results in-
dicates that to a great extent, the signs, and magnitudes of the coefficients are largely
replicated, for all household types, with most prominent here the replication of the results
regarding the coefficient on the natural logarithm of net worth (lnWEALTH). Here, it is
worth repeating that the estimated coefficient on lnWEALTH shows how C−k 1, i.e. the in-
verse of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and thereby Ck, i.e. the coefficient of relative
risk aversion varies with wealth. Hence, a positive coefficient indicates decreasing relative
risk aversion, while a negative coefficient indicates increasing relative risk aversion.
From the results, it is corroborated that all types of households manifest decreasing
relative risk aversion, but when it comes to the comparison between single women, and
single men, relative risk aversion does not decrease as much for single women as for single
men, corroborating the JB result that single women are relatively more risk averse than
single men. From Table 2.3, it is also replicated that there is no significant difference in
relative risk aversion exhibited by married couples versus single females. It is important to
note that in the above approach, the comparison of Ck of men and women is done on the
assumption of the same positive multiplicative constant referred in the Friend and Blume
model for men and women, while it is worth stressing that JB whom we follow here, work
with the estimated coefficient β̂1.
However, given the Tobit specification, if we wish to be more accurate, the partial effect
of lnWEALTH is not simply β̂1 but β̂1Φ(xβ/σ)
12. Nevertheless, this adjustment factor
taking values between zero and one is assumed not to change the results qualitatively. For
instance, by isolating, for all household types, the results from Table 2.3 referring to the
coefficient on lnWEALTH, and taking into account the effect of AGE, EDUCATION, RACE,
KIDS, HOMEOWNERSHIP, HUMAN CAPITAL, and WORK by evaluating the Tobit’s
adjustment factor Φ(xβ/σ), at the mean values of the corresponding samples for all the
12 Greene [26], Chapter 19, p.849.
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aforementioned variables, the following table, Table 2.5 is produced,
Table 2.5: Partial effect of lnWEALTH.
Single Women Single Men Married Couples
JB EK JB EK JB EK
β̂1Φ(x̄β̂/σ̂) 0.099 0.086 0.167 0.173 0.123 0.118
where it is numerically corroborated that all types of households manifest decreasing relative
risk aversion, and that when it comes to the comparison between single women, and single
men, relative risk aversion does not decrease as much for single women as for single men.
Actually, multiplying all coefficients of table 2.3 by the adjustment factor evaluated at the
means of the corresponding samples, the results do not change qualitatively. Thus, all
subsequent commentary, referring to the partial effects of all variables, will be based on the
numerical values and statistical results of Table 2.3.
Moving on with the commentary on the replication results, the interest shifts to the rest
of the explanatory variables of the model. More specifically, with regards to the effect of
AGE, the JB estimates indicated that age had a very different impact on portfolio allocation
for single women versus single men and married households. In particular, for JB, all of the
estimated coefficients associated with the age categories were significantly different for single
women versus single men, and with the exception of the over-65 age group, the same was
the case for the coefficients between single women and married couples. In the replication
exercise, the estimated coefficients for single women versus single men were significantly
different for the 36-40, 41-45, 46-50, 51-55, and 61-65 age groups. Further, the estimated
coefficients for single women versus married couples were significantly different only for the
36-40, 41-45, and 46-50 age groups. Moreover, the categorical variables indicating the age
category were significantly negative for the 31-35, 46-50, 51-55, 61-65 and over-65 age groups
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for single men, indicating that single men in the aforementioned age categories take fewer
financial risks than the less-25 aged single men, the omitted category. Correspondingly, for
single women, only the over-65 was indicated in the replication exercise as taking significantly
fewer financial risks than the omitted category of the less-25 age group.
With regards to the effect of WORK, it is replicated that the categorical variables indi-
cating labor force status are all significantly negative for single women, implying that single
women in all categories take fewer financial risks than self-employed women, the omitted
category. For single men, the corresponding coefficients are all negative but none of them is
significantly negative. The replication exercise further reveals that not only single females
categorized as farmers but also single females categorized as employed by others have a sig-
nificantly different portfolio allocation than single males based on labor force status, and
holding all other factors fixed. Further, in contrast with JB, for whom all labor-force-status
coefficients for married couples are significantly different from those of single women, in the
replication, this is the case only for the married couples where the household head is charac-
terized as employed by others or as farmer; it is replicated though that there is no consistent
pattern of differences in predicted portfolios of married couples versus single women.
With regards to the effect of EDUCATION, the replication does not fully agree with
the original JB results. More specifically, for JB, single women and single men with less
than a sixth grade education (the omitted category of their computations) are predicted to
hold portfolios with much greater percentages of risky assets, compared with those having
more education, holding other factors fixed. In the replication, this result is corroborated
for single women with 7-12 years of schooling, and for single men with more than 13 years of
schooling; the remaining groups, namely those of single women with more than 13 years of
schooling, and those of single men with 6-12 years of schooling seem to take higher financial
risks than their base groups of peers with less than a sixth grade education; nevertheless,
none of the replicated aforementioned coefficients is statistically significant. Lastly, for every
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level of education, in the replication, married couples are predicted to hold more risky assets
than single women but again, none of these differences are statistically significant.
With regards to the effect of RACE, the replication confirms the original JB result that
single black women are estimated to hold significantly more risky assets than single white
women, and that the reverse is the case for single men and married couples, holding every-
thing else fixed. It is noted, however, that with regards to single men, the replication result
is not significantly significant. Further, it is corroborated that single black women take sig-
nificantly higher risks than married black couples, and that single black women take higher
financial risks than single black men but the latter difference is not significantly significant.
With regards to the effect of KIDS, with the latter implying not only children under
18 in the household but any people under 18, allowing thus for the presence of grandchil-
dren or younger brothers or sisters, or other young people who might be dependents in the
household, the replication exercise corroborates the signs of the original JB results but not
their statistical significance. More specifically, the replication estimates indicate that as the
number of young dependents in a household increases, the proportion of risky assets held
stays unaffected for all household types, holding everything else constant, in contrast to the
JB results that indicated the proportion of risky assets to significantly decrease for single
women, to stay unaffected for single men, and to significantly increase for married couples,
holding everything else constant.
With regards to the effect of human capital, the original JB results indicated that the
greater the value of human capital relative to wealth, the smaller the proportion of risky
assets held for all household types, holding everything else fixed. This effect was found to be
statistically significant, and to differ for single women versus single men and married couples
but quantitatively was found to be a small one. The replication exercise derived the small
quantitative effect of the variable but statistically, with the exception of the case of married
couples, the effect was not found to be significant neither for single women nor for single
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men.
Lastly, with regards to the effect of homeownership, for the original JB work, the impact
of the variable was estimated to reduce holdings of risky assets for single women, and married
couples, and to increase them for single men. In the replication exercise, the signs of the
above relationships were derived but they were not statistically significant. In general, it is
noted that this inability to replicate the statistical significance of variables such as the ones
of HOMEWONERSHIP or KIDS from the previous analysis is attributed to the use of RII
techniques for the replication, while it is worth commenting that the effect of those variables
was quantitatively a very small one, in the first place, in the original JB work.
Comments on the new Results for the 2013 SCF
In terms of the 2013 results, it is first noted that the Wald test indicates that the estimated
equations are significantly different between single women and married couples but not be-
tween single women and single men. However, although the estimated equations between
single women and single men are not found to be significantly different, the coefficient on
lnWEALTH is found to be statistically different between single women and single men. In
particular, by isolating, for all household types, the results from Table 2.3 referring to the
coefficient on lnWEALTH13, and controlling for the effect of AGE, EDUCATION, RACE,
KIDS, HOMEOWNERSHIP, HUMAN CAPITAL, and WORK, the analysis shows an in-
teresting turn in the behavior of all types of households toward risk. More specifically, the
negative coefficients on lnWEALTH indicate a pattern of increasing relative risk aversion, a
reverse behavior from that of 1989. This is prominent in the case of single women but in the
case of single men, and married couples, since the negative coefficients are not statistically
13 The exercise of multiplying all coefficients from the 2013 results by Tobit’s adjustment factor Φ(xβ/σ)
evaluated at the mean values of the corresponding samples was repeated, and did not change qualita-
tively the results of the estimates displayed in the table. Hence, the numerical values, and statistical
significance results of Table 2.3 referring to 2013 are retained for the commentary for 2013.
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significantly different from zero, one could refer constant relative risk aversion. Still though,
the 2013 analysis indicates that in contrast to the 1989 behavior, holding all other factors
constant, all types of households decrease or keep constant their proportion of wealth held
in risky assets, as their wealth increases.
Further, the estimated coefficient on lnWEALTH for single women is significantly larger
in absolute terms than that for single men, which indicates that single women are increasing
their relative risk aversion by more14 than single men. Thus, while both single men and
single women exhibit increasing relative risk aversion, single women do so to a higher degree.
There is also a significant difference found in the relative risk aversion exhibited by married
couples versus single women, although in the lack of information of the gender of the financial
decision maker in married households, no conclusive results may be inferred.
Moving on with the commentary on the rest of the explanatory variables, the interest
shifts to the effect of AGE for the dataset of 2013. More specifically, with regards to the
age effect, it is first noted that with the exception of the 26-30 year old cohort, all other
estimated coefficients associated with the rest of the age categories are not significantly
different between single women and single men. Further, only the coefficients associated
with the 31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46-50, and 61-65 age groups are significantly different between
single women and married couples. Moreover, when it comes to single women, the effect
of most age categories seems to leave unaffected their proportion of risky assets, with the
exception of the 26-30 and over-65 age cohorts who are estimated to take significantly fewer
risks than the omitted category of the less-than-25 years old cohort. When it comes to single
men, again, age is estimated to leave unaffected their risky portfolio, with the exception of
the 36-40 age cohort who are estimated to take higher financial risks than their base group
of the less-than-25 years old peers. Lastly, married couples with the exception of the 51-55,
14 Once again, the assumption of the same positive multiplicative constant governing women and men
with regards to the Friend and Blume model is employed.
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61-65, and over-65 age groups whose age does not influence their risky holdings, the rest age
groups are estimated to take significantly fewer financial risks than the base group of the
less-than-25 years old couples.
With regards to the effect of WORK and the labor force status of the head of the
household in 2013, the following points are noted. First, with the exception of single women
categorized as farmers who are estimated to take significantly higher financial risks than
their base group of self-employed single women, the rest of the coefficients indicating labor
force status for single women are significantly negative, implying that single women in all
but farmers categories take fewer financial risks than the omitted category of their self-
employed peers, holding all other factors fixed. The above pattern is also repeated in the
case of married couples. At the same time, single men categorized as employed by others
and as retired are estimated to take significantly fewer risks than single men categorized as
self-employed, while single men categorized as farmers are estimated to take significantly
higher financial risks than self-employed single men. Lastly, being unemployed seems to
leave unaffected single men’s portfolio allocation. It is worth noting that only single females
categorized as employed by others and unemployed have a significantly different portfolio
allocation than single males, while the same coefficients are significantly different for single
women versus married couples.
With regards to the effect of EDUCATION, and the years of schooling of the head of the
household for 2013, all levels of education are estimated to leave unaffected risky holdings for
single women, holding all other factors constant. For single men, with the exception of the
6-12 years of schooling category that leaves unaffected single men’s portfolio allocation, for
all other levels of education, single men are predicted to hold significantly fewer risky assets
than the omitted category of single men with less than a sixth grade education. For married
couples, with the exception of the college graduates category, who are estimated to take
significantly higher financial risks than their peers with less than a sixth grade education,
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married couples with any other level of education are estimated to take significantly fewer
financial risks than the omitted category of married couples with less than a sixth grade
education. It is lastly worth noting that with respect to the differences between single
women, and single men, and single women and married couples, none of the differences is
significantly significant.
With respect to the effect of RACE in the data of 2013, the following things are note-
worthy. First, holding all other factors fixed, race appears to play a similar role in financial
risk taking for all three examined household types. More specifically, the estimates show
that single black women are estimated to take significantly higher financial risks than single
white women with the same behavior being estimated for single men and married couples,
too. This is an interesting finding similar to the one that JB had concluded with in their
1989 results, and which suggests that perhaps black people are more involved in undertaking
financial risks related to investment decisions than white people. It is also noted that there
is no significant difference in the race coefficients between single women and single men, and
the ones between single women, and married couples.
With regards to the effect of the number of people under 18 in the household, this effect
has as following. Holding all other factors constant, as the number of young dependents in
a household increases, the proportion of risky assets held significantly increases for single
women and married couples but remains unaffected for single men. This result reveals a
turn in the behavior of single women for 2013, since single women’s behavior shifts from
significantly decreasing their risk taking to significantly increasing their risk taking in the
presence of a young dependent.
With regards to the effect of HOMEOWNERSHIP, the estimates reveal that for all three
examined household types, being a homeowner is estimated to significantly decrease the
proportion of risky holdings in the household’s portfolio, holding all other factors fixed.
However, the coefficients are not significantly different between single women and single men
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and single women and married couples.
Lastly, with regards to the effect of HUMAN or the value of human capital relative to
wealth, the latter’s change is estimated to leave unaffected the proportion of risky assets.
Actually, the HUMAN coefficient is not statistically significant neither for single women
nor for single men and married couples, while the zero numerical values suggest an almost
negligible quantitative effect.
2.6.2 Empirical Results II: Pooling data from 1989 & 2013
In what follows, the surveys of 1989 and 2013 are pooled into an independently pooled cross
section. The motivation behind this setup is to increase the sample size, and to investigate
the effect of lnWEALTH over time. To that effect, and as already stated in the presentation
of the pooled model in equation (2.4), a year dummy variable, variable y13, that is equal to
one for the observations coming from the 2013 SCF, and zero for the observations coming
from the 1989 SCF is added, and it is further interacted with lnWEALTH.
We mentioned earlier that since the focus is on relative risk aversion, the effect of the
other explanatory variables is assumed to have remained constant from 1989 to 2013. This
assumption is further tested in the specification by adding time interactions with all explana-
tory variables, and performing Wald tests. The results reveal that this is indeed the case for
the rest of the explanatory variables with the exception of the AGE 51-55 age group, and the
Unemployed or Not in the Labor Force work status variables. Thus, since most of the other
slopes do not differ between the two years, pooling is deemed as a good strategy leading to
efficient and more precise estimates. The results are presented in the following table.
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Table 2.6: Tobit Regression Results with RII Techniques on Pooled Data
WEIGHTED Tobit Regression Results with Dependent Variable RATIO on 1989 & 2013 Pooled data
Single Women Single Men Married Couples
lnWEALTH 0.107*** 0.169***† 0.129***
(0.018) (0.022) (0.008)
y13 2.486*** 2.653*** 1.914***†
(0.258) (0.256) (0.094)
y13XlnWEALTH -0.191*** -0.213*** -0.143***†
(0.025) (0.024) (0.008)
AGE 26-30 -0.052 -0.012 -0.040
(0.048) (0.062) (0.044)
AGE 31-35 -0.013 -0.080 -0.078**†
(0.049) (0.062) (0.045)
AGE 36-40 0.053 -0.014 -0.053†
(0.050) (0.064) (0.043)
AGE 41-45 0.030 -0.032 -0.036†
(0.053) (0.060) (0.044)
AGE 46-50 0.047 -0.051† -0.071*†
(0.052) (0.052) (0.042)
AGE 51-55 0.003 -0.093*† -0.050†
(0.049) (0.055) (0.040)
AGE 56-60 -0.028 -0.067 -0.063*
(0.052) (0.061) (0.041)
AGE 61-65 0.006 -0.119**† -0.036
(0.050) (0.065) (0.044)
AGE Over 65 -0.140*** -0.137** -0.086**
(0.051) (0.074) (0.046)
EmpByOth -0.235*** -0.115**† -0.147***†
(0.050) (0.048) (0.018)
Retired -0.178*** -0.156** -0.210***
(0.050) (0.067) (0.027)
Farmer -0.105 0.105* 0.115†
(0.132) (0.074) (0.028)
Unemp/NotLF -0.192*** -0.035† -0.061***†
(0.050) (0.054) (0.027)
Some HS -0.068 -0.035 -0.020
(0.118) (0.090) (0.048)
HS Degree -0.040 -0.047 -0.051
(0.113) (0.086) (0.045)
Some College -0.053 -0.066 -0.076*
(0.113) (0.086) (0.045)
College Grad -0.058 -0.118* -0.110***
(0.113) (0.086) (0.045)
RACE 0.043** 0.016 -0.006†
(0.021) (0.030) (0.019)
KIDS 0.025*** 0.018 0.023***
(0.009) (0.024) (0.007)
HOMEOWNER -0.065*** -0.041* -0.086***
(0.021) (0.026) (0.016)
HUMAN -0.001** 0.000† 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
constant -0.446** -1.098*** -0.673***†
(0.231) (0.244) (0.117)
Sigma hat 0.289 0.289 0.309
Observations 1,632 1,042 5,669
Left-Censored 147 58 386
Right-Censored 136 84 151
Omitted Categories for Dummy Variables: Less than 25 for AGE, Self-employed for WORK, Grade School or less for EDUCATION.
***Significantly different from zero at the 1% significance level. **Significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level.
*Significantly different from zero at the 10% significance level.
†Significantly different from the single-female coefficients at the 10% significance level or lower.
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Comments on the Pooled Results
We remind that the effect of lnWEALTH for 1989, and with reference to equation (2.4) is
β̂1, while the effect of lnWEALTH for 2013 is β̂1 + δ̂1. Hence, after isolating from Table
2.6, the results referring to lnWEALTH, and the interacted variable, y13*lnWEALTH, (that
is controlling for the effect of AGE, EDUCATION, RACE, KIDS, HOMEOWNERSHIP,
HUMAN CAPITAL, and WORK), the resulting effect of lnWEALTH for 2013 is estimated
to be -0.084 for single women, -0.044 for single men, and -0.014 for married couples. All
coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero, and further, they are significantly
different between single women and single men, as well as between single women and married
couples. The resulting estimated coefficients with regards to lnWEALTH indicate increasing
relative risk aversion for all household types, and the significant differences indicate that
single women decrease their proportion of risky assets by significantly more than single men
and married couples implying persisting gender differences for 201315. This is an interesting
finding, especially in the light of the aftereffect of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, suggesting a
disinclination of all types of households towards investment, holding all other factors fixed.
With regards to the effect of the other factors in the pooled model, the following points
are noteworthy. More specifically, with regards to the effect of AGE, with the exception of
the 46-50, 51-55, and over-65 years old cohorts, all other estimated coefficients associated
with the rest of the age categories are not significantly different between single women and
single men. Further, only the coefficients associated with the 31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46-50,
and 61-65 age groups are significantly different between single women and married couples.
Moreover, when it comes to single women, the effect of most age categories seems to leave
unaffected their proportion of risky assets, with the exception of the over-65 age cohort which
is estimated to take significantly fewer risks than the omitted category of the less-than-25
15 Once again, the assumption of the same positive multiplicative constant in the Friend and Blume model
governing women and men is employed here.
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years old cohort. When it comes to single men, again, age is estimated to leave unaffected
their risky portfolio, with the exception of the 51-55, 61-65, and over-65 age cohorts who are
estimated to take significantly fewer financial risks than their base group of the less-than-
25 years old peers. Lastly, married couples with the exception of the 26-30, 36-40, 41-45,
51-55, and 61-65 age groups whose age does not influence their risky holdings, the rest age
groups are estimated to take significantly fewer financial risks than the base group of the
less-than-25 years old couples.
With regards to the effect of WORK, when it comes to single women, with the exception
of single women categorized as farmers, single women categorized in all other labor categories
are estimated to take significantly fewer financial risks than the omitted group of their self-
employed peers. With the exception of the unemployed or not in the labor force category
for single men, the above pattern also governs single men and married couples, that is all
labor categories are estimated to take fewer financial risks than their self-employed peers.
Further, only the coefficients associated with the employed and unemployed or not in the
labor force categories, are significantly different between single women and single men and
single women and married couples.
Another interesting finding is the lack of or negative effect of EDUCATION or years of
schooling on financial risk taking for all three examined household types. JB in their 1989
results had also commented that holding all other factors constant, one might anticipate
more years of schooling to lead to higher risk taking but the opposite proves to be the case
from the estimates. More specifically, for single women, years of schooling have no effect on
their proportion of risky assets, while for single men and married couples, it is noticeable
that being a college graduate translates to taking significantly fewer risks than a peer with
less than a sixth grade education. Still, one might consider that it is financial education, and
not education in general that might lead to higher financial risk taking. Nevertheless, the
finding that a higher education does not instill to individuals the necessity for higher risk so
42
as to secure a higher future return merits investigation.
With regards to the effect of RACE, in the pooled data, race is estimated to play a
significantly positive role for the proportion of risky assets held by single women, while it
is estimated to leave unaffected the proportion of risky assets for single men and married
couples. More specifically, holding all other factors fixed, single black women are estimated
to hold significantly more risky assets than single white women.
With regards to the effect of young dependents below 18 in the household, holding all
other factors fixed, the estimates suggest that both single women and married couples are
estimated to take higher financial risks in the presence of one more young dependent, while
an extra young dependent is not estimated to influence the portfolio allocation of single men,
leaving unaffected their proportion of risky assets.
With regards to the effect of HOMEOWNERSHIP, the estimates suggest that being
a homeowner leads to significantly fewer financial risks for all three considered types of
households. At this point, we remind the narrow definition of wealth employed in the JB
model and followed here, which left out residential wealth and human capital from the
consideration of risky assets. However, perhaps, when it comes to homeownership, these
significantly negative coefficients might indicate that despite the consumption component
of investments in residential housing, owning a primary residence might still be considered
as a risky investment for the households. Thus, the ownership of a home might not leave
much room for more financial risk taking for the households, leading to a decrease in the
proportion of risky assets, holding all other factors fixed.
Lastly with respect to HUMAN or the value of human capital relative to wealth, the
effect might be significantly negative for single women, and significantly positive for mar-
ried couples but overall, the effect of human capital relative to wealth on risky holdings is
quantitatively negligible for all three examined household types.
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2.7 Conclusions, Caveats, and Future Paths
Working within the expected utility theory framework, the first essay investigated the em-
pirical relationship between changes in wealth and relative risk aversion over time for several
household types, with emphasis given on the study of gender differences in the manifestation
of risk aversion. The vehicle of risky choice was households’ investment allocation in risky
assets, while data was used from the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF) for 1989, and 2013. The work was split into two directions: first in the replication of
existing results for the 1989 SCF, and second in the derivation of new results for the most
recent survey of 2013.
For the replication exercise, RII techniques were employed, and the analysis was done on
weighted data. The JB results were corroborated in the multivariate analysis performed on
the weighted 1989 data but the 2013 results brought to the surface a reverse trend in the
financial decision making under uncertainty for all types of households, namely a trend of
either increasing relative risk aversion (for both single women, and single men) or constant
relative risk aversion for married couples, in contradiction to a pattern of decreasing relative
risk aversion for all household types documented in the 1989 results. Still, gender differences
were again detected. The results were corroborated by pooling the data for 1989, and 2013,
and adding a time interaction.
An already mentioned caveat in the analysis, also stressed in the JB original work related
to the inability to specify the gender of the investment decision maker in the case of couples.
Hence, we emphasize that both replication and new results pertain to single women, and
single men, and may not be generalized to all women and men. Further, it is worth men-
tioning that the definition of wealth in the employed model has been based on an arbitrary
split of the assets of the database into risky and risk-free assets, a split from which certain
important asset categories have been omitted, and which would be worth including in future
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computations.
Finally, and in terms of the results, the new paths of increasing and constant relative
risk aversion along with the persistence of gender differences are noteworthy. Regarding the
latter, the policy issue of women’s better financial briefing aiming at a bolder risk taking
in women’s investment strategies, for the sake of the accumulation of adequate retirement
wealth, arises anew. Lastly, the generalized increase in relative risk aversion calls for further
investigation of the motivation of all types of households in terms of their wealth allocation.
Second Essay: Refining an Empirical
Framework to Measure Gender Differ-
ences in Financial Relative Risk Aver-
sion in the U.S. Federal Reserve Board’s
Survey of Consumer Finances
3.1 Introduction
The 1998 work “Are women more risk averse?” [30] by Jianakoplos and Bernasek (JB) is
considered in the field of study of financial decision making under uncertainty, as one of
the first works that explores the role of gender in the manifestation of relative financial risk
aversion.
More specifically, working with data from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF) for 1989, and employing the theoretical framework of Friend and Blume [25]
for the measurement of relative risk aversion, JB found among others that single women
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are relatively more risk averse than single men and married couples. Further, JB reported
that the portfolio proportion held in risky assets was found to increase with wealth for all
household types, implying decreasing relative risk aversion but the effect was significantly
smaller for single women than for single men and married couples.
In the first essay of the dissertation, the JB work was replicated for the 1989 SCF, and
was further repeated and tested on the most recent SCF, that of 2013. In this second essay,
a refinement of the JB model employed in the first essay is attempted. More specifically,
following a thorough study of the Survey of Consumer Finances, and especially of its latest
setup for 2013, and in accordance with other researchers’ approaches, certain limitations of
the JB model are addressed, and an attempt to overcome them follows.
The limitations pertain to “left out” or mishandled categories of assets in the computation
of wealth, and to an erroneous handling and consideration of specific demographic data of
the respondents. To overcome these limitations, the essay performs the following things.
First, the essay proceeds with a broader coverage of assets that takes advantage of the latest
information available in the 2013 SCF and that allows a more nuanced split of the assets
into risk-free and risky ones. Second the essay moves to a more appropriate consideration of
the available demographic information that allows more accurate interpretations.
The contribution of the work lies first in a more inclusive, and up-to-date split of the
assets encountered in the SCF into risk-free, and risky ones. Second, the work with the
subsequent consideration of an elaborate definition of wealth 1 allows the investigation of a
more nuanced risk taking behavior in the households’ portfolios by considering extra assets
such as 401(k)s or other thrift saving accounts. Thus, the innovative feature of the refined
wealth definition lies in the inclusion of assets that help reveal a different financial risk taking
profile of individuals and households related to important decisions such as the one of the
1 Wealth is defined as the net value of risk-free and risky assets. By altering the definitions of risk-free
and risky assets, the definition of wealth also alters.
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accumulation of retirement wealth.
In this frame, the research products of the essay are first a guide to risk-free and risky
assets of the SCF, accompanied by a technical document written from a user’s point of
view describing analytically the derivations of risk-free and risky assets and the subsequent
computation of wealth in the SCF. To the best of the author’s knowledge, the aforementioned
derived guide of risk-free and risky assets as encountered in the SCF is the most complete
guide in the relevant literature. Second and as a supplementary exercise, by employing
the updated wealth definition and after correcting for certain limitations of the original
specification, the essay proceeds with a repeated series of the tests of the original JB work.
More specifically, working with the refined JB specification, gender differences in manifested
relative risk aversion are further investigated. To that effect, the refined JB model is tested
anew on the 1989 SCF, and further on the 2013 SCF, as well as on an independently pooled
cross-section from the 1989 and 2013 SCF.
The structure of the essay has as following. Section 3.2 starts with a reference to existing
considerations of risk-free and risky assets with regards to the SCF and as encountered in
the literature . Section 3.3 proceeds with the essay’s suggested breakup of the SCF’s assets
into risk-free and risky ones, along with a subsequent definition of the household’s wealth.
Section 3.5 proceeds with the consideration of an extended and refined JB model. Section
3.6 proceeds with the empirical results and the new findings of the work with regards to
running anew the JB tests of gender differences on the refined specification. Lastly, Section
3.7 attempts a comparison of the original JB specification to the refined JB specification
by performing the Davidson and MacKinnon [19] (1981) non-nested J test in pursuit of the
most superior specification. Section 3.8 concludes with the recording of the outcomes of the
work, the highlighting of possible caveats, and the sketching of future directions.
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3.2 Literature Review
In the literature measuring financial relative risk aversion, a significant number of works
follows the Friend and Blume [25] framework (presented in section 2.3.1), with risk aversion
being manifested in the form of the proportion of households’ wealth invested in risky assets,
and relative risk aversion being interpreted as the wealth elasticity of the marginal utility of
wealth (Friend and Blume) (p.900). In this stream of research, are found, among others, the
exemplary works of Morin and Suarez [38], Bellante and Saba [11], Siegel and Hoban [47],
Riley Jr and Chow [43], and Schooley and Worden [46]. One work of particular importance
for the purposes of this dissertation is the work by Jianakoplos and Bernasek (JB) [30], which
explores the issue of differences in relative risk aversion by gender.
In the JB work, wealth is defined in the narrowest Friend and Blume consideration as the
liquid net worth of the investor, i.e. as the sum of the net value of risky and risk-free assets.
Given this definition of wealth, of immediate interest is the determination of its components,
namely the determination of the risk-free and risky assets, in relation to the database used.
The latter in the JB case, as it is in this dissertation, is the Survey of Consumer Finances.
It is noted that the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF)2, a triennial interview survey of
a nationally representative sample of U.S. families3, sponsored by the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System with the cooperation of the U.S. Department of the Treasury,
is considered by many researchers and studies, as “the best available source of individual
household wealth data collected in the United States” (Bajtelsmit and Bernasek [7] (p.4)).
The SCF aims at providing detailed information on the financial characteristics of U.S.
households. More specifically, the survey collects data on families’ assets and liabilities,
their current and past employment, their pensions, their income, their inheritances, and
2 A detailed presentation of the SCF is given in Appendix A.
3 It is noted here that by “families”, the SCF also considers one-person families.
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their consumer attitudes, as well as their demographics.
In terms of the wealth definition given above, the major difficulty encountered upon
reading the SCF lies in the split of households’ assets into risky ones and risk-free ones, since
the boundaries between safe, and risky are not always sharply defined, especially for certain
types of assets. In addition, there is no official guide suggesting such a split, hence there is a
certain degree of arbitrariness encountered on the followed splits with regards to the highly
popular SCF.
For instance, JB classify as risk-free assets: “dollar balances in checking accounts, sav-
ings, and money market accounts, certificates of deposit, U.S. savings bonds, IRA balances
invested in certificates of deposit or bank accounts, and the cash value of life insurance less
policy loans outstanding”. Further, JB classify as risky assets: “the sum of balances in IRAs
not invested in bank deposits, stock holdings less margin loans outstanding, bonds, trust
assets, the net value of real estate owned other than residential housing, the net value of
business owned, and the net value of other miscellaneous assets (e.g. precious metal, futures
contracts, art work) reported by the household”.
Nevertheless, the thorough study of the SCF with most prominent here the study of an
earlier version from 1989, and the study of the latest version of 2013 brought to the surface
certain asset categories that have been left out from the computations or have not been fully
exploited in the sense that the respondents’ reported risk-taking in the form of their followed
investment strategies has not been fully accounted for. For instance, the study of the SCF
revealed that JB had omitted from their computations any thrift savings accounts, although
the survey allowed for both such a consideration and a further distinction of possible thrift
savings accounts into risk-free and risky ones. In contrast, other researchers such as Chang
et al. [16] had included this asset category in their computations, and further suggested their
own distinction of thrift-savings plans into risk-free and risky ones. It is worth stressing
that to the best of our knowledge, the above mentioned work by Chang et al. [16] is most
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probably the most-inclusive split of assets into risk-free, and risky ones encountered in all
relevant approaches. Actually, by focusing on the Chang et al. [16] approach and adjusting
it to the latest SCF of 2013, while further consulting the algorithms of the SCF itself [1], in
what follows, the JB split of assets into risk-free, and risky ones gets updated and enhanced.
The outcome is a more nuanced treatment of risk-free, and risky assets, leading to perhaps
the most inclusive guide; one that abides to the latest version of the SCF.
3.3 Risk-free and Risky Assets in the SCF: Extended
Definitions
In what follows, we proceed with our own extended definitions of risk-free, and risky assets
as encountered in the SCF. We note that the canvas of our work is the JB work, while
the motivation behind the extra choices is in most cases related to the investment strategy
question offered in the SCF. More specifically, in most asset categories, the format of the
aforementioned question has as following.
“How is the money in (this/these) account(s) invested? Is it all in stocks, all in interest-
earning assets, is it split between these, or something else?”
Following the question, the respondent might select one of the following answers4.
4 Actually, the available options are even more elaborate but for the public use data set of the SCF, certain
codes have been consolidated. More specifically, the available options are: 1.*ALL IN STOCKS 2. *ALL
IN INTEREST EARNING ASSETS/BONDS 3. *SPLIT 4. Real estate 5. Hedge fund 6. Annuities 8.
Mineral rights 9. *GIC/guaranteed income contract 12. Business investment n.e.c. 13. Commodities
15. Life insurance 25. Non publicly traded business or other such investment 30. *MUTUAL FUND
(NOT A PREFERRED RESPONSE) -7. *OTHER 0. Inap. However, codes 4 (for investment in real
estate), 5 (for investment in hedge fund), 6 (for investment in annuities), 8 (for investment in mineral
rights), 12 (for investment in business investment), 15 (for investment in life insurance), and 25 (for
investment in non publicly traded business or such investments) have been combined with code -7 (for
other investment), while code 9 (for investment in GIC/guaranteed income contract) has been combined
with code 2 (for investment all in interest earning assets/bonds).
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“1.All in stocks, 2.All in interest earning assets/bonds, 3.Split, 30.Mutual Fund or -7.Other
investment strategy.”
Given the qualitative character of the question, as well as the limited information that
is available, we follow the following rough algorithm in our classifications. If the account or
plan in question is invested “all in interest earning assets/bonds”, we qualify the account
or plan as safe. Further, we consider the options “all in stocks” or “other ” as of full or
mixed risk. Thus, any account or plan invested in any of these two options is characterized
as risky. For the remaining two options of “split”, and “mutual fund” investment strategies,
we follow a 50-50 approach by classifying half the account or plan as risky, and the other
half of the account or plan as safe. With regards to the 50-50 allocation decision, in the lack
of the specifics of the investment strategies, we deem the division of risk in equal parts as
more appropriate.
The tables below show analytically the definitions first for the risk-free assets in Table
3.1 and second for risky assets in Table 3.2. For the sake of comparison with the JB work,
the definitions are presented in juxtaposition with the JB ones so as to depict our points
of differentiation. In particular, it is noted that the extended definitions differ from the JB
ones in the consideration of thrift-type plans and mutual fund holdings, two financial assets
categories for which JB make no reference5, as well as in the consideration of IRA/Keogh
5 In a personal mail correspondence with Dr. Jianakoplos regarding the omission of these two asset
categories, the following responses were kindly given and are shared here. With regards to the omitted
defined contribution accounts (401(k), etc.), Dr. Jianakoplos mentioned omitting them in the paper
“because the pension related accounts were not “transactable” (although you can borrow against some
of them)”. Nevertheless, Dr. Jianakoplos mentioned that in their 1999 paper “Gender differences in
defined contribution pension decisions” (Bajtelsmit et al. [8]), they focused exclusively on the defined
contribution pension balances (403(b)s, etc.) despite not having included them in their 1998 work
studied here. In any case, we consider the aforementioned liquidity concern as covered here, since
all our included retirement accounts or plans are satisfying the condition of the respondent being in
position to borrow or withdraw money from them. Further, with regards to mutual fund holdings, Dr.
Jianakoplos mentioned that they “included the mutual funds, but allocated the mutual fund balances
into risky and non-risky categories based on what was in the mutual funds – stocks or bonds”. Still,
there is no reference to this allocation in their paper, while in our own approach, we follow Chang et al.
[16] in their more elaborate mutual funds categorizations.
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accounts, and other managed assets that is more delicate than the JB one. In all the
aforementioned asset cases, once again, the point of differentiation lies in the analysis of the
stated as followed investment strategy by the respondents, and in the further distinction of
those assets into risk-free, and risky ones.
In the following tables, we note that the names appearing in parentheses refer to the code
names of the produced variables in the technical guide given in Appendix B. In the latter
Appendix, all the computations of every asset category, as well as the subsequent split of
assets into risk-free and risky components based on the SCF are provided in detail.6
Lastly, we refer that the use of the same code name in the entries of the following
tables signifies that the dollar value of the asset in question is computed identically in both
approaches: the JB, and our own.
6 Supplementarily, it is noted that in Appendix C and Appendix D, the reader may find indicative
questions from the SCF related to the considered assets and liabilities.
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Table 3.1: Risk-free Assets in the SCF: Two Definitions
(RiskFreeAssets)JB (RiskFreeAssets)EK
CHECKINGS: checking accounts CHECKINGS: checking accounts
MMAS: money market accounts including money
market deposit accounts & money market funds
MMAS: money market accounts including money
market deposit accounts & money market funds
IRAKHSSAFEJB: IRA/Keogh accounts invested
in CDs or bank accounts
IRAKHSAFE: IRA/Keogh accounts invested in
CDs or bank accounts, as well as a percentage of
IRA/keogh accounts invested in combined invest-
ment strategies (e.g. CDs and stock)
Not included NETTHRIFTSAFE: the net value of thrift-type
plans invested in interest earning, and half of the
net value of thrift-type plans invested in other in-
vestment strategies (thrift-type: 401(k), 403(b),
SRA accounts, borrow option, withdraw option)
Not included FUTPENSAFE: future pension benefits invested in
all interest earning assets or bonds, and half of the
future pension benefits invested in split strategies
or mutual funds
Not included CURRPENSAFE: pensions with currently received
benefits invested in all interest earning assets or
bonds, and half of the pensions with currently re-
ceived benefits invested in split strategies or mutual
funds
CDS: certificates of deposit CDS: certificates of deposit
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Table 3.1: Risk-free Assets in the SCF: Two Definitions
(RiskFreeAssets)JB (RiskFreeAssets)EK
SAVINGS: savings accounts SAVINGS: savings accounts
Not included MUTFSAFE: directly held mutual funds: tax-free
bond mutual funds, government or government
backed bond mutual funds, any other bond mutual
funds, and half of combination mutual funds
BONDSAFE: savings bonds BONDSAFE: savings bonds
Not included OTHMASAFE: legal trusts, annuities, or managed
investment accounts invested in bonds, interest,
CDs, money market accounts, as well as half of
legal trusts, annuities, or managed investment ac-
counts invested in combined investment strategies
(e.g. CDs and stock)
NETCASHLIFE: cash value life insurance policies
minus policy loans outstanding
NETCASHLIFE: cash value life insurance policies
minus policy loans outstanding
The same code name means that the asset in question is computed identically in both definitions.
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Table 3.2: Risky Assets in the SCF: Two Definitions
(RiskyAssets)JB (RiskyAssets)EK
IRAKHRISKYJB: IRA/Keogh accounts NOT in-
vested in CDs or bank accounts
IRAKHRISKY: IRA/Keogh accounts invested in
stock or “mutual funds”, as well as IRA/Keogh ac-
counts invested in combined investment strategies
(e.g. CDs and stock)
Not included NETTHRIFTRISKY: the net value of thrift-type
plans invested in stock and half of the net value
of thrift-type plans invested in other investment
strategies (thrift-type: 401(k), 403(b), SRA ac-
counts, borrow option, withdraw option)
Not included FUTPENRISKY: future pension benefits invested
in stocks, and half of the future pension benefits
invested in split strategies or mutual funds
Not included CURRPENRISKY: pensions with currently re-
ceived benefits invested in stocks, and half of the
currently received benefits invested in split strate-
gies or mutual funds
Not included MUTFRISKY: directly-held mutual funds: stock
mutual funds, and half of combination mutual funds
BONDRISKY: federal, state, and local government
bonds, corporate and mortgage-backed bonds, and
foreign bonds
BONDRISKY: federal, state, and local government
bonds, corporate and mortgage-backed bonds, and
foreign bonds
STOCKS: stock STOCKS: stock
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Table 3.2: Risky Assets in the SCF: Two Definitions
(RiskyAssets)JB (RiskyAssets)EK
NETBROKACCTS: the net value of brokerage ac-
counts (cash or call accounts minus margin loans
outstanding)
NETBROKACCTS: the net value of brokerage ac-
counts (cash or call accounts minus margin loans
outstanding)
TRUSTRISKYJB: legal trusts OTHMARISKY: legal trusts, annuities, or man-
aged investment accounts invested in stock or ”mu-
tual funds”, as well as half of legal trusts, annuities,
or managed investment accounts invested in com-
bined investment strategies (e.g. CDs and stock)
BUS: the net value of business owned (both actively
and non-actively managed)
BUS: the net value of business owned (both actively
and non-actively managed)
NNRESRE: the net value of real estate owned other
than residential housing
NNRESRE: the net value of real estate owned other
than residential housing
NETMISCASSETS: the net value of miscellaneous
assets (precious metal, art work)
NETMISCASSETS: the net value of miscellaneous
assets (precious metal, art work)
The same code name means that the asset in question is computed identically in both definitions.
57
3.4 The Definitions of WEALTH
3.4.1 The definition of WEALTH by JB
With regards to the originally employed definition of wealth, i.e. that of JB, as already
mentioned in the Section 3.2, JB measure wealth as the sum of the net value of risky and
risk-free assets. Further, risk-free assets for JB are defined to include “dollar balances in
checking accounts, savings, and money market accounts, certificates of deposit, U.S. savings
bonds, IRA balances invested in certificates of deposit or bank accounts, and the cash value
of life insurance less policy loans outstanding”. Thus, with reference to the code names
mentioned in Table 3.1, risk-free assets for JB are computed as following:
(3.1)(RiskFreeAssets)JB = CHECKINGS + SAV INGS +MMAS + CDS
+ IRAKHSAFEJB +BONDSAFE +NETCASHLIFE
At the same time, the risky assets (including mixed-risk assets) are defined by JB as “the
sum of balances in IRAs not invested in bank deposits, stock holdings less margin loans
outstanding, bonds, trust assets, the net value of real estate owned other than residential
housing, the net value of business owned, and the net value of other miscellaneous assets
(e.g. precious metal, futures contracts, art work) reported by the household”. Hence, with
reference to the code names in Table 3.2, the risky assets for JB are defined as following:
(3.2)
(RiskyAssets)JB = IRAKHRISKY JB +BONDRISKY + STOCKS
+NETBROKACCTS + TRUSTSRISKY JB
+NETNRESRE +BUS +NETMISCASSETS
Thus, if we denote the wealth by JB as WEALTHJB, the latter would be equal to:
(3.3)WEALTHJB = (RiskFreeAssets)JB + (RiskyAssets)JB
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3.4.2 An Alternative Definition of WEALTH
Upon meticulously reading the SCF and as already stated in the presentation of the extended
definitions of risk-free and risky assets, we came across the realization that JB, in their
analysis, make no reference to thrift-type plans or mutual fund holdings, while in terms of
other managed assets, they refer only to legal trusts. Below, the analysis is enhanced by
including or elaborating on all the aforementioned missing asset categories, which are also
accordingly split into risk-free and risky assets. Below, once again, the code names of the
assets in the tables 3.1 and 3.2 are employed with the extra assets considered in the EK
computations being added.
(3.4)
(RiskFreeAssets)EK = CHECKINGS + SAV INGS +MMAS + CDS
+ IRAKHSAFE +NETTHRIFTSAFE
+ FUTPEN + CURRPENSAFE +MUTFSAFE
+BONDSAFE +OTHMASAFE +NETCASHLIFE
(3.5)
(RiskyAssets)EK = IRAKHRISKY +NETTHRIFTRISKY
+ CURRPENRISKY +MUTFRISKY + STOCKS
+NETBROKACCTS +BONDRISKY +OTHMARISKY
+NETNRESRE +BUS +NETMISCASSETS
Hence, if we denote the extended wealth as WEALTHEK , the latter would be equal to:
(3.6)WEALTHEK = (RiskFreeAssets)EK + (RiskyAssets)EK
3.4.3 Descriptive Statistics for the two Definitions of WEALTH
Since we altered the definitions of risk-free and risky assets, and subsequently the definition
of wealth, the RATIO variable of equation (2.2), defined as the proportion of wealth held in
risky assets, alters too. Below, we document how JB’s wealth along with the JB’s wealth
59
components, namely the risk-free, and risky assets, as well as the ratio variable compare with
the corresponding ones of ours (the EK ones). To that effect, we show descriptive statistics
(not just mean and standard deviation but also minimum, 5%, 25%, median, 75%, 95% and
maximum) of all the involved variables in the 1989 SCF. The statistics refer to households
with wealth exceeding $1,000.
In the following table, the subscript JB stands for the JB definitions7 and the subscript
EK stands for our own definitions. Supplementarily, a comparison of means of the variables
is implemented and the statistical significance is indicated in the table. It is also noted
that in the 1989 SCF, the correlation coefficient for WEALTHJB and WEALTHEK and its
p-value are computed to be 0.99 and 0.000 respectively.
Table 3.3: Weighted Descriptive Statistics in the 1989 SCF
Mean Std. Dev. Min 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% Max
(RiskFreeAssets)JB 34,021 132,705 0 500 2,810 9,910 28,800 125,000 3.49e+07
(RiskFreeAssets)EK 47,158† 173,628 0 710 3,400 12,250 47,000 183,650 3.52e+07
(RiskyAssets)JB 119,004 1,067,300 -16,200 0 0 4,000 33,400 418,500 1.23e+08
(RiskyAssets)EK 119,059 1,059,504 -866,500 0 0 4,720 35,000 402,600 1.23e+08
WEALTHJB 153,026 1,107,460 1,020 1,660 5,800 21,000 80,000 514,300 1.52e+08
WEALTHEK 166,218† 1,116,260 1,010 1,800 7,080 25,500 90,380 562,000 1.52e+08
RATIOJB 0.38 0.42 -11.57 0 0 0.28 0.77 0.98 0.99
RATIOEK 0.27† 4.01 -173.3 0 0 0.28 0.70 0.93 0.99
†The difference of means is significantly different from zero
Table 3.3 shows the produced EK wealth to be higher than the JB one in all percentiles.
Further, Table 3.3 reveals that the EK wealth, as well as the subsequent EK ratio of risky
holdings are significantly different than the corresponding wealth and ratio in the JB model.
The analysis is also repeated for the 2013 SCF, and is given below. For the 2013 SCF, it
is noted that the correlation coefficient for WEALTHJB and WEALTHEK and its p-value
are computed to be 0.96 and 0.000 respectively.
7 More specifically, our replication results of the JB definitions
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Table 3.4: Weighted Descriptive Statistics in the 2013 SCF
Mean Std. Dev. Min 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% Max
(RiskFreeAssets)JB 64,099 3,672,249 -21,510 1,000 3,200 11,560 41,000 241,000 8.62e+07
(RiskFreeAssets)EK 145,681† 815,406 -6,300 1,010 5,001 24,015 100,300 574,000 4.08e+08
(RiskyAssets)JB 343,041 3,316,850 -7,000 0 0 4,500 86,000 1,225,000 1.05e+09
(RiskyAssets)EK 356,278† 3,357,208 -12,000 0 0 15,100 120,000 1,205,000 1.10e+09
WEALTHJB 407,140 3,444,328 1,001 1,550 6,400 29,500 150,450 1,412,500 1.05e+09
WEALTHEK 501,958† 3,803,137 1,001 2,000 10,500 55,960 244,500 1,821,000 1.31e+09
RATIOJB 0.39 0.41 -1.43 0 0 0.24 0.84 0.98 0.99
RATIOEK 0.39† 0.35 -2.15 0 0 0.41 0.66 0.98 0.99
†The difference of means is significantly different from zero
Table 3.4 reveals that for the 2013 SCF, too, the EK wealth, as well as the subsequent EK
ratio of risky holdings are significantly different than the corresponding wealth and ratio in
the JB model. Further, WEALTHEK is higher than WEALTHJB in all percentiles, while
RATIOEK is lower than RATIOJB in most percentiles.
3.5 The Refined JB Model
Next, employing the EK definition of wealth, the specification of equation (2.2) of the first
essay is tested anew. More specifically, all the tests on gender differences in relative risk
aversion presented in Section 2.5 of the first essay are repeated. In particular, working with
WEALTHEK , first the specification in (2.2) is tested again separately on the 1989 SCF, and
on the 2013 SCF, and subsequently the specification in (2.4) is tested on data pooled from
the 1989 SCF and the 2013 SCF.
However, in contrast to the first essay where the tests were implemented for single women,
for single men and for married couples, the focus here shifts entirely on single-headed house-
holds: first for all the reasons already mentioned in the first essay, namely the inability to
specify the gender of the true investment decision maker in the case of couples8 (either mar-
ried or living together as partners), and second for the sake of consistency in the econometric
8 The issue of the gender of the decision maker in the case of couples is analytically given in Appendix
A.6.3.
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model. More specifically, with reference to the latter, it is noted that since AGE, WORK
and EDUCATION in equations (2.2) and (2.4) refer to the Household Head, and since the
RACE of the Household Head is known only if the respondent is the head9, the work limits
the comparisons between single females, and single males, where all regressors are referring
to the head of the household.
One last minor correction refers to the construction of WORK variable, where the cate-
gory Farmer is omitted from consideration, since a Farmer is already classified in the data
as either Self-employed or Employed by others. Hence a Farmer category is deemed as
redundant10.
Lastly in order to account for possible sample variability error, attributed to the fact that
the SCF sample is not an equal-probability design, the descriptive statistics reported in the
work such as means and medians will be sample weighted. Furthermore, in the multivariate
analyses, in order to account for the effects of imputation error on the standard errors of
the estimates, an error attributed to the fact that missing or incomplete information in the
SCF is imputed in multiple ways, data from all five implicates provided by the SCF will be
used, employing the “repeated-imputation inference” (RII) technique, described analytically
in Rubin [44], and given from a user’s point of view in Montalto and Sung [36]11.
9 The issue of the race of the respondent is given analytically in Appendix A.6.1.
10 We note that following the JB Farmer definition, there are 62 out of 3,143 respondents or 1.9% of the
sample in the 1989 SCF, and 49 out of 6,015 respondents or 0.8% of the sample in the 2013 SCF that
are categorized as Farmer. From the 62 JB Farmer cases in the 1989 SCF, 44 cases are classified as
Self-employed and 18 cases are classified as Employed by others. Similarly, from the 49 JB Farmer
cases in the 2013 SCF, 39 cases are classified as Self-employed, and 10 cases are classified as Employed
by others. Due to the limited overall number of Farmer cases, we do not proceed with a probably
more nuanced consideration of a Self-employed Farmer versus a Nonagricultural Self-employed or of an
Employed by others Farmer versus a Nonagricultural Employed by others. Thus, we assume that self-
employed farmers behave similarly to any non-farm self-employed, and that a farmer hired by someone
else behaves similarly to any nonagricultural employer.
11 The coverage of possible sample variability or imputation error in the SCF is given in Appendix A.1.
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3.6 Empirical Results Based on the Extended Defini-
tion of Wealth
The analysis proceeds with the presentation of the empirical results. The analysis consists
of two parts. The first part presents the results of testing the refined JB model with the
enhanced definition of wealth and the variables’ correction on the SCF of 1989, as well as
the results of running the same refined model on the most recent SCF of 2013. We note
that in these two exercises, the two data sets are treated as two independent cross-sections.
The second part presents the results of testing the refined JB model after pooling the two
independent cross-sections from 1989, and 2013 and adding a time interaction.
3.6.1 Empirical Results I: The Refined JB Model in the 1989 SCF
& the 2013 SCF for WEALTHEK
Below, we start with the empirical results of repeating the tests of the first essay in the
refined JB specification. More specifically, we start with the estimation of equation (2.2) for
the alternative definition of wealth, WEALTHEK and for the 1989 SCF. In this exercise, we
are inquisitive about the degree to which the original JB results differ or can be replicated.
Thus, for comparison purposes, the table also includes the original JB results for the 1989
SCF and their own definition of wealth, WEALTHJB. Next, employing again the refined JB
specification, we run the model in the latest SCF of 2013 being inquisitive about the latest
trend in households’ financial risk taking behavior if we employ our own enhanced definition
of wealth. We note that these two exercises are run separately for single women and single
men and for the statistical significance of the estimates, we follow the methodology and
econometric techniques described in Section 2.5.
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Table 3.5: Regression Results with RII techniques for WEALTHEK
WEIGHTED Tobit Regression Results, JB: JB results, EK: 1989, and 2013 results for WEALTHEK
Single Women Single Men
JB EK EK JB EK EK
1989 1989 2013 1989 1989 2013
lnWEALTH 0.117*** 0.113*** 0.126*** 0.170***† 0.168***† 0.120***
(0.009) (0.025) (0.011) (0.010) (0.028) (0.014)
AGE 26-30 0.044 -0.058 0.005 -0.137***† -0.064 0.153*
(0.079) (0.194) (0.117) (0.047) (0.170) (0.098)
AGE 31-35 0.127** 0.022 0.039 -0.342***† -0.398**† 0.258**†
(0.063) (0.172) (0.118) (0.059) (0.184) (0.107)
AGE 36-40 0.381*** 0.050 0.220** -0.263***† -0.255 0.210
(0.066) (0.189) (0.121) (0.049) (0.161) (0.116)
AGE 41-45 0.241*** 0.090 0.055 -0.252***† -0.384**† 0.228**
(0.062) (0.181) (0.119) (0.059) (0.198) (0.102)
AGE 46-50 0.129 0.181 0.129 -0.295***† 0.228† 0.233***
(0.066) (0.183) (0.116) (0.078) (0.195) (0.098)
AGE 51-55 0.130** -0.249* 0.055 -0.350***† -0.364** 0.156*
(0.064) (0.193) (0.116) (0.074) (0.179) (0.109)
AGE 56-60 0.065 -0.091 0.054 -0.322***† -0.274* 0.189**
(0.065) (0.176) (0.113) (0.065) (0.207) (0.103)
AGE 61-65 0.250*** -0.166 0.026 -0.540***† -0.541** 0.158*
(0.066) (0.199) (0.116) (0.077) (0.246) (0.116)
Over 65 -0.232*** -0.338** -0.032 -0.005 -0.495** -0.023
(0.061) (0.178) (0.118) (0.069) (0.248) (0.119)
EmpByOth -0.262*** -0.307*** -0.253*** -0.113*** -0.142* -0.131**†
(0.044) (0.116) (0.075) (0.043) (0.115) (0.060)
Retired -0.181*** -0.166* -0.360** -0.040 -0.209 -0.228***†
(0.049) (0.143) (0.080) (0.057) (0.192) (0.096)
Unemp/NotLF -0.395*** -0.263** -0.211** -0.222*** -0.118 0.024†
(0.051) (0.146) (0.089) (0.053) (0.157) (0.094)
Some HS -0.310*** 0.080 0.081 -0.300*** 0.033 -0.406*†
(0.066) (0.366) (0.289) (0.067) (0.196) (0.271)
HS Degree -0.336*** 0.183 0.353 -0.274*** 0.052 -0.290†
(0.064) (0.354) (0.275) (0.067) (0.219) (0.253)
Some Col. -0.254*** 0.109 0.389* 0.325***† 0.003 -0.258†
(0.067) (0.355) (0.275) (0.070) (0.232) (0.254)
Col. Grad -0.339*** 0.217 0.360* -0.244*** -0.017 -0.306†
(0.067) (0.355) (0.276) (0.068) (0.219) (0.250)
RACE 0.154*** 0.112* -0.056* -0.024† -0.141† 0.014†
(0.035) (0.107) (0.042) (0.066) (0.134) (0.079)
KIDS -0.030* -0.022 0.057*** 0.034† 0.145 0.032
(0.016) (0.038) (0.021) (0.027) (0.105) (0.058)
HOMEOWNER -0.068*** -0.036 -0.017 0.070**† 0.003 -0.045
(0.024) (0.064) (0.043) (0.031) (0.069) (0.050)
HUMAN -0.002*** -0.001* 0.000 0.000† 0.000 0.000
(.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
constant -0.244** -0.668* -1.176*** -0.668***† -0.986***† -0.670***†
Sigma Hat 0.415 0.422 0.398 0.401 0.385 0.416
Observations 384 380 858 230 228 606
LeftCensored 123 143 0 65 58 0
RightCensored 2 2 134 6 4 80
Omitted Categories: Less than 25 for AGE, Self-employed for WORK, Grade School or less for EDUCATION. 12
***Significantly different from zero at the 1% significance level.
**Significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level.
*Significantly different from zero at the 10% significance level.
†Significantly different from the single-female coefficients at the 10% significance level or lower.
12 With regards to the dummy variables of the model, we note that for comparison purposes, we follow
JB in their selections of omitted groups.
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Comments on the 1989 Results for WEALTHEK
In terms of running the refined JB model employing WEALTHEK in the 1989 SCF, the most
noteworthy points are the following ones. First, when it comes to the estimated equations,
the Wald test shows that they are not significantly different between single women and single
men.
Next, with regards to the estimated coefficients, the most prominent similarity between
the estimates of the original JB model and the ones of our own refined model refers to the
sign/magnitude of the coefficient on the natural logarithm of net worth (lnWEALTH). Here,
it is worth repeating that the estimated coefficient on lnWEALTH shows how C−k 1, i.e. the
inverse of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and thereby Ck i.e. the coefficient of relative
risk aversion varies with wealth. Hence, a positive coefficient indicates decreasing relative
risk aversion, while a negative coefficient indicates increasing relative risk aversion. From
the results, it is deduced that the examined types of households manifest decreasing relative
risk aversion. Further, it is deduced that when it comes to the comparison between single
women, and single men, relative risk aversion does not decrease as much for single women
as for single men, corroborating the original JB result that single women are relatively more
risk averse than single men. It is important to note that in the above approach, and with
reference to the original Friend and Blume model (presented analytically in the Section 2.3.1)
the comparison of the Ck of single men and single women is done based on the assumption
of the same positive multiplicative constant for single men and single women, while it is
worth stressing that JB whom we follow here, work with the estimated coefficient β̂. We
also refer that an exercise similar to the one of the first essay accounting for the Tobit
specification and the true partial effect of lnWEALTH, β̂1Φ(xβ/σ), was implemented with
the adjustment factor Φ(xβ/σ) being evaluated at the mean values of all variables in the
corresponding samples and we report that the exercise gave identical qualitative results in
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terms of the manifested relative risk aversion.
Moving on with the commentary on the refined JB model’s results for 1989 and in juxta-
position with the original JB model’s results, the interest shifts to the rest of the explanatory
variables of the model. More specifically, with regards to the effect of AGE, we note that the
JB estimates indicated that age had a very different impact on portfolio allocation for single
women versus single men. Further, for JB, all of the estimated coefficients associated with
the age categories were significantly different for single women versus single men. In our
own exercise, the estimated coefficients for single women versus single men are significantly
different only for the 31-35, 41-45 and 46-50 age groups. Moreover, the categorical variables
indicating the age category are significantly negative with the exception of the 26-30, 36-40,
and 46-50 age groups, for all other age groups of single men, indicating that single men
in the majority of age groups take significantly fewer financial risks than the less-25 aged
single men, the omitted category. Correspondingly, for single women, only the 51-55 and
over-65 age groups are indicated as taking significantly fewer financial risks than the omitted
category of the less-25 age group.
With regards to the effect of WORK and after reminding that the Farmer category is
omitted from our own computations, our exercise replicates the original JB results that
the categorical variables indicating labor force status are all significantly negative for single
women, implying that single women in all categories take fewer financial risks than self-
employed women, the omitted category. For single men, the corresponding coefficients are
also negative but with the exception of the Unemployed or Not in the Labor Force category,
none of the rest of the coefficients is significantly negative. Our exercise further reveals that
in contrast to the JB original results, there are no significant differences in the labor-force-
status coefficients for single men versus single women.
With regards to the effect of EDUCATION, the exercise on the refined JB model, mostly
does not agree with the results on the original JB model. More specifically, for JB, sin-
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gle women and single men with less than a sixth grade education (the omitted category
of their computations) were predicted to hold portfolios with much greater percentages of
risky assets, compared with those having more education, holding other factors fixed. In our
own exercise, none of the produced coefficients associated with years of schooling is statisti-
cally significant, neither for single women nor for single men, while there are no significant
differences for single women versus single men.
With regards to the effect of RACE, our exercise confirms the original JB result that
single black women are estimated to hold significantly more risky assets than single white
women, while single black men are estimated to take fewer financial risks than single white
men, holding everything else fixed. It is noted, however, that with regards to single men,
our result is not significantly significant. Nevertheless, it is corroborated that single black
women take significantly higher financial risks than single black men.
With regards to the effect of KIDS, with the latter implying not only children under 18
in the household but any people under 18, allowing thus for the presence of grandchildren or
younger brothers or sisters, or other young people who might be dependents in the household,
our exercise does not corroborate fully the original JB results. More specifically, our estimates
indicate that as the number of young dependents in a household increases, the proportion of
risky assets held stays unaffected for both single women and single men, holding everything
else constant. This comes partially in contrast to the JB results, which had estimated that
in the presence of an additional young dependent, the proportion of risky assets significantly
decreased for single women but stayed unaffected for single men.
With regards to the effect of human capital, the original JB results indicated that the
greater the value of human capital relative to wealth, i.e. the greater the value of HUMAN,
the smaller the proportion of risky assets held for all household types, holding everything else
fixed. This effect was statistically significant for JB, and further significantly different for
single women versus single men but the impact was quantitatively a small one. In our own
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exercise with the refined definition of wealth and the subsequent alteration of the HUMAN
variable, we also derive the small quantitative effect of HUMAN on the proportion of risky
assets held but statistically, the effect is found to be a significant one only for single women
but not for single men.
Lastly, with regards to the effect of homeownership, for the original JB work, the impact of
the variable was estimated to reduce holdings of risky assets for single women and to increase
them for single men. In the replication exercise, the signs of the above relationships were
derived but they were not statistically significant. In any case, we believe that this inability
to replicate the statistical significance of variables such as the ones of HOMEWONERSHIP
or HUMAN should be attributed to the use of RII techniques for our estimation, while it is
worth commenting that the effect of those variables in the original JB work was either way,
quantitatively, a very small one.
Comments on the 2013 Results for WEALTHEK
In terms of the 2013 results, it is first noted that the Wald test indicates that the estimated
equations are not significantly different between single women and single men.
Further, by isolating from Table 3.5 the results referring to the coefficient on lnWEALTH,
and controlling for the effect of AGE, EDUCATION, RACE, KIDS, HOMEOWNERSHIP,
HUMAN CAPITAL, and WORK, the 2013 analysis, in contrast to the 2013 analysis of
the first essay, reveals that households retain their pattern of relative risk aversion. More
specifically, the positive coefficients on lnWEALTH indicate a pattern of decreasing relative
risk aversion for both single women and single men. However, we note that the coefficient
on lnWEALTH is not found to be significantly different between single women and single
men. That is, holding all other factors constant, single-headed households decrease their
proportion of wealth held in risky assets as their wealth increases but there is no significant
difference in the exhibited decreasing relative risk aversion between single women and single
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men. Thus, there are no gender differences recorded for 2013.
The recorded patterns of decreasing13 relative risk aversion for 2013, for both single
women and single men along with the recorded lack of gender differences constitute two very
interesting findings of the second essay. We note that these findings come in contradiction
first to the patterns of increasing relative risk aversion for single women and of constant
relative risk aversion for single men for 2013 documented in the first essay and second and
more importantly, they come in contradiction to the documented gender differences of the
first essay. From our perspective, we attribute to a great extent both findings to the most
inclusive definition of wealth and to the nature of the wealth components that we added14
which are deemed to offer a deeper and more realistic view in the households’ financial risk
taking decisions, and subsequently to their risk aversion.
Besides the prominent interest on the effect of lnWEALTH, as well as the associated
pattern of relative risk aversion and the detection of any gender differences, we also move on
with the commentary on the rest of the explanatory variables in the specification. To that
effect, our interest shifts first to the effect of AGE for 2013. In particular, we first note that
with the exception of the 31-35 year old cohort, all other estimated coefficients associated
with the rest of the age categories are not significantly different between single women and
single men. Moreover, when it comes to single women, the effect of most age categories
seems to leave unaffected their proportion of risky assets, with the exception of the 36-40
age cohort that is estimated to take significantly higher risks than the omitted category of
the less-than-25 years old cohort of single women. When it comes to single men, the picture
changes, since with the exception of the 36-40 and over-65 age groups, all other age groups
13 We also refer that an exercise similar to the one of the first essay accounting for the Tobit specification
and the true partial effect of lnWEALTH, β̂1Φ(xβ/σ), was separately implemented with the adjustment
factor Φ(xβ/σ) being evaluated at the mean values of all variables in the corresponding samples and we
report that the exercise gave identical qualitative results in terms of the manifested decreasing relative
risk aversion.
14 We remind here the detailed inclusion in the computation of wealth of retirement accounts such as
401(k)s or 403(b)s along with the more delicate handling of assets such as IRAs or Keogh accounts.
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are estimated to take higher financial risks than their base group of the less-than-25 years
old peers.
With regards to the effect of WORK and the labor force status of the head of the
household, and given the left out category of Farmer, the following points are noted for the
dataset of 2013. First, all the coefficients indicating labor force status for single women are
significantly negative, implying that single women take fewer financial risks than the omitted
category of their self-employed peers, holding all other factors fixed. At the same time, single
men categorized as employed by others and as retired are estimated to take significantly fewer
risks than single men categorized as self-employed. However, being unemployed or not in
the labor force seems to leave unaffected single men’s portfolio allocation, although this a
not statistically significant result. It is also noteworthy that all coefficients are significantly
different for single women versus single men.
With regards to the effect of EDUCATION and the years of schooling of the head of the
household for 2013, we note the following things. First, our estimates suggest that all levels
of education are estimated to leave unaffected the risky holdings of single men, holding all
other factors constant. Similarly, for single women, education of up to 12 years of schooling
is estimated to leave unaffected their portfolio allocation. However, for higher levels of
schooling, namely for more than 12 years, single women are predicted to hold significantly
higher risky assets than the omitted category of single women with less than a sixth grade
education. We note here that this is the first time in the analysis of the first and second
essay that we encounter a result suggesting that higher education leads to significantly higher
financial risk taking. It is lastly worth noting that with respect to the differences between
single women, and single men, all the differences are significantly significant.
With regards to the effect of RACE in the data of 2013, we note that first, holding all
other factors fixed, race appears to play a different role in financial risk taking for single
women versus single men. More specifically, the estimates show that single black women
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are estimated to take significantly fewer financial risks than single white women, while at
the same time, race seems to leave unaffected single black men’s versus single white men’s
financial risk taking. We remark that the finding referring to single black women and their
2013 financial risk taking is a very interesting one, since it comes in contrast to the original
JB result for 1989. More specifically, JB had suggested that perhaps single black women
are more involved in undertaking financial risks related to investment decisions than single
white women. Nevertheless, we get the opposite trend here. Lastly, we note that there is a
significant difference in the race coefficients between single women and single men.
With regards to the effect of KIDS, i.e. the number of people under 18 in the household,
this effect has as following. Holding all other factors constant, an additional young dependent
in a household is estimated to significantly increase the proportion of risky assets held for
single women but to leave unaffected the proportion of risky assets held for single men. This
result reveals a turn in the behavior of single women, since in the presence of one more young
dependent, single women’s behavior shifts from 1989 to 2013, from significantly decreasing
their risk taking to significantly increasing it.
With regards to the effect of HOMEOWNERSHIP, the estimates reveal that for both
single women and single men, being a homeowner is estimated to leave unaffected the pro-
portion of risky holdings in the household’s portfolio, holding all other factors fixed. Further,
the coefficients are not significantly different between single women and single men.
Lastly, with regards to the effect of HUMAN or the value of human capital relative to
wealth, the latter’s change is estimated to leave unaffected the proportion of risky assets.
Actually, the HUMAN coefficient is not statistically significant neither for single women nor
for single men, while the almost zero numerical values suggest a negligible quantitative effect
on the proportion of wealth held in risky assets.
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3.6.2 Empirical Results II: Pooling data from 1989 & 2013 and
Employing WEALTHEK
In what follows, the surveys of 1989 and 2013 are pooled into an independently pooled cross
section. The motivation behind this setup is to increase the sample size and to investigate
the effect of lnWEALTH over time. To that effect, and as already stated in the presentation
of the pooled model in equation (4), a year dummy variable, variable y13, that is equal to
one for the observations coming from the 2013 SCF and zero for the observations coming
from the 1989 SCF is added, and it is further interacted with lnWEALTH.
We mention here that since the focus is on relative risk aversion, the effect of the other
explanatory variables is assumed to have remained constant from 1989 to 2013. This as-
sumption is further tested in the refined JB specification by adding time interactions with
all explanatory variables, and performing Wald tests. The results reveal that this is indeed
the case for all the explanatory variables. Thus, since all the other slopes do not differ
between the two time periods, pooling is deemed as a good strategy leading to efficient and
more precise estimates. The results are presented in the following table.
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Table 3.6: Tobit Regression Results on Pooled Data for WEALTHEK
WEIGHTED Tobit Regression Results with Dependent Variable RATIO on 1989 & 2013 Pooled data







AGE 26-30 -0.012 0.087
(0.104) (0.102)
AGE 31-35 0.004 -0.020
(0.099) (0.111)
AGE 36-40 0.149 -0.002
(0.111) (0.105)
AGE 41-45 0.049 -0.015
(0.105) (0.106)
AGE 46-50 0.141 0.039
(0.104) (0.103)
AGE 51-55 -0.057 -0.048
(0.105) (0.107)
AGE 56-60 0.005 0.001
(0.101) (0.108)
AGE 61-65 -0.034 -0.098
(0.106) (0.118)








Some HS 0.061 -0.083
(0.286) (0.169)
HS Degree 0.233 -0.015
(0.275) (0.161)
Some College 0.234 -0.002
(0.273) (0.159)
















Omitted Categories: Less than 25 for AGE, Self-employed for WORK, Grade School or less for EDUCATION.
***Significantly different from zero at the 1% significance level.
**Significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level.
*Significantly different from zero at the 10% significance level.
†Significantly different from the single-female coefficients at the 10% significance level or lower.
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Comments on the Pooled Results
We remind that the effect of lnWEALTH for 1989, and with reference to equation (4) is β̂1,
while the effect of lnWEALTH for 2013 is β̂1 + δ̂1. Hence, after isolating from Table 3.6
the results referring to lnWEALTH, and the interacted variable y13*lnWEALTH, (that is
after controlling for the effect of AGE, EDUCATION, RACE, KIDS, HOMEOWNERSHIP,
HUMAN CAPITAL, and WORK), the resulting effect of lnWEALTH for 2013 and the
refined JB specification is estimated to be 0.129 for single women and 0.130 for single men.
We note that the coefficients on lnWEALTH are statistically significantly different from
zero but they are not significantly different between single women and single men. Thus,
the resulting estimated coefficients with regards to lnWEALTH indicate decreasing relative
risk aversion for both single women and single men but the lack of a significant difference
indicates that gender differences are non-existent in 2013. This is an interesting finding,
especially in the light of the aftereffect of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, which suggests a
persisting pattern of decreasing relative risk aversion for both single women and single men
but no gender differences in financial risk taking, holding all other factors fixed.
With regards to the effect of the other factors in the pooled model, the following points
are noteworthy. More specifically, with regards to the effect of AGE, it is first characteristic
that all estimated coefficients associated with the age categories are not significantly different
between single women and single men. Moreover, when we look separately at the estimates
of single women and single men, we remark that the effect of most age categories is estimated
to leave unaffected the proportion of risky assets held for both single women and single men
with the exception of the over-65 age cohort. With respect to the latter age cohort, both
single women and single men over-65 years old are estimated to take significantly fewer risks
than the omitted category of their less-than-25 years old peers.
With regards to the effect of WORK and the labor force status of the head of the
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household, and given the left out category of Farmer, the following points are noted for the
pooled dataset. First, all the coefficients indicating labor force status for single women are
significantly negative, implying that single women in every labor category take fewer financial
risks than the omitted category of their self-employed peers, holding all other factors fixed.
At the same time, single men categorized as employed by others and as retired are estimated
to take significantly fewer risks than single men categorized as self-employed. However,
being unemployed or not in the labor force seems to leave unaffected single men’s portfolio
allocation, although this a not statistically significant result. It is also noteworthy that with
the exception of the retired category, all other labor coefficients are significantly different for
single women versus single men.
With regards to the effect of EDUCATION, it is noteworthy that EDUCATION or years
of schooling leave unaffected the proportion of risky assets held for both single women and
single men. JB in their 1989 results had commented that holding all other factors constant,
one might anticipate more years of schooling to lead to higher risk taking but the opposite
proves to be the case from the estimates. Still, one might consider that it is financial
education, and not education in general that might lead to higher financial risk taking.
Nevertheless, the finding that a higher education does not instill to individuals (or at least
to single individuals) the necessity for higher risk so as to secure a higher future return merits
investigation.
With regards to the effect of RACE, in the pooled data, race is estimated to leave
unaffected the proportion of risky assets held for both single women and single men, holding
all other factors fixed. Further, we note that there is no significant difference in the race
coefficients between single women and single men.
With regards to the effect of KIDS or young dependents below 18 in the household,
holding all other factors fixed, the estimates suggest that single women are estimated to
take higher financial risks in the presence of one more young dependent, while an additional
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young dependent is not estimated to influence the portfolio allocation of single men, leaving
unaffected their proportion of risky assets. Further, there is no significant difference in the
coefficients between single women and single men.
With regards to the effect of HOMEOWNERSHIP, the estimates suggest that being a
homeowner leaves unaffected the proportion of risky assets held for both single women and
single men, and the same is estimated to be the effect of HUMAN, i.e. the effect of the value
of human capital relative to wealth on the proportion of risky assets held in the portfolios
of single women and single men. Further, we comment that overall, the effect of human
capital relative to wealth on risky holdings is estimated to be quantitatively negligible for
both single women and single men.
.
3.7 The Non-Nested J Test: Choosing Between the
Model of the First Essay Employing WEALTHJB
and the Model of the Second Essay Employing
WEALTHEK
If we treat the specification of equation (2.2) in the first essay where WEALTHJB is
employed, and the refined specification of the same equation in the second essay where
WEALTHEK is employed as two competing model specifications, then of subsequent inter-
est is the choice of the most superior model. To determine this, we employ the non-nested
J test, a statistical specification test, introduced by Davidson and MacKinnon [19]. More
specifically, for the purposes of the J test, we estimate four models15.
15 Here, we also praise the valuable notes by Bremmer [14] for their guidance in the J test implementation.
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In particular, first, we estimate the original JB model, which employs the WEALTHJB
definition that in turn affects the definitions of RATIO and HUMAN, which we denote below
as RATIOJB and HUMANJB respectively:













As a post-estimation exercise, we estimate the predicted values of RATIOJB, denoted aŝRATIOJB, given by the Tobit prediction Φ(xβ/σ)xβ + σφ(xβ/σ).
Second, we estimate the refined JB model, which employs the WEALTHEK definition.
The latter, in turn, affects the definitions of RATIO and HUMAN, which we denote below
as RATIOEK and HUMANEK , respectively. We also remind that the Farmer category is
omitted in the WORK status variable for the head of the household. Thus, the specification
transforms as following:













Again, as a post-estimation exercise, we estimate the predicted values of RATIOEK , denoted
as ̂RATIOEK .
Third, we estimate again the JB model adding as an additional regressor the predicted
values of RATIO by the EK model, i.e. ̂RATIOEK , in a specification of the following form:
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λmEDUCATIONmk + φ ̂RATIOEKk + uk
(3.9)
Fourth, we estimate again the EK model by adding as an extra regressor the predicted
values of RATIO by the JB model, namely ̂RATIOJB, in a specification of the following
form:











λmEDUCATIONmk + θ ̂RATIOJBk + uk
(3.10)
We note that all estimations are Tobit16 estimations employing sample weights, and that
the process takes place separately for single women and for single men and for both 1989
and 2013. Also and as Bremmer [14] comments, the outcome of the J test rests on the
statistical significance of the estimates of φ and θ. The table below presents the results of
the t-statistics associated with φ̂ and θ̂, i.e. the estimates for φ and θ in the third and fourth
estimations respectively, namely the statistics associated with the null hypotheses that φ = 0
and θ = 0 respectively.
16 The J test can be generalized to nonlinear regressions [19].
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Table 3.7: The Non-Nested J Test
1989 2013
Single Women Single Men Single Women Single Men
H0 : φ = 0 t = -0.80 t = -3.22 t = -1.19 t = 0.74
H0 : θ = 0 t = 0.42 t = -1.52 t = -0.85 t = -1.61
Observations 375 229 1,251 813
Table 3.7 reveals that there are no definitive results with regards to the best specification of
the model. More specifically, with regards to 1989 and single women, the null hypothesis that
the coefficient associated with the predicted values from the the EK model is zero cannot
be rejected. Therefore, the predicted values from the EK model fail to add any meaningful
explanatory power to the JB model. At the same time, the predicted values of the JB model
fail to add any explanatory power to the EK model. Since the predicted values of the JB
model do not improve the performance of the EK model, and the converse is also true, the
J tests indicate that none of the two models is superior.
With regards to 1989 and single men, the J tests reveal that there is a superior model. In
particular, the null hypothesis that the coefficient associated with the predicted value from
the EK model is zero can be rejected. Therefore, the predicted values from the EK model
do add meaningful explanatory power to the JB model. However, the converse is not true,
that is that the predicted values from the JB model fail to add any meaningful explanatory
power to the EK model. Thus, for the subgroup of single men, the J tests indicate the EK
model to be the best choice.
With regards to 2013 and single women, Table 3.7 reveals that neither the predicted
values from the EK model improve the performance of the JB model, nor the predicted
values from the EK model improve the performance of the JB model. Thus none of the two
models is superior to the other.
With regards to 2013 and single men, the t-statistic associated with the φ̂ coefficient
reveals that the null hypothesis that φ = 0, that is that the predicted values from the EK
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model do not improve the performance of the JB model cannot be rejected. At the same
time though, the t-statistic associated with the θ̂ coefficient and the null hypothesis that
θ = 0 reveals that the null hypothesis that the coefficient associated with the predicted
values from the JB model can be rejected, indicating that the predicted values of the JB
model add meaningful explanatory power to the EK model. Thus, the JB model is superior
to the EK model for the subgroup of single men and the dataset of 2013.
3.8 Conclusions, Caveats, and Future Paths
Based on the related literature employing the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), as well
as the study of the latest setup of the SCF, that of 2013, the second essay offered first, a
more inclusive, and up-to-date guide of risk-free, and risky assets as encountered in the SCF.
Subsequently, based on the suggested assets’ split, the households’ wealth defined as
the net value of risk-free and risky assets was computed anew. Further, employing the
extended definition of wealth and performing certain refinements, the seminal 1998 work by
Jianakoplos and Bernasek exploring gender differences in relative risk aversion with data
from the 1989 SCF was tested again. More specifically, the refined JB model was tested on
data from the 1989 SCF, on data from the most recent 2013 SCF, as well as on pooled data
from the 1989 and 2013 SCF surveys. For all three exercises, RII techniques were employed,
and the analysis was done on weighted data, focusing on single-headed households.
In the first exercise, the original JB results were corroborated in the multivariate analysis
on the 1989 data. In particular, the estimates produced indicated decreasing relative risk
aversion for both single females and single males with gender differences being detected in the
sense that both types of households manifested decreasing relative risk aversion but single
women did so on a lesser extent than single men. In the second exercise, performed on the
latest SCF, that of 2013, the analysis found evidence of decreasing relative risk aversion but
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no significant differences in the manifested relative risk aversion between single women and
single men. Further, the third exercise performed on pooled data from the 1989 SCF, and
the 2013 SCF corroborated the pattern of decreasing relative risk aversion over time, along
with evidence that there are no significant gender differences in the exhibited relative risk
aversion.
In the light of the very interesting finding that decreasing relative risk aversion seems
to be unchanged over time, we deem the suggested refinements in the original JB model as
worthwhile ones. More specifically, we consider that by further including assets such as re-
tirement accounts in the computations of wealth, we have managed to add a few additionally
revelatory dimensions of households’ financial risk taking that also helped us in the deeper
examination of manifested gender differences.
However, despite the more inclusive consideration of households’ wealth, a possible caveat
in the analysis has been the concern of the extent to which the questionnaire of the SCF
allows in the first place to successfully elicit risk-taking behaviors, first given the difficulty
in extracting sophisticated financial information from the respondents, and second given the
very generic format of the related question referring to the stated as followed investment
strategy from the household. An extra concern springs from the considered subsample of
the SCF, i.e., the single-headed households: this subsample allows a direct test of gender
differences in manifested relative risk aversion but admittedly it is a subsample that remains
limited even in the pooled dataset, not to mention the questionable assumption of considering
as singles not only never married but also divorced and widowed individuals. Lastly, a related
concern here also acknowledged by JB links to the ability to generalize the derived results
for single women and single men to all women and men in general.
In any case, we consider the refined JB model as a valuable tool of further tests. In
particular, we suggest the following two exercises. First, we suggest testing the refined JB
model in a larger collection of repeated cross-sections from the SCF so as to increase our
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sample size of never married households and make more valid inferences for single females
and single males. Second, we suggest testing the refined JB model in a panel of SCFs, so as
to investigate gender differences over time for the same households. Regarding the feasibility
of the latter suggestion, we note here that the SCF has contained a panel element over two
periods with respondents to the 1983 survey being re-interviewed in 1986 and 1989, and
respondents to the 2007 survey being reinterviewed in 2009 [4]. Thus, perhaps the panel
with data from 2007 and 2009, a time frame also including the critical period of the 2007-
2008 financial crisis, would be an interesting alternative dataset for further investigation of
gender differences in financial risky taking and financial risk aversion.
Third Essay: Gender Differences in Risk
Taking Investment Strategies in Defined
Contribution Plans: Evidence from the
U.S. Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of
Consumer Finances for 2013
4.1 Introduction
The third essay of the dissertation studies gender differences in risk-taking investment strate-
gies in the accumulation of U.S. retirement wealth with the help of evidence from the U.S.
Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF ) for 2013. The latter database,
already employed twice in the dissertation, is a triennial interview survey of a nationally
representative sample of U.S. families1, sponsored by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System with the cooperation of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, which aims at
providing detailed information on the financial characteristics of U.S. households, including
1 It is noted here that by “families”, the SCF also considers one-person families.
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information on the households’ retirement assets2, and which is frequently praised in the
literature as “the best available source of individual household wealth data collected in the
United States” (Bajtelsmit and Bernasek [7] (p.4)).
With regards to the U.S. retirement wealth, and with reference to the so-called “three-
legged stool”, where Social Security, Employer-sponsored Plans, and Personal Savings consist
the three legs of the stool, if we consider that Employer-sponsored Plans can be further
distinguished into Defined Benefit Plans, and Defined Contribution Plans, the exact focus of
the essay is on the Defined Contribution Plans component of the Employer-sponsored Plans
with plans such as 401(k)s, 403(b)s or other thrift saving accounts.
However, taking into consideration Munnell’s [39] (p.1) approach based on the argument
that “more than half of money collected” in retirement savings through 401(k) plans “now
resides in Individual Retirement Accounts”, the current coverage also includes Individual
Retirement Accounts (IRAs), Roth accounts, and Keogh accounts in the consideration of
Defined Contribution Plans.
Schematically, and following again Munnell [39] (p.2) for the division of employer-sponsored
plans, the colored blocks in Figure 4.1 highlight the areas of retirement income that are of
interest in the essay.




















Figure 4.1: U.S. Retirement Income: The Areas of Interest for the Third Essay
It is important to note that all information about the aforementioned employer-sponsored
plans, as well as about the balances of IRAs and Keogh accounts is handily available in the
SCF. Further, one of the characteristic features of all the above mentioned Defined Contri-
bution Plans is that the participants are called to make their own investment decisions. As
Bajtelsmit and Bernasek [7] (p.2) note, “investment choice is arguably a source of empow-
erment” for individuals. Nevertheless, increasing evidence documents that individuals tend
to choose conservative investment strategies for self-directed accounts, a financial behavior,
that as already stressed in this dissertation, cumulatively might have a negative impact on
the accumulation of adequate retirement wealth for individual investors, with the effect being
more prominent for women than for men.
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The current essay working on the above described enriched consideration of Defined
Contribution Plans proceeds with a suggested and novel split of Defined Contribution Plans
into risk-free, and risky ones that takes advantage of all the information available in the
SCF. Subsequently, the essay constructs ratios of risky Defined Contribution Plans over
total Defined Contribution Plans, and further compares the mean risky ratios of female,
and male investors into two different exercises. In the first exercise, and as the most direct
test of gender differences, the mean risky ratios of single females, and single males are
compared. In the second exercise, the analysis, taking advantage of the SCF’s uniquely
available information on the Defined Contribution Plans of both spouses or partners in the
households of couples, splits each couple into two separate observations, and by creating
an extended sample, compares the mean risky shares of female, and male investors. The
work adds to the existing literature exploring gender differences in financial risk taking by
investigating gender differences in the accumulation of retirement wealth, and by looking
into investment vehicles such 401k(s) and IRAs that constitute the state-of-the-art gateways
of retirement savings.
The structure of the essay has as following. Section 4.2 starts with an insight in the
relevant literature exploring gender differences in financial risk taking with emphasis given
on those works exploring gender differences in risk taking in pensions and other retirement
assets. Section 4.3 presents in detail the Defined Contribution Plans encountered in the
SCF, and proceeds with the computation of their dollar value. Section 4.4 proceeds with
a suggested split of the Defined Contribution Plans encountered in the SCF into risk-free
and risky ones and further builds the ratios of risky Defined Contribution Plans. Section 4.5
describes in detail the dataset of the 2013 SCF and the subsamples to be employed in the
two exercises of the essay. Section 4.6 proceeds with the empirical results of both exercises
and the findings of the work. Section 4.7 concludes with the recording of the outcomes of
the essay, the highlighting of possible caveats, and the sketching of future directions.
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4.2 Literature Review
In field economics, there are several works examining gender differences in financial risk
taking with mixed results in terms of differences between female and male investors. Below,
several earlier works from the 1990s along with more latest ones are briefly presented.
More specifically, Bajtelsmit and VanDerhei [9] employing data provided by a large pen-
sion plan sponsor from 1993 worked with a sample of 20,000 management-level employees.
The employees had the choice to direct their pension contributions to “employer stock”, “a
diversified equity portfolio”, “a government bond portfolio”, “a social choice equity funds”,
or “a guaranteed interest fund”. The authors found significant evidence that women were
more likely to choose the “guaranteed interest” fund, while men were more likely to choose
“employer stock”.
Hinz et al. [29] working with data from the federal government’s Thrift Savings Plan
reported evidence that a large percentage of women invested in the minimum-risk portfolio
available to them, along with evidence that married women also invested less in common
stock than married men.
Jianakoplos and Bernasek [30] in a work of vital role for the purposes of the dissertation,
working with data from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) for 1989,
found that single women are relatively more risk averse than single men and married couples.
Further, JB reported that the portfolio proportion held in risky assets was found to increase
with wealth for all household types, implying decreasing relative risk aversion but the effect
was significantly smaller for single women than for single men and married couples.
Sundén and Surette [48] with the help of data from the 1992 and 1995 Survey of Consumer
Finances examined whether workers differ systematically by gender in the allocation of assets
in defined contribution plans, and they concluded that gender and marital status significantly
affect how individuals choose to allocate assets in defined contribution plans.
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Bajtelsmit [6] working with data from the Health and Retirement Study, a nationally
representative survey of households with at least one member aged 53-63 in 1994, found
among others that while all individuals exhibited decreasing relative risk aversion, the relative
risk aversion of single women was significantly greater than that of married couples.
Bernasek and Shwiff [12] employing data from a survey of faculty employed at five uni-
versities in Colorado found that single women are more risk averse than single men, along
with evidence of gender differences in risk taking among people who are either married or
cohabitating.
In general, the consensus in the literature seems to be that women are more risk averse
than men in their pension decisions. The current work aspires in contributing to the literature
exploring gender differences in financial decision making related to the accumulation of
retirement wealth by looking for gender differences in state-of-the-art retirement assets such
as 401(ks)s or Roth or Keogh accounts as recorded in the database of the project, namely
the SCF.
4.3 Defined Contribution Plans in the 2013 SCF
As already mentioned, the SCF collects information on a plethora of respondents’ possible
assets, intended to finance retirement. Actually, the retirement assets comprising the essay’s
consideration of Defined Contribution Plans are scattered in several sections of the SCF.
Below, a more detailed presentation of the Defined Contributions Plans’ components is
given.
To that effect, it is first repeated that following Munnell [39], as well as Bricker et al.
[15] (p.33), the Defined Contribution Plans considered in the work include IRAs, Roth, and
Keogh accounts, as well as specific employer-sponsored accounts. In particular, by IRAs
and Keogh accounts, following the SCF’s codebook [2] the reference is to accounts that the
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respondents might have “rolled over” into an IRA after leaving a previous job, as well as
Roth IRAs, or any other type of IRA or Keogh account that is not part of a retirement
plan on a current or past job’. Further, by employer-sponsored accounts, the reference is to
“401(k), 403(b), thrift savings accounts from current or past jobs; other current job plans
from which loans or withdrawals can be made, as well as accounts from past jobs from which
the family expects to receive the account balance in the future”. The analysis is confined to
the aforementioned accounts because of the portability of the latter across jobs3.
Schematically, the Defined Contribution Plans considered in the 2013 SCF are presented
in Figure 4.2 with code names appearing in parentheses for each considered retirement asset
category4.
3 Indicative questions from the codebook of the 2013 SCF, extracting the relevant information for both
IRA/Roth/Keogh accounts, and employer-sponsored accounts are given in Appendix D, while the ex-
act computations of the dollar value of all of the aforementioned retirement assets are presented in
Appendix B, with IRAs computed analytically in section B.2.2, and employer-sponsored accounts com-
puted analytically in section B.3.2.
4 It is noted that the code names correspond to the produced variables computing the retirement assets’























Figure 4.2: Defined Contribution Plans in the 2013 SCF
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Subsequently, the dollar value of Defined Contribution Plans (DCP) is given in the following
summation:
(4.1)DCP = IRAKEOGH +NETTHRIFT + CURRPEN + FUTPEN
4.4 Risk-Free and Risky Defined Contribution Plans
in the SCF
Next, one major difficulty encountered upon reading the SCF lies in the split of the Defined
Contribution Plans into risk-free, and risky ones. The second essay of the dissertation has
dealt with this kind of problem on a large scale involving a plethora of assets (including also
the retirement assets encountered in the survey and employed here) and proceeded with its
own suggested distinction of assets into risk-free and risky ones. We repeat here that in the
majority of the cases, the rationale of this distinction was based on the household’s response
regarding the investment strategy in the asset in question. More specifically, in most asset
categories, the format of the aforementioned question had as following.
“How is the money in (this/these) account(s) invested? Is it all in stocks, all in interest-
earning assets, is it split between these, or something else?”
Further, following the question, the respondent could select one of the following answers:
“1.All in stocks, 2.All in interest earning assets/bonds, 3.Split, 30.Mutual Fund or -
7.Other investment strategy.”
We repeat here that given the qualitative character of this investment question, as well
as the limited information that was available, the following rough algorithm was followed
in our classifications. In particular, if the account or plan in question was invested “all
in interest earning assets/bonds”, we qualified the account or plan as safe. Further, we
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considered the options “all in stocks” or “other ” as of full or mixed risk. Thus, any account
or plan invested in any of these two options was characterized as risky. For the remaining two
options of “split”, and “mutual fund” investment strategies, we followed a 50-50 approach by
classifying half the account or plan as risky, and the other half of the account or plan as safe.
With regards to the 50-50 allocation decision, in the lack of the specifics of the investment
strategies, we deemed the division of risk in equal parts as more appropriate.
This algorithm is retained here too and as we move on with constructing risk-free and
risky Defined Contribution Plans for the respondents of the survey. In particular, following
the above algorithm, the essay builds safe IRAs and Keogh accounts (IRAKHSAFE), safe
thrift savings accounts (THRIFTSAFE), safe current pensions (CURRPENSAFE) and safe
future pensions (FUTPENSAFE)5. Thus, the safe Defined Contribution Plans are given in
the summation of all safe components:
(4.2)DCPSAFE = IRAKHSAFE +NETTHRIFTSAFE
+ FUTPENSAFE + CURRPENSAFE
Similarly, the essay builds risky IRAs and Keogh accounts (IRAKHRISKY), risky thrift
savings accounts (THRIFTRISKY), risky current pensions (CURRPENRISKY), and risky
future pensions (FUTPENRISKY)6. Thus, the risky Defined Contribution Plans are given
in the summation of all the risky components:
(4.3)DCPRISKY = IRAKHRISKY +NETTHRIFTRISKY
+ CURRPENRISKY + FUTPENRISKY
Lastly, we proceed with the construction of the mean risky share of Defined Contribution
Plans, which we define as the ratio of Defined Contribution Plans invested in risky plans.
5 All technical computations are given analytically in sections B.2.2, and B.3.2 of Appendix B.
6 All technical computations are given analytically in sections B.2.2, and B.3.2 of Appendix B.
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More specifically, by employing the total dollar value of Defined Contribution Plans (DCP)
and the total dollar value of the risky Defined Contribution Plans (DCPRISKY), we build




Our next goal is to compare the mean risky shares of female and male investors. To that
effect, we delve into SCF and its dataset for 2013.
4.5 The 2013 SCF Dataset
We mention here that the 2013 SCF provides information on 6,015 families, where by families,
also one-person families are considered. A look on the sample frequencies of the 6,015
households by marital status, also presented on Table 4.1, reveals the following picture.
Table 4.1: Sample Frequencies of Households By Marital Status in the 2013 SCF
Marital Status 2013 SCF
Married 3,278 54.50%




Never Married 873 14.51%
Total 6,015
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4.5.1 The Sub-sample(s) of Single Females and Single Males
To compare female and male investors’ risky shares of Defined Contribution Plans, and
following the study of the setup of the SCF, we start our approach with the realization that
in the case of couples (either married or living together as partners), we cannot really know
if the two spouses or partners make individual or joint decisions in terms of their financial
risk taking in their retirement plans. Actually, this is a lacking piece of information that
makes questionable the gender of the decision maker in the case of couples7.
Since we cannot accurately know the gender of the investment decision maker in the
dataset, a common approach encountered in the gender literature (Embrey and Fox [23],
Jianakoplos and Bernasek [30]) is followed, which considers as the most direct test of gender
differences in portfolio allocation, the test between households headed by never married
females, and households headed by never married males.
Table 4.1 shows that in the 2013 database, we encounter 873 cases of never married
households. Out of these 873 cases only 316 never married respondents or a 36% of the
sub-sample reports participation in a Defined Contribution Plan. Despite the aforemen-
tioned small sample size, we still proceed with comparing the mean risky shares of Defined
Contribution Plans of never married women and never married men. However, supplemen-
tarily, in order to overcome the limited sample size of never married households with Defined
Contribution Plans, we also share the Jianakoplos and Bernasek [30] approach here, which
considers as single people not only “never married” but also “widowed” and “divorced” in-
dividuals8. The aforementioned approach gives us a sub-sample of 2,066 households out of
whom, 806 cases are reporting participation in a Defined Contribution Plan. We note that
7 The issue of the gender of the true decision maker in the case of couples (either married or living together
as partners) is given analytically in Appendix A.6.
8 Jianakoplos and Bernasek themselves, acknowledge the issue of the extent to which widows and/or
divorced women, for instance, continue the investment strategies begun by their late or ex-husbands
but still, they allow for biased results against finding any gender differences in financial risk taking.
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it is debatable here whether the heterogeneity introduced by adding formerly-married indi-
viduals to never married individuals is worth the trouble. In the empirical part, we explore
this issue further.
4.5.2 An Alternative Sample of Females and Males
On a second level analysis, the essay considers as worthwhile to explore a more elaborate
sample being based not only on the original full sample of the 6,015 respondents but also on
another 3,769 cases, namely the 3,278 spouses and 491 partners for the cases of respondents
being married or living with a partner. The rationale for such a consideration is that when it
comes to the SCF, the variables related to pensions are among the very few variables collected
separately for the respondent, and the spouse or partner of the respondent, hence besides the
Defined Contribution Plans of 6,015 respondents, the Defined Contribution Plans of another
3,769 cases could be considered. In particular and also following Sundén and Surette [48]
(p.207), as well as Bajtelsmit and Bernasek [7] (p.4), since the focus is on individuals’ gender
differences in risk-taking in their retirement plans, data for the Defined Contribution Plans of
the respondents and the Defined Contribution Plans of the respondents’ spouses or partners
are included separately in the sample, under the admittedly questionable assumption that
when it comes to couples either married or living together as partners, the spouses or partners
are not influencing each other on their risk-taking in their pension decisions.
Methodologically, the essay computes separately the Defined Contribution Plans of the
respondent’s spouse or partner, splits these assets into risk-free ones and risky ones, and
subsequently considers the Defined Contribution Plans of all individuals together. As a
result, gender differences in risk-taking behavior in retirement plans is investigated for a
sample of 9,784 individuals. In this alternative sample, we note that 4,763 cases or a 49% of
the sample reports participation in a Defined Contribution Plan. Further, we note that by
pooling all women and all men, we introduce heterogeneity in the form of marital status. In
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the empirical part, we will test whether this matters.
4.5.3 Accounting for Sample Variability and Imputation Error in
the SCF
Lastly, following the SCF instructions [2] and in the spirit of the discussion given in Section
2.4 of the first essay, as well as in the Appendix A.3, we note that in our computations, we
need to account for the following two things.
First, we need to account for possible sample variability error, attributed to the fact that
the SCF sample is not an equal-probability design9. To that effect, the statistics reported
in the work that follows will be sample weighted.
Second, we need to account for the effects of imputation error, an error attributed to the
fact that missing or incomplete information in the SCF is imputed in multiple ways. Thus,
data from all five implicates provided by the SCF will be used, employing the “repeated-
imputation inference” (RII) technique, described analytically in Rubin [44], and given from
a user’s point of view in Montalto and Sung [36].
4.6 Empirical Results
The work proceeds with the investigation of gender differences in risky Defined Contribution
Plans by comparing the mean risky shares of Defined Contribution Plans of the female and
male investors for the sub-samples of the essay. The analysis consists of two parts.
9 The sampling procedure of the SCF is given analytically in A.1
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4.6.1 Empirical Results I: Comparison of Mean Risky Shares Be-
tween Single Females and Single Males
In the first part of the empirical results, we present and compare the risky shares of Defined
Contribution Plans for the sub-samples presented in 4.5.1, that is for households headed by
single females and for households headed by single males. By “singles”, the analysis originally
refers to “never married” individuals and subsequently to a more elaborate consideration that
includes “never married”, “divorced” and “widowed” individuals. The results are presented
in the tables below, where besides the shares of total risky Defined Contribution Plans,
the share of risky IRA accounts over total Defined Contribution Plans, the share of risky
Thrift Plans over total Defined Contribution Plans, the share of risky current pensions over
total Defined Contribution Plans, and the share of risky future pensions over total Defined
Contribution Plans are also presented.
Table 4.2: Mean Risky Shares of Single Females and Single Males
with Single referring to “Never Married” Individuals
WEIGHTED Data Single Women Single Men
Share of Risky IRA/Roth/Keogh 0.178 0.215
Std. Err. (0.021) (0.026)
Share of Risky Thrift Plans 0.301 0.310
Std. Err. (0.025) (0.027)
Share of Risky Current Pensions 0.002 0
Std. Err. (0.002) (0)
Share of Risky Future Pensions 0.048 0.049
Std. Err. (0.014) (0.015)
Ratio of Risky Defined Contribution Plans 0.529 0.575
Std. Err. (0.023) (0.024)
Observations 172 144
†The difference of means in the ratio in question between Single Males and Single Females is Different from Zero.
The following points could be deduced from Table 4.2. First, it is observed that the risky
shares of total Defined Contribution Plans are not significantly higher for single men versus
the ones for single women. It is also noteworthy that there are no significant differences in
the shares of risky IRAs over total Defined Contribution Plans and risky Thrift Plans over
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Total Defined Contribution Plans (with the latter including 401(k)s or 403(b)s) between
single females and single men. Lastly, the ratios of risky current and future pensions, are
negligible in terms of their magnitude in the portfolio of total Defined Contribution Plans,
and there are no significant differences in risky holdings for single women and single men.
Table 4.3: Mean Risky Shares of Single Females and Single Males with
Single referring to “Never Married”, “Divorced” and “Widowed” Individuals
WEIGHTED Data Single Women Single Men
Share of Risky IRA/Roth/Keogh 0.232 0.279†
Std. Err. (0.014) (0.021)
Share of Risky Thrift Plans 0.236 0.243
Std. Err. (0.014) (0.018)
Share of Risky Current Pensions 0.007 0.008
Std. Err. (0.002) (0.004)
Share of Risky Future Pensions 0.050 0.046
Std. Err. (0.008) (0.010)
Ratio of Risky Defined Contribution Plans 0.524 0.576†
Std. Err. (0.013) (0.017)
Observations 499 307
†The difference of means in the ratio in question between Single Males and Single Females is Different from Zero.
Table 4.3 reveals the following things. First, the risky shares of total Defined Contribution
Plans are significantly higher for single men than for single women indicating a more risk
taking behavior for single males. It is also noteworthy that the share of risky IRAs over total
Defined Contribution Plans is significantly different between single females and single males
but there is no significant difference between single females and single men in the shares of
risky Thrift Plans over Total Defined Contribution Plans (with the latter including 401(k)s
or 403(b)s). Lastly, the ratios of risky current and future pensions, are negligible in terms
of their magnitude in the portfolio of total Defined Contribution Plans, and there are no
significant differences in risky holdings for single women and single men.
Heterogeneity in the “Singles” Sample
We mentioned in the description of the sub-sample of singles that it is debatable whether the
heterogeneity introduced by adding formerly-married individuals to never-married individu-
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als is worth the trouble. To explore this issue further, we examine the difference in the ratios
of risky Defined Contribution Plans between never married women and formerly-married
women, as well as between never married men and formerly-married men. In the table that
follows, we present the results of paired t-tests for the aforementioned sub-groups and we
further depict whether the mean difference in the ratios is significantly different from zero.
Table 4.4: Paired t tests for Never Married and Formerly Married Individuals
WEIGHTED Data Observations Mean Std. Err.
Ratio of Risky Defined Contribution Plans for Never Married Women 172 0.529 0.023
Ratio of Risky Defined Contribution Plans for Formerly Married Women 172 0.518 0.023
t-test = 0.3559 Two-tailed p-value = 0.7223
Ratio of Risky Defined Contribution Plans for Never Married Men 144 0.575 0.024
Ratio of Risky Defined Contribution Plans for Formerly Married Men 144 0.582 0.027
t-test = -0.2381 Two-tailed p-value = 0.8122
†The difference of means is Different from Zero.
Table 4.4 shows that the mean difference of risky shares of Defined Contribution Plans
for never married women and formerly married women is not significantly different from
zero. The same applies for the mean difference of risky shares of Defined Contribution Plans
for never married men and formerly married men.
4.6.2 Empirical Results II: Comparison of Mean Risky Shares Be-
tween Females and Males (Alternative Sample)
Table 4.5: Mean Risky Shares of Females and Males
WEIGHTED Data Women Men
Share of Risky IRA/Roth/Keogh 0.305 0.284†
Std. Err. (0.007) (0.007)
Share of Risky Thrift Plans 0.203 0.246†
Std. Err. (0.006) (0.006)
Share of Risky Current Pensions 0.005 0.010†
Std. Err. (0.001) (0.002)
Share of Risky Future Pensions 0.036 0.034
Std. Err. (0.003) (0.003)
Share of Risky Defined Contribution Plans 0.549 0.574†
Std. Err. (0.007) (0.006)
Observations 2,279 2,484
†The difference of means in the ratio in questions between Males and Females is Different from Zero.
99
In this second part of the results, we present the mean risky shares of Defined Contribution
Plans of the alternative sample introduced in Section 4.5.2, that is of all women and men
in the 2013 SCF. The results in Table 4.5 reveal the following points. First, we observe
that the risky shares of total Defined Contribution Plans are significantly higher for men
than for women indicating a more risk taking behavior for males. Further, we note that the
shares of risky IRAs over total Defined Contribution Plans, risky Thrift Plans over Total
Defined Contribution Plans (with the latter including 401(k)s or 403(b)s), as well as risky
current pensions over total Defined Contributions Plans are significantly different between
females and males. Lastly the ratios of risky future pensions, are negligible in terms of their
magnitude in the portfolio of total Defined Contribution Plans and there are no significant
differences in risky holdings for women and men.
Heterogeneity in the Alternative Sample
By pooling all women and all men, we have introduced heterogeneity in the form of marital
status. Below we test whether this matters. To that effect, we examine the difference in the
ratios of risky Defined Contribution Plans between single women and married/cohabiting
women, as well as between single men and married/cohabiting men. In the table that
follows, we present the results of paired t-tests for the aforementioned sub-groups and we
further depict whether the mean difference in the ratios is significantly different from zero.
Table 4.6: Paired t tests for Single and Married/Cohabiting Individuals
WEIGHTED Data Observations Mean Std. Err.
Ratio of Risky Defined Contribution Plans for Single Women 499 0.524 0.013
Ratio of Risky Defined Contribution Plans for Married/Cohabiting Women 499 0.554 0.014
t-test = -1.5243 Two-tailed p-value = 0.1281
Ratio of Risky Defined Contribution Plans for Married Men 307 0.576 0.017
Ratio of Risky Defined Contribution Plans for Married/Cohabiting Men 307 0.604 0.016
t-test = -1.220 Two-tailed p-value = 0.2234
†The difference of means is Different from Zero.
Table 4.6 reveals that the mean difference of risky shares of Defined Contribution Plans for
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single women and married/cohabiting women is not significantly different from zero. The
same applies for the mean difference of risky shares of Defined Contribution Plans for single
men and married/cohabiting men.
4.7 Conclusions, Caveats, and Future Paths
The third essay employing data from the SCF, and its latest setup for 2013 studied an
enriched consideration of Defined Contribution Plans (including also IRAs/Roth/Keogh ac-
counts besides employer-sponsored plans) and compared risk-taking strategies of female and
male investors. In particular, the work started with a suggested split of Defined Contribu-
tion Plans into risk-free and risky ones and subsequently compared risk-taking strategies of
female and male investors. The latter claim was implemented in two separate exercises with
the first exercise comparing the risky Defined Contribution Plans of single females and single
males, and the second exercise considering an enhanced sample of individuals and comparing
the risky Defined Contribution Plans of female and male investors. Both exercises concluded
with significant differences in the risky shares of total Defined Contribution Plans between
(single) women and (single) men with (single) men holding significantly higher proportions
than (single) women of their Defined Contribution Plans into risky plans.
Although we deem our work as highly innovative in the ways it has employed all valuable
information offered by the SCF and its latest setup of 2013, we do acknowledge that the
empirical part has mostly dealt with a series of simple comparison of means tests. A natural
future step for us would be the setup of a regression model explaining the ratios of risky
Defined Contribution Plans with the help of a set of economic and demographic variables.
We comment here that the variables already introduced in the first and second essay of
the dissertation could be perfectly employed in such a set up exploring further for gender
differences in financial risk taking.
Conclusions, Policy Implications and
Future Directions of the Research
The current dissertation project investigated gender differences in financial risk taking by
employing data from the U.S. Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).
More specifically, the study brought into light new important evidence about the relative risk
aversion of single female investors versus single male investors by investigating the allocation
of their total wealth in risky assets in general, and in risky defined contribution plans in
particular, and by exploiting the richness of the data source available in the best possible way.
The latter claim was materialized first by meticulously studying the survey and extracting
the respondents’ risk-taking in terms of their investment strategies in a way that is more
nuanced than is available in the current literature, and second by employing state-of-the-art
Repeated-Imputation Inference (RII) techniques to make valid statistical inferences from the
data.
Among the major results of the research, we refer here to the over time pattern of relative
risk aversion for single women and for single men and to the pattern of gender differences
between the aforementioned sub-groups of the SCF dataset. In particular, we refer that by
looking at a span of time from 1989 to 2013, our results in the first two essays were dependent
on the employed definition of wealth. More specifically, the first essay revealed a turn in
101
102
the relative risk aversion of single-headed households over time, where the 1989 pattern of
decreasing relative risk aversion for both single women and single men was transformed to
increasing relative risk aversion for single women and constant relative risk aversion for single
men. Nevertheless, despite the turn in behavior, we concluded with significant differences
in relative risk aversion between single women and single men for 2013. The second essay
employing a refined definition of wealth revealed that the pattern of decreasing relative risk
aversion was retained over time for both single women and single men. However, we found no
significant difference in the manifested relative risk aversion between single women and single
men for 2013. In the third essay, in a simpler setup and by focusing on the accumulation
of retirement wealth, we concluded with significant differences in the ratios of risky Defined
Contribution Plans of single women versus single men with single men taking significantly
greater risks than single women in their pension decisions for the dataset of 2013.
In the light of our results, we stress the policy implications of the dissertation project.
More specifically, we mention that proving that certain groups of individuals distinguished by
an individual characteristic, such as their gender are or remain more risk averse than others,
could have major implications in the effective conduct of risk management as well as the
efficient design of public policy. In terms of risk management, among others, Damodaran [18]
(p.43) addresses the question of whether policies on risk at businesses should be tailored to
the age or gender of the owners, stressing at the same time the necessity of risk management
practices that reflect the risk aversion of both the owners and managers of the firms. In terms
of public policy design, and in an era of self-directed accounts, persistent gender differences
make critical the role of education and financial education in particular. More specifically, if
risk taking is a prerequisite for adequate retirement income but not a given in today’s female
investors’ behavior, public policies should safeguard women by educating them towards a
realistic and timely allocation of their portfolios.
We close with the future directions of our research, where we mention the following points.
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In particular, we start by repeating that the SCF remains a valuable tool in our investigation
of gender differences. In particular, as a possible future area of exploration we mention here
the comparison of the credit cards holdings of single-headed households. However, besides
the SCF inspection, we also briefly wish to refer to a series of alternative approaches in
the study of financial decision making under uncertainty. To that effect, we remind here
that all our analyses of gender differences were done on the grounds of the expected utility
theory. Nevertheless, we should note that although the expected utility theory framework
has been the framework of choice in decision-making under risk, this does not mean that
it is flawless. On the contrary, being based on a set of rational axioms, it often fails to
capture or predict individuals’ actual behavior, being often criticized for giving “normative”
and not “descriptive” predictions. The term “descriptive” here captures preferences “as
they are, not as they should be” (Kahneman and Tversky [31]), in contradiction with a
“normative” analysis. As an alternative pattern here of the study of rational choice under
uncertainty, we refer to a rich series of experiments, investigating risky choice through a
great gamut of instruments. Indicatively, questionnaires (Kogan and Dorros [33]), gambles
(Eckel and Grossman [21]), and more elaborate computer-administered experiments (Croson
and Gneezy [17]) are referred here, while specific experiments related to the study of gender
differences and statistical stereotypes in risk taking, and financial risk taking in particular
such as those by Zinkhan and Karande [52], or Eckel and Grossman [21] are singled out
as worthwhile of future study in terms of replication, enrichment and repetition in varied
settings.
The Survey of Consumer Finances
The analysis in all three essays of the dissertation is based on the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF). This Appendix proceeds with a brief presentation of the SCF, emphasizing
on the challenges in extracting appropriately the information the survey provides.
First of all it is mentioned that the SCF is a triennial interview survey of a nationally
representative sample of U.S. families, sponsored by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System with the cooperation of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.1 It is noted
here that by “families”, the SCF also considers one-person families.
The SCF aims at providing detailed information on the financial characteristics of U.S.
households. More specifically, the survey collects data on families’ assets and liabilities,
their current and past employment, their pensions, their income, their inheritances, and
their consumer attitudes. Data on the demographics of the families are also collected.
A.1 The Sampling Procedure
The SCF employs a dual-frame sample incorporating both an area-probability (AP) sample,
and a special list sample developed from a sample of tax records, and obtained under very
strict rules governing confidentiality. The AP sample is intended to provide good coverage
1 All descriptions, definitions, and relevant technical information about the SCF, are derived from the
SCF website, [4], and the 2013 SCF codebook [2].
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of characteristics, such as home ownership, home mortgages, automobile ownership, and
credit card debt that are broadly distributed in the population, while the special list sample
is designed to disproportionately select families that are likely to be relatively wealthy. By
oversampling households which are more likely to be wealthy, the special list sample provides
good information on financial variables, which are highly correlated with wealth, such as
ownership of stocks, real estate, investments, and business assets (Montalto and Sung [36]
(p.134)).
A.2 Participation and Data Collection
Since 1992, data for the SCF have been collected by the National Opinion Research Center
(NORC), a research organization at the University of Chicago, roughly between May and De-
cember of each survey year. Once chosen by the sampling procedure, the prospective survey
participants receive a letter by the Federal Reserve Board Chairman 2, while a representative
of NORC contacts each potential participant personally to explain the study and request
time for an interview 3. Participation is voluntary but its usefulness is stressed, as well as
the importance of obtaining as much accurate information as possible from the participants.
Guarantees are provided about the privacy of all survey participants and the confidentiality
of their answers, while very strict rules are governing the rights of potential respondents.
2 The 2013 letter from Chairman Bernanke, mailed in mid-April 2013 to approxi-
mately 13,000 households, urging their participation in the study, can be found here:
https://www.federalreserve.gov/scf/bernankeletter2013.htm
3 The 2013 SCF data were collected using computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI), thus there is
no questionnaire in the usual sense.
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A.3 Missing Information & Multiple Imputation Pro-
cedure
Of great interest in the SCF is the way the survey handles missing or incomplete information.4
More specifically, for the final releases of the SCF public use data sets, missing and incomplete
data have been imputed using the multiple imputation technique [44] as developed for the
SCF FRB [3]. In essence, this procedure yields five values for each missing value so as
to approximate the distribution of the missing data. The imputations are stored as five
successive replicates (or “implicates”) of each data record, thus the number of observations
in the full public data set is five times the actual number of respondents.
The value of incorporating information from all five data sets of the SCF for the sake of
valid inferences in empirical analysis has been stressed by several researchers; indicatively
here Montalto and Sung [36] Montalto and Yuh [37], and Lindamood et al. [34] are referred.
A.4 Accounting for Imputation Error & Sample Vari-
ability Error
For the purposes of the analysis, both simple statistics, such as means and medians, as well
as more complex statistics, related to regressions are estimated.
Given that the SCF sample is not an equal-probability design, the descriptive statistics
reported in the work such as means and medians are sample weighted. 5
Furthermore, in the multivariate analyses, in order to account for the effects of imputation
4 As Montalto and Sung [36] (p.133) note, the incidence of missing data illustrates the difficulty of
obtaining financial information from individuals, while data can be missing because “respondents are
unable or unwilling to provide information, or due to errors in data recording and processing which
render data unuseable”.
5 The weight used is given in variable X42001.
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error on the standard errors of the estimates, information from all five implicates is used,
employing the “repeated-imputation inference” (RII) technique, described analytically in
Rubin [44], and given from a user’s point of view in Montalto and Sung [36].
A.5 Primary Economic Unit & the “Head” of the House-
hold
Further in the SCF coverage, it is worth mentioning the way that SCF defines a household
unit. More specifically, in the SCF, a household unit is divided into a primary economic
unit (PEU) —the family—and everyone else in the household. The PEU is intended to be
the economically dominant single individual or couple (whether married or living together
as partners) and all other persons in the household who are financially interdependent with
that economically dominant person or couple 6. Most of the data in the survey are intended
to represent the financial characteristics of the PEU but summary information is collected
at the end of the interview for all household members who are not included in the PEU. 7
The SCF also designates a “head” of the household. More specifically, if a couple is
economically dominant in the PEU, then the head is the male in a mixed-sex couple or the
older person in a same-sex couple. If a single person is economically dominant, then that
person is designated as the family head [2](p.5).
It is worth noting here that at several points in the SCF documentation, it becomes
explicit that the designation of the head in married couples or couples living together as
partners, reflects merely the systematic way in which the data set has been organized, and
it does not reflect any judgement about who the actual head of the household is.
6 For example, in the case of a household composed of a married couple who own their home, a minor
child, a dependent adult child, and a financially independent parent of one of the members of the couple,
the PEU would be the couple and the two children [2](p.3).
7 The great majority of the time, the PEU and the household are identical.
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A.6 Methodological Issues Arising in the SCF
A.6.1 The head is not always the respondent
The designated head of the PEU is not always the person responding the survey. A reason
for this is suggested by Lindamood et al. [34](p.198), who refer that “because of the detailed
nature of the financial data the SCF gathers, interviewers are trained to establish who is
the most financially knowledgeable person in the household, and to interview that person”,
so this person may not be the designated head. For instance, in several couples, it is the
“spouse” or “partner” who gives the responses. In any case, correctly identifying whose
demographic data is being used is particularly important, especially when analyzing variables
such as the race or various attitude variables, which are available only for the respondent of
the survey. For instance, the race of the head is known only if the head is the respondent
(Lindamood et al. [34] (p.198)). 8
A.6.2 Individual Financial Characteristics of the PEU’s Members
Another issue of concern, also acknowledged by the SCF documentation, [2](p.4) is that
because financial information is collected at the PEU level, it is not possible to make direct
separate estimates of the financial characteristics of the individuals in the households, e.g.
compute separately the financial characteristics of the respondent, and the respondent’s
spouse or partner. The only variables collected separately for the the respondent and the
spouse or partner of the respondent are those concerning employment, pension, and certain
demographic characteristics.
8 In the SCF, “When the original respondent is someone other than the person determined to be the head
in this sense, all data (including response codes) for the two members of the couple are systematically
swapped.[2](p.4). The variable X8000 indicates which cases have been subjected to such rearrangement.
This rearrangement was the case for 860 out of 3,143 households in the 1989 SCF, and for 1,378 out of
6,015 households in the 2013 SCF.
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For instance, the following stream of questions reveals how financial information is ex-
tracted regarding checking accounts or mutual funds holdings:
How many checking accounts do you (and your family living here) have?
How much is in this account? (What was the average over the last month?)
Do you (or anyone in your family living here) have any mutual fund holdings?
What is the total market value of all of the stock mutual funds that you (and your family
living here) have?
Throughout time, the survey has added some extra layers of sophistication in its ques-
tions, in an effort to disentangle the respondents’ assets from their spouses’ or partners’ or
other family members’ ones. For instance, the following stream of questions, in the 2013
SCF, gives a glimpse of this implementation regarding checking accounts:
How many checking accounts do you (and your family living here) have?
How much is in this account?
Is this a joint account with your (husband/wife/partner), or is the account in your name,
in your (husband’s/wife’s/partner’s) name, or in someone else’s? 9
However, this has been implemented on a small scale, and not for all assets, e.g. in
the example above, the extra question is not available for mutual funds holdings, thus the
available information regarding assets and liabilities remains largely at the PEU level, and
9 Possible answers in the question: 1. *Joint account; with spouse/partner 2. *R’s account 3.
*Spouse’s/partner’s account 4. *Other family member’s account 5. *CHILD ONLY; grandchild only 6.
Child/grandchild and R/spouse/partner 8. Other relative with R/spouse/partner 9. Unrelated person,
n.f.s. 10. Unrelated person with R/spouse/partner 11. Equal amounts in R/spouse/partner names
(only use for CDs) 50. Trust account 51. Personal business account -7. *Other 0. Inap.
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the difficulty in full computations of individuals’ financial characteristics persists.
A.6.3 The Gender of the Decision Maker in Couples
Lastly, and with most prominent here the case of couples, given the format 10 of the available
questions related to investment decisions in the survey, we cannot really know if the two
spouses or partners take joint investment decisions for their assets (either individual or joint
ones) or if it is one of the two (perhaps the respondent of the survey) who overbears in
financial decision making. And if the latter is the case, especially in the mixed-sex couples,
it is not possible to accurately determine the gender of the investment decision maker in a
couple.
Actually, given this inability to determine the nature (either joint or individual) of finan-
cial decision-making in couples (either married or living together as partners), as well as the
gender of the investment decision-maker(s), JB’s and other researchers’ approach (Embrey
and Fox [23]) is shared that the most direct test of gender differences in portfolio alloca-
tion is between households headed by never married females, and households headed by never
married males.
10 How is the money in (this/these) account(s) invested? Is it all in stocks, all in interest-earning assets,
is it split between these, or something else?
Risk-free and Risky Assets in the SCF:
A Guide
The current Appendix provides a technical manual, which distinguishes, and computes an-
alytically the risk-free, and risky assets encountered in the U.S. Federal Reserve Board’s
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). Further, the Appendix proceeds with a subsequent
computation of households’ liquid net worth, equal to the the net value of both risky and
risk-free assets. It is mentioned here that the criterion of assets’ inclusion in the computa-
tions is the selected assets’ “transactability”, implying those assets’ ease in selling them or
trading them, a mechanism permitting the adjustememt of the households’ portfolios.
The novel feature of the study lies in the distinction, and computation of the risk-free, and
risky assets in the latest version of the SCF, namely that of 2013. The point of differentiation
from similar approaches in the literature with most prominent here that of Chang et al.
[16] lies on the more delicate analysis of the stated as followed investment strategy by the
respondents. The whole approach aspires to offer an up-to-date technical manual for all
the researchers wishing to explore risk-taking behaviors in the households’ portfolios by
employing the SCF data.
In what follows below, and for the purposes of the dissertation project, there is also
a parallel presentation of the computations of risk-free, and risky assets, and the subse-
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quent computation of wealth as presented in the 1998 work of Jianakoplos & Bernasek [30]
(JB). These computations are necessary for the replication part of the empirical part of the
dissertation, which replicates the JB work for the 1989 SCF.
In essence, by delving into the 1989 SCF, and the 2013 SCF, the Financial Assets, the
Nonfinancial Assets, and the Debt of every household that are necessary for the computations
of wealth are studied, and the required information is extracted. Upon the presentation, the
assets are split into risk-free, and risky ones. In the analysis, whenever the computations of
assets or debt differ from the 1989 SCF to the 2013 SCF, the different computations, are
reported accordingly.1 The computations start with the Financial Assets that may be found
in the SCF. Here, assets such as checking accounts, money market type accounts, certifi-
cates of deposit, savings accounts, retirement accounts, mutual funds, stocks and brokerage
accounts, other managed assets (such as legal trusts, annuities or managed investment ac-
counts), cash value life insurance policies, as well as other financial assets, such as oil and
gas leases, futures contracts, royalties, proceeds from lawsuits or estates in settlement, and
loans made to others are encountered. Below, the analytical computations are presented,
accompanied by the classifications to risk-free, and risky assets.
B.1 Checking Accounts & Money Market Accounts
First comes the calculation of the respondents’ checking accounts. More specifically, the
respondent is being asked to report the number of checking accounts in his or her own
possession or in his or her family’s possession, as well as any money market accounts with
check-writing privileges. The latter, following SCF’s algorithm of calculation of Net Worth,
[1] could be distinguished in money market deposit accounts, and money market mutual
1 A version of the guide with references only to the 2013 SCF is also available by the author.
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funds. According to the SCF documentation, money market deposit accounts include money
market accounts held at commercial banks, savings and loans, savings banks, and credit
unions, while money market mutual funds include money market accounts held at institutions
other than commercial banks, savings and loans, savings banks, and credit unions.
B.1.1 Checking Accounts and Money Market Accounts in the
1989 SCF
Using as control variables, the variables X3507, X3511, X3515, X3519, X3523, and X3527,
that give the nuance of a checking account being also a money market type account, the total
checking accounts (CHECKINGS) are calculated first by summing accordingly the dollar
values found in variables X3506, X3510, X3514, X3518, X3522, and X3526, and setting
the corresponding control variables equal to 5 (non money market-type accounts). Some
remaining checking accounts are encountered in the variable X3529, and added accordingly.
The same variables, and controls are used next, accordingly, for the computation of money
market accounts, with the control variables set now equal to 1, and extra controls applied
to capture the type of the institution related to the account. The extra control variables,
are found in variables X9113, X9114, X9115, X9116, X9117, and X9118, and the purpose of
their application is to capture the difference between money market deposit accounts, and
money market mutual funds.
For the 1989 SCF, some supplementary money market accounts are given in variables
X3706, X3711, X3716, and X3718 with corresponding type of institution controls for these
accounts coming from variables X9131, X9132, X9133, and X9133, respectively. The sum-
mation of the dollar amounts with the corresponding controls, produces the dollar value of
money market deposit accounts (MMDAS), and the dollar value of money market mutual
funds (MMMFS). The subsequent summation of MMDAS and MMMFS produces the total
114
dollar amount of money market accounts, variable MMAS.
B.1.2 Checking Accounts and Money Market Accounts in the
2013 SCF
Using as control variables, the variables X3507, X3511, X3515, X3519, X3523, and X3527,
that give the nuance of a checking account being also a money market type account, the the
total checking accounts (CHECKINGS) are calculated by summing accordingly the variables
X3506, X3510, X3514, X3518, X3522, and X3526, and setting the corresponding control
variables equal to 5. Some remaining checking accounts are encountered in the variable
X3529, and added accordingly.
In the 2013 SCF one extra step is undertaken for the case of couples living together as
either married or partners, where the checking accounts for the respondent, and the checking
accounts for the respondent’s spouse or partner are computed, separately. More specifically,
using as control variables, the variables X7601, X7603, X7605, X7607, X7609 declaring the
nature (joint ownership or sole ownership or other ownership) of the corresponding accounts
X3507, X3511, X3515, X3519, X3523, and X3527 from above, the checking accounts for
the respondent (CHECKINGSR), and the checking accounts for the respondent’s spouse or
partner (CHECKINGSS) are built.
In general, the approach that is pursued not only here but in all accounts for which it
is feasible to do the distinction between the accounts jointly owned by the couple or solely
owned either by the respondent or the respondent’s spouse or partner has as following: The
account is assigned to both the respondent and the respondent’s spouse or partner if it
declared as a joint account (control variable equal to 1), it is assigned only to the respondent
if it is declared as a respondent’s account (control variable equal to 2), while it is assigned
only to the spouse/partner if it declared as an account in the name of the spouse/partner
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(control variable equal to 3). The value of the account is split between the respondent
and the respondent’s spouse or partner if the option “Equal amounts in R/spouse/partner
names” (control variable equal to 11) is declared.
The same variables, and controls are used next, accordingly, for the computation of money
market accounts, with the control variables set now equal to 1, and extra controls applied
to capture the type of the institution related to the account. The extra control variables,
are found in variables X9113, X9114, X9115, X9116, X9117, and X9118, and the purpose of
their application is to capture the difference between money market deposit accounts, and
money market mutual funds.
For the 2013 SCF, some supplementary money market accounts are given in variables
X3730, X3736, X3742, X3748, X3754, X3760, and X3765, with corresponding control vari-
ables, first the variables, X3732, X3738, X3744, X3750, X3756, X3762, and X3762 (control-
ling for the type of the account, and set equal to 4 or 30), and second the variables X9259,
X9260, X9261, X9262, X9263, X9264, and X9264 (controlling for the type of institution).
The summation of the dollar amounts with the corresponding controls, produces the
dollar value of money market deposit accounts (MMDAS), and the dollar value of money
market mutual funds (MMMFS). An extra step is undertaken to compute separately the
money market deposit accounts for the respondent, (MMDASR), and the money market
deposit accounts for the respondent’s spouse or partner, (MMDASS), as well as the money
market mutual funds for the respondent, (MMMFR), and the money market mutual funds
for the respondent’s spouse or partner, (MMMFS). The subsequent summation of (MM-
DAS) and (MMMFS) produces the total dollar amount of money market accounts, variable
MMAS or (MMASR) for the respondent or (MMASS) for the respondent’s spouse or partner.
Both CHECKINGS and MMAS are classified as risk-free assets.
Next follows the computation of respondents’ possible retirement assets, intended to fi-
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nance retirement. Retirement assets are scattered in several sections of the SCF. Below, IRAs
and Keogh accounts, are calculated first, followed by the computations of other employer-
sponsored accounts.
B.2 IRA & Keogh Accounts
For the computation of IRA/Keogh accounts, it is worth referring that the IRA or Keogh
account might belong to the respondent, his or her spouse or even any other person in the
household.
B.2.1 IRA & Keogh Accounts in the 1989 SCF
For the 1989 SCF, variables X3610, X3620, and X3630 in their summation give the total
dollar amount in IRA/Keogh accounts (variable IRAKH) for the respondent and/or the
respondent’s family members.
For the classification of IRA/Keogh accounts into risk-free and risky ones, the ways
the money is invested in the accounts is controlled with variable X3631 allowing for the
proper control. More specifically, the money could be invested in “CDs/bank accounts;
money market” (X3631 equal to one), in “stock; “mutual funds”” (X3631 equal to two), in
“bonds/similar assets;treasury bills;treasury notes” (X3631 equal to three), as well as in-
vestment combinations of the above, for instance, “combination of CDs, stocks, and bonds”
(X3631 equal to four) or “combination of stock and bonds” (X3631 equal to five) or “com-
bination of CDs and stock” (X3631 equal to six) or any “other combination” (X3631 equal
to minus seven).
JB classify as safe, “the IRA balances invested in certificates of deposit or bank accounts”,
which for the purposes of the current work are computed in IRAKHSAFEJB, while they
classify as risky “the sum of balances in IRAs not invested in bank deposits”, which for the
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purposes of the replication part of the work are computed in the variable IRAKHRISKYJB.
Next, beyond the JB definitions and separately, risk-free (IRAKHSAFE) and risky IRA
accounts (IRAKHRISKY) are computed following the more elaborate algorithm suggested
by Chang et al.(2014) [16],(p.47). More specifically, following the latter algorithm, the
safe IRA/Keogh accounts are composed of those accounts for which X3631 is equal to 1
or X3631 is equal to 3 (Bonds/Similar Assets; T-Bills) or 3631 = 11 (Universal life pol-
icy) plus two thirds of the amount of IRA/Keogh accounts for which X3631 is equal to 4,
(combination of money market-stock mutual funds-bonds and T-bills) plus one half of the
amount of IRA/Keogh accounts for which X3631 is equal to 5 (combination of stock mutual
funds-bonds and T-bills) or X3631 is equal to 6 (combination of money market and stock
mutual funds) or X3731 is equal to minus 7 (other). Subsequently, the risky IRA/Keogh
accounts are composed of those accounts for which X3631 = 2 (stocks) or X3631 = 14
(Real Estate/Mortgages) or X3631 = 15 (Limited Partnership) or X3631 = 16 (Brokerage
account) plus one third of the amount of IRA/Keogh accounts for which X3631 = 4, (combi-
nation of money market-stock mutual funds-bonds and T-bills), plus one half of the amount
of IRA/Keogh accounts for which X3631 = 5 (combination of stock mutual funds-bonds and
T-bills) or X3631 = 6 (combination of money market and stock mutual funds) or X3731 =
-7.
B.2.2 IRA & Keogh Accounts in the 2013 SCF
For the 2013 SCF, the rationale is the same but the implementation differs in terms of the
necessary variables’ new positions in the 2013 SCF. More specifically, Roth IRA accounts
can be found in variables X6551, X6559, and X6567, belonging respectively to the respon-
dent, the respondent’s spouse or partner, and any other family members. Similarly, rollover
IRA accounts are found in variables X6552, X6560, and X6568, belonging respectively to
the respondent, the respondent’s spouse or partner, and any other family members. Reg-
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ular or other IRA accounts are found in variables X6553, X6561, and X6569, belonging
respectively to the respondent, the respondent’s spouse or partner, and any other family
members. Finally, Keogh accounts are found in variables X6554, X6562, and X6570, belong-
ing respectively to the respondent, the respondent’s spouse or partner, and any other family
members.
By summing the variables X6551, X6552, X6553, and X6554, the IRA/Keogh accounts
for the respondent are built (IRAKHR). Similarly, by summing the variables X5559, X6560,
X6561, and X6562, the IRA/Keogh accounts for the respondent’s spouse or partner are
built (IRAKHS), while by summing the variables X6567, X6568, X6569, and X6570, the
IRA/Keogh accounts for other family members are built (IRAKHO). The total IRA/Keogh
accounts (IRAKH) are produced by summing (IRAKHR), (IRAKHS), and IRAKHO. Fur-
thermore, in the 2013 SCF, instead of one control variable linked to the investment strategy
followed for all the IRA/Keogh accounts, there are now three control variables, distinguish-
ing between the investment strategy followed for the IRA/Keogh accounts of the respondent
(control variable X6555), the investment strategy followed for the IRA/Keogh accounts of
the respondent’s spouse or partner (control variable X6563), and the investment strategy
followed for the IRA/Keogh accounts of the other family members (control variable X6571).
The IRA/Keogh accounts for the respondent (IRAKHR) can thus be distinguished to safe
IRA/Keogh accounts for the respondent (IRAKHSAFER), and risky IRA/Keogh accounts
for the respondent (IRAKHRISKYR). The same applies for the IRA/Keogh accounts for the
respondent’s spouse or partner (IRAKHS), which can be distinguished to safe IRA/Keogh
accounts for the respondent’s spouse or partner (IRAKHSAFES), and risky IRA/Keogh
accounts for the respondent’s spouse or partner (IRAKHSRISKYS). Similarly, IRA/Keogh
accounts for other family members (IRAKHO), can be distinguished to safe IRA/Keogh
accounts for other family members (IRAKHSAFEO), and risky IRA/Keogh accounts for
other family members (IRAKHRISKYO).
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In all these classifications, safe IRA/Keogh accounts are those IRA/Keogh accounts for
which the corresponding control variables are set equal to 2 (interest earning assets/bond),
half of those IRA/Keogh accounts for which the control variables are set equal to 3 (split),
and half of those IRA/Keogh accounts for which the control variables are set equal to 30
(mutual fund). At the same time, risky IRA/Keogh accounts are those IRA/Keogh accounts
for which the control variables are set equal to 1 (stock), half of those IRA/Keogh accounts
for which the control variables are set equal to 3 (split) or 30 (mutual fund), and those
IRA/Keogh accounts for which the control variables are set equal to 13 (commodities) or
minus 7 (other).
For the 2013 SCF, the total safe IRA/Keogh accounts IRAKHSAFE are built by the
summation of the safe IRA/Keogh accounts for the respondent (IRAKHSAFER), the safe
IRA/Keogh accounts for the respondent’s spouse or partner (IRAKHSAFES), and the safe
IRA/Keogh accounts for other family members (IRAKHSAFEO), that is IRAKHSAFE =
IRAKHSAFER + IRAKHSAFES + IRAKHSAFEO. Similarly, the total risky IRA/Keogh
accounts IRAKHRISKY are produced by the summation of the risky IRA/Keogh accounts
for the respondent (IRAKHRISKYR), the risky IRA/Keogh accounts for the respondent’s
spouse or partner (IRAKHRISKYS), and the risky IRA/Keogh accounts for other family
members (IRAKHRISKYO), that is IRAKHRISKY = IRAKHRISKYR + IRAKHRISKYS
+ IRAKHRISKYO.
Lastly, and for the purposes of the replication part of the work, it is mentioned that
the variables IRAKHSAFEJB, and IRAKHRISKYJB, with references to the new positions,
and the separate control variables, are built as following: IRAKHSAFEJB are all those safe
IRA/Keogh accounts for which the control variables are set equal to 2 (interest earning
assets/bond), while IRAKHRISKYJB are all those risky IRA/Keogh accounts for which the
control variables are set not equal to 2.
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B.3 Employer-Sponsored Accounts
Following (Bricker et al) [15],(p.33), as well as the FED’s algorithm for the computation
of quasi-liquid retirement accounts, employer-sponsored accounts, refer to accounts such as
“401(k), 403(b), thrift savings accounts from current or past jobs, other current job plans
from which loans or withdrawals can be made, as well as accounts from past jobs from which
the family expects to receive the account balance in the future”. The analysis is confined
to the aforementioned accounts because of the portability of the latter across jobs. Such
accounts may be invested in any asset, including stocks, bonds, pooled investment funds,
options, and real estate. Lastly, following footnote 39, on p.33 of [15], it is worth mentioning
that because of difficulties in translating future income streams directly into a current value,
two common types of retirement plans, namely Social Security (the federally funded Old-Age
and Survivors’ Insurance program (OASI), and employer-sponsored defined-benefit plans, are
not included in the assets described here.
B.3.1 Employer-Sponsored Accounts in the 1989 SCF
In the 1989 SCF, for the computation of employer-sponsored retirement accounts, the sec-
tion “Employment of Respondent”, and the section“Employment of R’s Spouse” are used.
Here, both the respondents and their spouses or partners, both working for someone else or
being self-employed, are called to report, excluding Social Security, and aside from already
recorded IRAs or Keogh plans, any other possible pension plans or tax-deferred savings plans
in their possession. Here thrift-type plans are built both for the respondent, and the respon-
dent’s spouse or partner by including thrift or savings accounts, and 401(k)/403(b)/SRA
accounts(with control variables, variables X4216, X4316, X4416 for the respondent’s ac-
counts, and variables X4816, X4916, and X5016 for the accounts of the respondent’s spouse
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or partner), as well as accounts for which the participants have the option to borrow (control
variables, variables X4227, X4327, X4427 for the respondent’s accounts, and variables X4827,
X4927, and X5027 for the accounts of the respondent’s spouse or partner) or accounts for
which the participants may withdraw in an emergency (control variables, variables X4231,
X4331, X4431 for the respondent’s accounts, and variables X4831 X4931, and X5031 for
the respondent’s spouse or partner). For the accounts fulfilling the control criteria, the dol-
lar vale of thrift accounts is equal to the summation of variables X4226, X4326, X4426 for
the respondent’s accounts (THRIFTR), and the summation of variables X4826, X4926, and
X5026 for the accounts of the respondent’s spouse or partner (THRIFTS). Is it worth men-
tioning that for these accounts, respondents, as well as the respondents’ spouses/partners
might have become indebted by acquiring a loan. This debt is computed by summing the
dollar amounts in variables X4229, X4329, X4429 for the respondent’s accounts (THRIFT-
DEBTR), and variables X4829, X4929, and X5029 for the accounts of the respondent’s
spouse or partner (THRIFTDEBTS), while controlling accordingly so as not to include any
loans already recorded (respective control variables for every possible loan, variables X4230,
X4330, X4430 for the respondent’s plans, and variables X4830, X4930, and X5030 for the
plans of the respondent’s spouse or partner). The net value of thrift-type plans is computed
for the respondent’s accounts (NETTHRIFTR), and the accounts of the respondent’s spouse
or partner (NETTHRIFTS) by subtracting accordingly any possible debt. 2 For the pur-
poses of the work, safe thrift-type plans for both the respondent (NETTHIRFTSAFER) and
the respondent’s spouse or partner (NETTHRIFTSAFES), as well as risky thrift-type plans
for both the respondent (NETTHRIFTRISKYR), and the respondent’s spouse or partner
(NETTHRIFRISKYS) are built by taking into consideration respondents’ feedback regard-
ing the investment vehicle of their savings plans (control variables, variables X4234, X4334,
2 It is noted that any possible pension mopups either for the respondent (variable X4436) or the respon-
dent’s spouse or partner (variable X5036) are not considered or included in further computations.
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X4434 for the respondent’s accounts, and variables X4834, X4934, and X5034 for the ac-
counts of the respondent’s spouse or partner). More specifically, as safe are classified the
savings plans invested “mostly or all in interest earning” (control variable(s) equal to 2),
while as risky are classified, the savings plans invested “mostly or all in stock” ( control
variable(s) equal to 1). For “split” investment strategies (control variable(s) equal to 3)
or “other” investment strategies (control variable equal to minus seven), half of the dollar
amount is allocated in safe savings accounts, and the other half of the amount is allocated in
risky savings accounts. Two last summations, first that summing the respondent’s , and the
respondent’s spouse or partner safe net thrift assets, (NETTHIRFTSAFER + NETTHRIFT-
SAFES), and that summing the respondent’s , and the respondent’s spouse or partner risky
net thrift assets, (NETTHRIFTRISKYR + NETTHRIFRISKYS), give the household’s total
safe net thrift assets (NETTHRIFTSAFE), and the household’s total risky net thrift assets
(NETTHRIFTRISKY).
B.3.2 Employer-Sponsored Accounts in the 2013 SCF
For the 2013 SCF, the rationale is the same but the positions, and the control variables are
different. More specifically, thrift-type plans are built again both for the respondent, and the
respondent’s spouse or partner by including in the computations 401(k)/403(b)/thrift/savings
plans/SRA accounts/SEP accounts/money purchase plans/457 plans (with control variables,
variables X11001, and X11101 for the respondent’s accounts, and variables X11301, and
X11401 for the accounts of the respondent’s spouse or partner), as well as accounts for
which the participants have the option to borrow (control variables, variables X11025, and
X11125 for the respondent’s accounts, and variables X11325, and X11425 for the accounts
of the respondent’s spouse or partner) or accounts for which the participants may with-
draw in an emergency (control variables, variables X11031, and X1131 for the respondent’s
accounts, and variables X11331, and X11431 for the respondent’s spouse or partner). For
123
the accounts fulfilling the control criteria, the dollar vale of thrift accounts is equal to the
summation of variables X11032, and X11132 for the respondent’s accounts (THRIFTR),
and the summation of variables X11332, and X11432 for the accounts of the respondent’s
spouse or partner (THRIFTS). Similarly to the 1989 SCF, it worth mentioning that for
these accounts, respondents, as well as the respondents’ spouses/partners might have be-
come indebted by acquiring a loan against the plan. This debt is computed by summing the
dollar amounts in variables X11027, and X11127 for the respondent’s accounts (THRIFT-
DEBTR), and variables X11327, and X11427 for the accounts of the respondent’s spouse
or partner (THRIFTDEBTS), while controlling accordingly so as not to include any loans
already recorded (respective control variables for every possible loan, variables X11070, and
X11170 for the respondent’s plans, and variables X11370, and X11470 for the plans of the
respondent’s spouse or partner). Again, the net value of thrift-type plans is computed for
the respondent’s accounts (NETTHRIFTR), and the accounts of the respondent’s spouse or
partner (NETTHRIFTS) by subtracting accordingly any possible debt, if necessary (control
variables for net amounts, variables X11033, and X11133 for the respondent’s accounts, and
variables X11333, and X11433 for the accounts of the respondent’s spouse or partner). 3 For
the purposes of the paper, safe thrift-type plans for both the respondent (NETTHIRFTR-
SAFE) and the respondent’s spouse or partner (NETTHRIFTSSAFE), as well as risky thrift-
type plans for both the respondent (NETTHRIFTRRISKY), and the respondent’s spouse or
partner (NETTHRIFTSRISKY) are built by taking into consideration respondents’ feedback
regarding the investment vehicle of their savings plans (control variables, variables X11036,
and X1136 for the respondent’s accounts, and variables X11336, and X11436 for the ac-
counts of the respondent’s spouse or partner). More specifically, as safe are classified the
savings plans invested “mostly or all in interest earning assets/bonds” (control variable(s)
3 Once again, any possible pension mopups either for the respondent (variable X11259) or the respondent’s
spouse or partner (variable X11559) are not considered or included in further computations.
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equal to 2), while as risky are classified, the savings plans invested “all in stocks” ( control
variable(s) equal to 1) or the savings plans invested in “commodities” ( control variable(s)
equal to 13). For “split” investment strategies (control variable(s) equal to 3) or “mutual
fund” investment strategies (control variable equal to 30) or “other” investment strategies
(control variable equal to minus seven), half of the dollar amount is allocated in safe savings
accounts, and the other half of the amount is allocated in risky savings accounts. Again,
two last summations, first that summing the respondent’s , and the respondent’s spouse or
partner safe net thrift assets, (NETTHIRFTRSAFE + NETTHRIFTSSAFE), and second
that summing the respondent’s , and the respondent’s spouse or partner risky net thrift as-
sets, (NETTHRIFTRRISKY + NETTHRIFTSRISKY), give the household’s total safe net
thrift assets (NETTHRIFTSAFE), and the household’s total risky net thrift assets (NET-
THRIFTRISKY), respectively.
Next, and always in the category of retirement wealth, future pension benefits to whose
the respondent and his or her spouse might have earned rights, complete the computations
for the 1989 SCF. Variables X5604, X5612, X5620, X5628, X5636, and X5644, give in their
summation the dollar amount of possible future pensions (FUTPEN).
For the 2013 SCF, possible future pensions are located in variables X5604, X5612, X5620,
X5628, which in their summation give FUTPEN. The four aforementioned future benefits
might belong to the respondent or the the respondent’s spouse or partner. Working with
the control variables X5606, X5614, X5622, and X5630, possible future pensions for the
respondent (FUTPENR), and possible future pensions for the respondent’s spouse or partner
(FUTPENS) are built separately.
Further, in the 2013 SCF, future benefits may be distinguished into safe ones, (variable
FUTPENSAFE), and risky ones ( variable FUTPENRISKY) based on the declared invest-
ment strategy (control variables, variables X6962, X6968, X6974, and X6980, respectively for
the above four possible accounts). More specifically, as safe are classified the future benefits
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invested “mostly or all in interest earning assets/bonds” (control variable(s) equal to 2),
while as risky are classified, the future benefits invested “all in stocks” (control variable(s)
equal to 1) or the future benefits invested in “commodities” (control variable(s) equal to
13) or “other” investment strategies (control variable equal to minus seven) . For “split”
investment strategies (control variable(s) equal to 3) or “mutual fund” investment strate-
gies (control variable equal to 30) , half of the dollar amount is allocated in safe future
benefits, and the other half of the amount is allocated in risky future benefits. The same
approach helps build the safe future benefits for the respondent (FUTPENRSAFE), and the
respondent’s spouse or partner (FUTPENSSAFE), as well as the risky currently received
benefits for the respondent (FUTPENRRISKY), and the respondent’s spouse or partner
(FUTPENSRISKY).
It is noted that some possible remaining future pension benefits are given in position
X6997, with control variable X5480 specifying to whom (that is to the respondent or the re-
spondent’s spouse/partner or both) these remaining benefits might belong. These remaining
accounts are added carefully to the above (FUTPEN), (FUTPENR), and (FUTPENS) but
there is no further information on their followed investment strategy so as to classify them
as safe or risky ones.
Lastly, in the 2013 SCF, there is one last category of retirement wealth to be considered,
the so-called pensions with currently received benefits belonging to the respondent or the
respondent’s spouse or partner. Such pensions according to the SCF (control variables
X6461, X6466, X6471, and X6476) may be currently account plans such as a 401(k), which
is of interest for the purposes of the work. The balances of such benefits can be found
in variables X6462, X6467, X6472, and X6477, and in their summation build the variable
CURRPEN. The SCF associates each of these four possible currently received benefits, with
respective control variable (variables X5315, X5323, X5331, and X5415), which allow the
allocation of the benefit either to the respondent or the respondent’s spouse or partner. In
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the light of this information, pensions with currently received benefits for the respondent
(CURRPENR), and pensions with currently received benefits for the respondent’s spouse or
partner (CURRPENS) are built with the control variables set equal to 1 for the respondent,
and the control variable set equal to 2 for the respondent’s spouse or partner.
Further, currently received benefits may be distinguished into safe ones, built in vari-
able (CURRPENSAFE), and risky ones built in (CURRPENRISKY) based on the declared
investment strategy (control variables, variables X6933, X6937, X6941, and X6945, respec-
tively for the above four possible accounts). More specifically, as safe are classified the
currently received benefits invested “mostly or all in interest earning assets/bonds” (control
variable(s) equal to 2), while as risky are classified, the currently received benefits invested
“all in stocks” (control variable(s) equal to 1) or the currently received benefits invested
in “commodities” (control variable(s) equal to 13) or “other” investment strategies (control
variable equal to minus seven) . For “split” investment strategies (control variable(s) equal
to 3) or “mutual fund” investment strategies (control variable equal to 30) , half of the dol-
lar amount is allocated in safe currently received benefits, and the other half of the amount
is allocated in risky currently received benefits. The same approach helps build the safe
currently received benefits for the respondent (CURRPENRSAFE), and the respondent’s
spouse or partner (CURRPENSSAFE), as well as the risky currently received benefits for
the respondent (CURRPENRRISKY), and the respondent’s spouse or partner (CURRPEN-
SRISKY).
It is noted that some possible remaining plans are given in position X6957, with con-
trol variable X5460 specifying to whom (that is to the respondent or the respondent’s
spouse/partner or both) these remaining accounts might belong. These remaining accounts
are added carefully to the above (CURRPEN), (CURRPENR), and (CURRPENS) but there
is no further information on their followed investment strategy so as to classify them as safe
or risky ones.
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It is worth referring that the algorithm followed by FED, for the 1989 SCF, [1], adds up
(IRAKH), (THRIFT), and (FUTPEN), in what it defines as the total value of quasi-liquid
retirement accounts. The latter, for the 2013 SCF is the summation of (IRAKH), (THRIFT),
(FUTPEN), and (CURRPEN).
B.4 CDs (Certificates of Deposit)
Next financial asset in the computations is that of the CDs or Certificates of Deposit. The
latter are “certificates that are held for a set period of time that must be cashed or renewed
at the maturity date”.
B.4.1 CDs (Certificates of Deposit) in the 1989 SCF
By not considering CDs that are part of IRAs or Keoghs, the respondents give the total
dollar value of CDs in their own possession or in their family’s possession in variable X3721
(CDS).
B.4.2 CDs (Certificates of Deposit) in the 2013 SCF
In the 2013 SCF, (CDS) are given in variable X3721 but one extra step is undertaken for the
case of couples living together as either married or partners, where the CDs for the respondent
(CDSR), and the CDs for the respondent’s spouse or partner (CDSS) are computed, sepa-
rately. More specifically, using as control variable, the variable X7620 declaring the nature
(joint ownership or sole ownership or other ownership) of the CD, The account is assigned to
both the respondent and the respondent’s spouse or partner if it declared as a joint account
(control variable equal to 1), the account is assigned to the respondent if it is declared as a
respondent’s account (control variable equal to 2), while it is assigned to the spouse/partner
if it declared as an account in the name of the spouse/partner (control variable equal to 3).
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The value of the account is split between the respondent and the respondent’s spouse or part-
ner if the option “Equal amounts in R/spouse/partner names” (control variable equal to 11)
is declared. In all other cases, the account’s value is shared by both individuals in the couple.
CDs are classified as risk-free assets.
B.5 Savings Accounts
After CDs, respondents’ savings accounts are computed, including any other accounts at
banks, savings, and loan associations, or credit unions.
B.5.1 Savings Accounts in the 1989 SCF
As the 1989 SCF refers, these accounts could be “passbook accounts, share accounts, Christ-
mas Club accounts, or any other type of savings account”.
In the 1989 SCF, the total dollar amount for every household (SAVINGS) is found by
summing up variables X3804, X3807, X3810, X3813, X3816, and X3818, while SAVINGS
are classified as risk-free assets.
B.5.2 Savings Accounts in the 2013 SCF
According to the 2013 SCF, [15] (p.32), “the savings account category includes a relatively
small number of tax-preferred accounts such as medical or health savings accounts and
Coverdell or 529 education accounts”. (SAVINGS) for 2013 are computed by summing up
variables X3730 (control variable X3732), X3736 (control variable X3738), X3742 (control
variable X3744), X3748 (control variable X3750), X3754 (control variable X3756), X3760
(control variable X3762), and X3765 (control variable X3732) (for any remaining accounts).
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The control variables capture the type of the saving account, and they could be any option
except for 4 (money market account) or 30 (sweep account or cash management account).
Further, there are two extra steps that are undertaken in the 2013 SCF. First, for the
case of couples living together as either married or partners, the savings for the respon-
dent (SAVINGSR), and the savings for the respondent’s spouse or partner (SAVINGSS) are
computed, separately. More specifically, for the first six savings accounts mentioned above,
using as respective control variables, the variables X3731, X3737, X3743, X3749, X3755, and
X3761, declaring the nature (joint ownership or sole ownership or other ownership) of the
savings account, the account is assigned to both the respondent and the respondent’s spouse
or partner if it declared as a joint account (control variable equal to 1), it is assigned only
to the respondent if it is declared as a respondent’s account (control variable equal to 2),
while it is assigned only to the spouse/partner if it declared as an account in the name of
the spouse/partner (control variable equal to 3). The value of the account is split between
the respondent and the respondent’s spouse or partner if the option “Equal amounts in
R/spouse/partner names” (control variable equal to 11) is declared. In all other cases, the
account’s value is shared by both individuals in the couple.
Second, savings in the 2013 SCF may be distinguished into safe ones, (SAVINGSSAFE)
and risky ones (SAVINGSRISKY) based on the declared investment strategy (control vari-
ables, variables X7074, X7077, X7080, X7083, X7086, and X7089, respectively for the first
six savings accounts). More specifically, as safe are classified the savings accounts invested
“mostly or all in interest earning assets/bonds” (control variable(s) equal to 2), while as
risky are classified, the savings accounts invested “all in stocks” (control variable(s) equal to
1) or savings accounts invested in “commodities” (control variable(s) equal to 13) or “other”
investment strategies (control variable equal to minus seven) . For “split” investment strate-
gies (control variable(s) equal to 3) or “mutual fund” investment strategies (control variable
equal to 30) , half of the dollar amount is allocated in safe savings accounts, and the other
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half of the amount is allocated in risky savings accounts. The same approach helps build
the safe savings accounts for the respondent (SAVINGSSAFER), and the ones of the re-
spondent’s spouse or partner (SAVINGSSAFES), as well as the risky savings accounts for
the respondent (SAVINGSRISKYR), and the ones of the respondent’s spouse or partner
(SAVINGSRISKYS).
B.6 Mutual Fund Holdings
B.6.1 Mutual Fund Holdings in the 1989 SCF
Next, any possible mutual fund holdings of the respondents and their families are computed.
Here the respondents are prompted not to include and pension-type, thrift-saving, 401-k or
profit sharing plans, or accounts already recorded. Instead, they are prompted to report
their holdings into stock mutual funds (STMUTF) (control variable X3821, total market
value in variable X3822), tax-free bond mutual funds (TFBMUTF) (control variable X3823,
total market value in variable X3824), government or government backed bond mutual funds
(GBMUTF) (control variable X3825, total market value in variable X3826), any other bond
mutual funds (OBMUTF) (control variable X3827, total market value in variable X3828),
and combination mutual funds or any other mutual funds (COMUTF) (control variable
X3829, total market value in variable X3830). The algorithm of FED in excluding “money
market funds and indirectly held mutual funds” [15] (p.32) is followed, and total directly-
held mutual funds, (MUTF) are built by summing (STMUF), (TFBMUTF), (GBMUTF),
(OBMUTF), and (COMUTF).
To distinguish further between risky mutual funds and risk-free mutual funds, the algo-
rithm of Chang et al. (2014) [16], (p.46) is followed. More specifically, for the 1989 SCF,
risky mutual fund holdings (MUTFRISKY) are computed by summing up the market values
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of stock mutual funds and half of the market value of combination mutual funds, (STMUF +
0.5*COMUTF), while risk-free mutual fund holdings (MUTFSAFE) are calculated by sum-
ming up the market values of tax-free bond mutual funds, government or government backed
bond mutual funds, any other bond mutual funds, as well as the other half of the market value
of combination mutual funds (TFBMUTF + GBMUTF + OBMUTF + 0.5*COMUTF).
B.6.2 Mutual Fund Holdings in the 2013 SCF
For the 2013 SCF, total directly-held mutual funds, (MUTF) are computed similarly the
1989 SCF computations, with only one extra addition, namely there is one last category
of other mutual funds, (OMUTF) (control variable X7785, total market value in variable
X7787), which is added accordingly.
For the distinction between risk-free, and risky mutual funds, the computations are again
similar to the 1989 SCF, with one extra nuance here that the other mutual funds (OMUTF)
encountered only in the 2013 SCF are being split equally between risky and risk-free assets:
that is (STMUF) + 0.5*(COMUTF) + 0.5*(OMUTF) for risky mutual fund holdings, and
(TFBMUTF) + (GBMUTF) + (OBMUTF) + 0.5*(COMUTF) + 0.5*(OMUTF) for safe
mutual fund holdings.
B.7 Savings Bonds and Bonds Other than Savings Bonds
Next follows the calculation of savings bonds that the respondents or/and their families may
have in their possession. According to the SCF, savings bonds include only U.S. government
issues (recent series including EE, HH, and I, and older bonds including series E and H)
that can be purchased by payroll deduction. Variable X3902 records their total face value,
(SAVBND).
Next, bonds other than savings bonds are computed, including only those held directly,
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and not those being part of a managed investment account or bond fund, [15] (p.32). Here,
corporate and mortgage-backed bonds (MRTBND) (face value recorded in variable X3906),
U.S. government bonds or Treasury bills (GOVTBND) (face value recorded in variable
X3908), state or municipal bonds or other taxfree bonds (MUNBND) (face value recorded in
variable X3910), and corporate or foreign bonds or any other type of bonds (OBND) (face
value recorded in variable X3912 for the 1989 SCF, and in variables X7633 and X7634 for the
2013 SCF) are encountered. Apart from summing up all the above face values to compute
the total face value of bonds, (BOND = MORTBND + GOVBND + MUNBND + OBND),
one step further is followed by computing risk-free, and risky bonds.
Following Friend and Blume [25], (p.907), U.S. government savings bonds are classified
as risk-free bonds, (BONDSAFE = SAVBND), while U.S. government bonds or Treasury
bills, and state or municipal bonds or other taxfree bonds, as well as mortgage-backed bonds,
and corporate or foreign bonds are classified as risky bonds (BONDRISKY = GOVBND +
MUNBND + MRTBND + OBND). JB share the same classification.
B.8 Stocks & Brokerage Accounts
Next comes the computation of any stocks in the ownership of the respondent or his/her
family. Following the survey’s guideline, it is about publicly traded stocks that are directly
held, that is, “corporate equities not held as part of a managed investment account or
bond fund”, [15] (p.32), so the respondents are called not to include ”any stock held through
mutual funds, pension accounts or trusts, or in accounts or businesses that have been already
recorded”. Variable X3915 gives the total market value of the stock (STOCKS), while stocks
are classified as a risky asset.
On related grounds, the computation of possible brokerage accounts owed by the respon-
dents and/or their families for the purposes of the purchase or sale of stocks, and other
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securities takes place. Based on variable X3930, the total dollar value of possible “cash”
or “call money” accounts, (CALL), is computed with the latter accounts referring to “ac-
counts holding money received from the sale of securities until the money is reinvested”.
At this point, it is worth mentioning that some of the respondents owning brokerage ac-
counts, might find themselves indebted in related margin loans (the so-called borrowing on
margin accounts). This debt is computed here from the variable X3932 (MARGINDEBT).
The net value of brokerage accounts (CALL - MARGINDEBT) is deemed as a risky asset
(NETBROKACCTS).
B.9 Other Managed Assets
B.9.1 Annuities, Trusts, and Managed Investment Accounts in
the 1989 SCF
Next comes the computation of respondents’ other managed assets including personal annu-
ities (control variable, variable X3934), trusts (control variable, variable X3935), managed
investment accounts (control variable, variable X3936), or any remaining other managed
accounts (control variable, variable X3937). In the 1989 SCF, more than one controls might
apply in the description of the managed account.
Following Bricker et al., [15] (p.33), “annuities” may be those “in which the family has
an equity interest in the asset or in which the family possesses an entitlement only to a
stream of income”. For the purposes of the analysis, and for the computation of wealth,
only the annuities in which the family has an equity interest, that is annuities which the
respondents could “cash in” if they wanted to are included. Furthermore, the “trusts” or
“managed investment accounts” included in other managed assets are again those “in which
families have an equity interest, and for which components are not separately recorded”,
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implying accounts in which the ownership is complicated or the management is undertaken
by a professional.
With all the above nuances into consideration, first, the total dollar value of all types of
other managed assets (OTHMA) is built, based on the variable X3942, which includes all
types of managed accounts with an equity interest. Further, based on (OTHMA), and the
managed accounts’ type(s) (control variables, variables X3934, X3935, X3936, and X3937),
annuities (ANNUITIES), and trusts (TRUSTS) are built separately with trusts also includ-
ing managed investment accounts and other managed accounts. Subsequently, based on
the reported by the respondent followed investment strategy, a distinction between risk-
free and risky other managed assets takes place. More specifically, safe annuities (ANNU-
ITIESSAFE), and safe trusts (TRUSTSSAFE) are built including those managed accounts
for which, most of the money is invested in bonds/interest/CDS/money market accounts
(control variable X3947=2), and similarly, risky annuities (ANNUITIESRISKY), and risky
trusts (TRUSTSRISKY) are built including those managed accounts for which the money
is invested in stocks/mutual funds (control variable X3947=1) or real estate (control vari-
able X3947=3). For any other investment strategy, for instance, a combination strategy of
stocks, mutual funds, and CDS, (control variable X3947=5), or a mixed strategy (control
variable X3947=6) or any other strategy (control variable X3947=-7), half of the correspond-
ing amount is allocated in the risk-free accounts, and the other half in the risky ones. Safe
annuities, and safe trusts build in their summation the safe other managed accounts (OTH-
MASAFE) = (ANNUITIESSAFE) +(TRUSTSSAFE), while risky annuities, and risky trusts
build in their summation the risky other managed accounts (OTHMARISKY) = (ANNU-
ITIESRISKY) + (TRUSTSRISKY). As a last note here it is mentioned that for the purposes
of the replication part of the work of JB, the latter, report only trust assets as a part of their
risky assets, without any reference to the investment strategy, hence a variable TRUST-
SRISKYJB is built to be equal to (TRUSTS).
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B.9.2 Annuities, Trusts, and Managed Investment Accounts in
the 2013 SCF
In the 2013 SCF, the same rationale is followed but the variables used are found in differ-
ent positions. More specifically, for annuities (ANNUITIES) the dollar amount is found on
variable X6577, while further distinction into safe ones (ANNUITIESSAFE), and risky ones
(ANNUITIESRISKY) is based on the control variable X6581. Similarly, trusts or managed
investment accounts (TRUSTS) are built with the dollar amount found in variable X6587
with further split into safe accounts (TRUSTSSAFE), and risky ones (TRUSTSRISKY) be-
ing based on the control variable X6591. As safe annuities (ANNUITIESSAFE), and safe
trusts/managed investment accounts (TRUSTSSAFE) are classified those accounts invested
“mostly or all in interest earning assets/bonds” (control variable(s) equal to 2), while as risky
annuities (ANNUITIESRISKY), and risky trusts/managed investment accounts (TRUST-
SRISKY) are classified those accounts invested “all in stocks” (control variable(s) equal to
1) or the accounts invested in “commodities” (control variable(s) equal to 13) or “other” in-
vestment strategies (control variable equal to minus seven). For “split” investment strategies
(control variable(s) equal to 3) or “mutual fund” investment strategies (control variable equal
to 30), half of the dollar amount is allocated into safe managed accounts, and the other half
of the amount is allocated into risky ones. Safe annuities, and safe trusts/managed invest-
ment accounts build in their summation the safe other managed accounts (OTHMASAFE) =
(ANNUITIESSAFE) +(TRUSTSSAFE), while risky annuities, and risky trusts build in their
summation the risky other managed accounts (OTHMARISKY) = (ANNUITIESRISKY) +
(TRUSTSRISKY)
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B.10 Life Insurance Policies
Next financial asset in the analysis is that of possible life insurance policies owned by the
respondents or anyone in their families. The two major types of life insurance are term and
cash-value policies: Term policies pay a benefit if the insured person dies, but otherwise have
no value. They are often provided through an employer or union, but may also be bought by
individuals. Cash-value policies also pay a death benefit, but differ in that they build up a
value as premiums are paid. Following the Federal Reserve Bulletin, [15](p.33), only cash
value life insurance policies are considered here.
The total cash value of these policies is given in variable X4006, and based on the latter,
the cash value of whole life insurance policies, called (CASHLIFE). Still on the category of
cash value life insurance policies, the respondents might have become indebted by taking
loans against these policies. The possible debt, is found on variable X4010, and is called
(CASHLIFEDEBT), and by subtracting it accordingly, the net value of cash value life insur-
ance policies (NETCASHLIFE = CASHLIFE - CASHLIFEDEBT) is built. Sharing the JB
approach, the net value of cash value life insurance policies (NETCASHLIFE) is classified
as a risk-free asset.
B.11 Miscellaneous Assets
Lastly, a category of miscellaneous assets is computed, including first, other assets such as
money owed by friends, relatives, businesses, or others otherwise coded as “loans to friends or
relatives”, as well as other financial assets such as oil and gas leases, futures contracts, pro-
ceeds from lawsuits or estates in settlement, royalties, deferred compensation, or non-publicly
traded stock 4. These assets could be characterized as other financial assets, and their total
4 Following [15], (p.33), any possible employer-related stock options are excluded from the computations.
The latter are typically not publicly traded, or their executions is otherwise constrained, hence “their
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dollar value (OTHFIN) is built based on the summation of variables X4018, X4022, X4026,
and X4030 with corresponding control variables for the last three variables, the variables,
X4020, X4024, and X4028, respectively. At the same time, in variables X4022, X4026, and
X4030, again controlling by X4020, X4024, and X4028, respectively, other possible assets in
the respondents’ possession may be encountered such as gold, silver or other metals, jew-
elry or gem stones, art objects, rare books, coin collections, stamp collections, even furs or
oriental rugs. These assets could be characterized as other nonfinancial assets (OTHNFIN),
and although they are referred again in the “Nonfinancial Assets” section, their total dollar
value is built here accordingly.
JB refer to the summation of both other financial assets, and other nonfinancial assets,
as “other miscellaneous assets”, and the same summation of (OTHFIN) and (OTHNFIN) is
followed here so as to build the total value of other miscellaneous assets (MISCASSETS =
OTHFIN + OTHNFIN).
It is also possible that respondents might have found themselves indebted in loans for
the acquisition on any of the above miscellaneous assets, with possible, not recorded earlier
debt, found in variable X4032 (MISCDEBT). By subtracting (MISCDEBT) from (MISCAS-
SETS), the net value of other miscellaneous assets (NETMISCASSETS) (= MISCASSETS
- MISCDEBT) is obtained.
Lastly, the net value of other miscellaneous assets is classified by [16] (p.47) as a safe or
risk-free asset but JB include it in their group of risky assets, a classification that is also
shared here.
Next comes the consideration of Nonfinancial Assets, which consist of assets such as
primary residences, and nonresidential real estate properties, as well as business interests,
and miscellaneous nonfinancial assets such as artwork, precious metals, antiques or oil and
gas leases.
value is uncertain until the exercise date”.
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B.12 Real Estate Wealth
It is worth noting that in real estate, primary residences, other residential properties, as
well as nonresidential real estate properties are encountered. Following the FED documen-
tation, ([15] (p.34)), primary residences include mobile homes and their sites, the parts of
farms and ranches not used for farming or ranching business, condominiums, cooperatives,
townhouses, other single-family homes, and other permanent dwellings. Other residential
property includes second homes, time-shares, one- to four- family rental properties, and
other types of residential properties, as well as outstanding balances on loans that the family
may have made to finance the sale of properties they previously owned and which are still
owed to the family. Lastly, nonresidential real estate includes the following types of proper-
ties unless they are owned through a business: commercial property, rental property with five
or more units, farm and ranch land, undeveloped land, and all other types of nonresidential
real estate.
For the purposes of the work the first thing of interest is the specification of homeowner-
ship. By consulting the SCF documentation, [15] (p.4, footnote 12), “a family is considered a
homeowner if at least one person in the family owns at least some part of the family’s primary
residence”. Here, variable X508 gives the legal ownership status of the farm/ranch, variable
X601 gives the ownership status of the mobile home and site or lot, and variable X701 gives
the ownership status of the rest of housing settings. By controlling accordingly these vari-
ables, the binary variable, HOMEOWNER, is built indicating whether the respondent is a
homeowner or not.
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B.12.1 Nonresidential Real Estate in the 1989 SCF
The computation of other nonresidential real estate is of subsequent interest.To that effect,
the “Investment Real Estate and Vacation Properties” section of the SCF is visited, which
records whether the respondents (or anyone in their families) own a seasonal residence such as
a vacation house or other real estate such as land and a trailer or mobile home. Distinguishing
properly (with control variables X1703, X1803, and X1903 between other residential real
estate, and nonresidential real estate, with the latter having the nuance of not being used for
family residential purposes, the calculations are based on the summation of variables X1706,
X1806, X1906, X2002, and X2012 which give the total worth of this kind of properties, if
these properties were to be sold today. The above analysis, results in the creation of the
variable of interest here, which is the value of nonresidential real estate (NRESRE).
Next, of immediate interest is the computation of the net value of other nonresidential
real estate. To that effect, the corresponding debt is computed by looking at any outstand-
ing loans that the respondents (or their families) might have taken for the purchase of any
other nonresidential property. To distinguish between loans for other residential real estate,
and loans for nonresidential real estate a careful control is applied with variables X1703,
X1803, and X1903, followed by a subsequent summation of the variables X1715, X1815,
and X1915 so as to compute the total dollar amount of any money still owed. Any loans
for remaining properties bought for non-recreational purposes (variable X2016), are added
appropriately. One last nuance in the debt computations, comes from the SCF algorithm
for the computation of net worth, [1], by visiting the “Loans” section in the 1989 SCF or
the “Other Consumer Loans” section in the 2013 SCF, and looking for not already recorded
loans, taken for the purposes of investment in real estate (control variables X2710, X2727,
X2810, X2827, X2910, and X2927 equal to ‘78’ with the dollar value of any money still owed
found in the summation of variables X2723, X2740, X2823, X2840, X2923, and X2940. The
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above analysis, leads to the computation of the value of the debt related to nonresidential
real estate (NRESREDEBT). Subsequently, the net value of nonresidential real estate (NET-
NRESRE) is equal to the value of nonresidential real estate minus any related debt, that is
(NETNRESRE) = (NRESRE) - (NRESREDEBT).
B.12.2 Nonresidential Real Estate in the 2013 SCF
The computations of the net value of nonresidential real estate (NETNRESRE) in the 2013
SCF are identical with the only difference that specific variables are not encountered in the
2013 SCF. In particular, the positions X1903, X1906, X1915 are not any more available.
The analysis of nonresidential real estate closes by noting that for the purposes of the work,
the net value of other nonresidential real estate is deemed as a risky asset.
B.13 Businesses
B.13.1 Businesses in the 1989 SCF
Next comes the computation of the value of any businesses that the respondent might be
involved in. By “involvement”, originally ownership or partnership combined with an ac-
tive management role from the part of the respondent (and his/her family) is meant. A
plethora of business classifications arises here: From farm and ranch businesses to privately-
held businesses, as well as professional practices or partnerships. The goal is to measure
the relationship between the respondent’s (and his/her family’s) personal finances, and the
finances of the respondent’s (and his/her family’s) business.
To that effect, the value of actively managed businesses is first calculated by following
the algorithm of the SCF, [1] (p.3), which defines the value for active businesses as “the sum
of net equity if business were sold today”, (that is variables X513 and X526, in the case
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of agricultural businesses (weighted by the corresponding percentage of the property used
for farming or ranching business, variable X507), and variables X3129, X3229, X3329, and
X3335, in the case of all other kinds of business), plus any “money owed from business to
the respondent (and his/her family)”, (that is variables X3124, X3224, and X3324), minus
any “money owed from the respondent (and his/her family) to business” not previously
reported, (that is variables X3126, X3226, and X3326), plus ”the value of personal assets
used as collateral for business loans”, (that is variables X3121, X3221, and X3321).
On a second level of analysis, the respondents might have interests in other businesses
or partnerships, without having an active management role. These non-actively managed
businesses could be limited partnerships or other partnerships, subchapter S corporations
and other corporations, sole proprietorships or any other type of businesses, and their value
is calculated by summing variables X3408, X3412, X3416, X3420, X3424, and X3428.
In the end, the total net value of businesses owned, (BUS) is the sum of both actively
managed and non-actively managed business.
B.13.2 Businesses in the 2013 SCF
(BUS) is computed identically in the 2013 SCF with the only exception that some vari-
ables have been removed, namely the variables X3329, X3324, X3326, and X3321 are not
encountered in the 2013 version.
Lastly, it is noted that JB characterize the “net value of business owned” as a risky asset.
Since, they do not distinguish between actively and non-actively managed business, the
current work takes the liberty to assume that they refer to both types of businesses, and
include (BUS) as a component of risky assets.
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B.14 The Definitions of WEALTH
B.14.1 The definition of WEALTH by JB
JB measure wealth as the sum of the net value of risky and risk-free assets. Risk-free assets
for JB are defined to include dollar balances in checking accounts, savings, and money market
accounts, certificates of deposit, U.S. savings bonds, IRA balances invested in certificates of
deposit or bank accounts, and the cash value of life insurance less policy loans outstanding.
Hence with reference to the above built variables:
(B.1)(RiskFreeAssets)JB = CHECKINGS + SAV INGS +MMAS + CDS
+ IRAKHSAFEJB +BONDSAFE +NETCASHLIFE
On the other hand, the risky assets (including mixed-risk assets) are defined by JB as
the sum of balances in IRAs not invested in bank deposits, stock holdings less margin loans
outstanding, bonds, trust assets, the net value of real estate owned other than residential
housing, the net value of business owned, and the net value of other miscellaneous assets
(e.g. precious metal, futures contracts, art work) reported by the household. Hence, again
with reference to the constructed variables:
(B.2)
(RiskyAssets)JB = IRAKHRISKY JB +BONDRISKY + STOCKS
+NETBROKACCTS + TRUSTSRISKY JB
+NETNRESRE +BUS +NETMISCASSETS
Thus,
(B.3)WEALTHJB = (RiskFreeAssets)JB + (RiskyAssets)JB
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B.14.2 An Alternative Definition of WEALTH
JB, in their analysis, make no reference to thrift-type plans or mutual fund holdings, while
in terms of other managed assets, they refer only to legal trusts. Below, the analysis is
enhanced by including or elaborating on all the aforementioned missing asset categories,
which are also split to risk-free and risky assets. Below, the extra assets considered in the
computations are added, while the EK subscript indicates the author’s approach.
(B.4)
(RiskFreeAssets)EK = CHECKINGS + SAV INGS +MMAS + CDS
+ IRAKHSAFE +NETTHRIFTSAFE
+ FUTPEN + CURRPENSAFE +MUTFSAFE
+BONDSAFE +OTHMASAFE +NETCASHLIFE
(RiskyAssets)EK = IRAKHRISKY +NETTHRIFTRISKY





(B.6)WEALTHEK = (RiskFreeAssets)EK + (RiskyAssets)EK
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B.14.3 WEALTH in the case of couples in the 2013 SCF
Lastly, and in accordance with the handling of the third essay of the dissertation of the two
spouses or partners in a couple as two separate individuals, the individual wealth of each
partner or spouse is attempted below based on the available information in the 2013 SCF.
As already mentioned in the SCF presentation, the 2013 SCF allows to a certain extent
the computation of the individual wealth of each of the spouses or partners in the case of a
couple. Below, the separate computations of wealth for the respondent and the respondent’s
spouse or partner are given.One extra nuance, accounted for in the 2013 SCF is the distinction
of savings into safe and risky ones for both the respondent, and the respondent’s spouse or
partner.
(WEALTH)R = CHECKINGSR + SAV INGSSAFER +MMASR + CDSR
+ IRAKHSAFER +NETTHRIFTSAFER + FUTPENSAFER
+ CURRPENSAFER +MUTFSAFE +BONDSAFE
+OTHMASAFE +NETCASHLIFE + IRAKHRISKY R
+ SAV INGSRISKY R +NETTHRIFTRISKY R




(WEALTH)S = CHECKINGSS + SAV INGSSAFES +MMASS + CDSS
+ IRAKHSAFES +NETTHRIFTSAFES + FUTPENSAFES
+ CURRPENSAFES +MUTFSAFE +BONDSAFE
+OTHMASAFE +NETCASHLIFE + IRAKHRISKY S
+ SAV INGSRISKY S +NETTHRIFTRISKY S




Indicative Questions from the 2013 SCF
Related to Assets and Liabilities
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
CHECKING ACCOUNTS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Now I’d like to ask about different types of financial assets that you might have. First,
do you (or anyone in your family living here) have any checking accounts at any type of
institution?
IF YES: Please do not include any money market accounts unless you use them regularly as
checking accounts.
DO NOT INCLUDE BUSINESS ACCOUNTS.




DO NOT INCLUDE ACCOUNTS HELD FOR PEOPLE NOT IN THE FAMILY LIVING
HERE.
How much is in this account?
Is this a money market-type account?
Is this a joint account with your (husband/wife/partner), or is the account in your name, in
your (husband’s/wife’s/partner’s) name, or in someone else’s?
1. *Joint account; with spouse/partner 2. *R’s account 3. *Spouse’s/partner’s account 4.
*Other family member’s account 5. *CHILD ONLY; grandchild only 6. Child/grandchild
and R/spouse/partner 8. Other relative with R/spouse/partner 9. Unrelated person, n.f.s.
10. Unrelated person with R/spouse/partner 11. Equal amounts in R/spouse/partner names
(only use for CDs) 50. Trust account 51. Personal business account -7. *Other 0. Inap.
How much is in your (family’s) remaining checking account?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Do you (or anyone in your family here) have any CDs or certificates of deposit at financial
institutions?
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IF YES: Please do not include CDs that are part of IRAs or Keoghs I have already recorded.
IF R ASKS: CDs are certificates held for a set period of time that must be cashed or renewed
at the maturity date.
INCLUDE ’BANKERS ACCEPTANCES’ AND ’REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS’. DO NOT
INCLUDE ACCOUNTS HELD FOR PEOPLE NOT IN THE FAMILY LIVING HERE.
What is the total dollar value of (this CD/these CDs)?
Is this CD held jointly with your (husband/wife/partner), or is it in your name, in your
(husband’s/wife’s/partner’s) name, or in someone else’s?
1. *Joint account; with spouse/partner 2. *R’s account 3. *Spouse’s/partner’s account 4.
*Other family member’s account 5. *CHILD ONLY; grandchild only 6. Child/grandchild
and R/spouse/partner 8. Other relative with R/spouse/partner 9. Unrelated person, n.f.s.
10. Unrelated person with R/spouse/partner 11. Equal amounts in R/spouse/partner names
(only use for CDs) 50. Trust account 51. Personal business account -7. *Other 0. Inap. (no
certificates of deposit: X3719ˆ=1; R lives alone: X7001=1)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
SAVINGS/MONEY MARKET ACCOUNTS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Do you (or anyone in your family living here) have any savings or money market accounts?
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These could be traditional savings accounts, Coverdell or 529 education accounts, Christmas
Club accounts, or any type of savings or money market account I have not already recorded.
IF YES, PROBE: Please do not include Flexible Spending Accounts, accounts that are part
of a pension plan, or mutual funds other than money market funds.
A MONEY MARKET ACCOUNT HAS AN INTEREST RATE THAT VARIES FROM
MONTH TO MONTH, AND IT USUALLY HAS LIMITED CHECKING PRIVILEGES.
COVERDELL ACCOUNTS AND STATE-SPONSORED ”529” ACCOUNTS ARE EDU-
CATIONAL SAVINGS PLANS (ESPs).
DO NOT INCLUDE CUSTODIAL ACCOUNTS HELD FOR PEOPLE NOT IN THE FAM-
ILY LIVING HERE.
DO NOT INCLUDE MUTUAL FUNDS OTHER THAN MONEY MARKET ACCOUNTS.
INCLUDE ALL OTHER SUCH ACCOUNTS IN WHICH THE FAMILY HAS ANY ASSET
INTEREST.
How much is in this account?
Is this a joint account with your (husband/wife/partner),or is the account in your name, in
your (husband’s/wife’s/partner’s) name, or in someone else’s? Is this account in your name,
or in someone else’s?
1. *Joint account; with spouse/partner 2. *R’s account 3. *Spouse’s/partner’s account 4.
*Other family member’s account 5. *CHILD ONLY; grandchild only 6. Child/grandchild
and R/spouse/partner 8. Other relative with R/spouse/partner 9. Unrelated person, n.f.s.
10. Unrelated person with R/spouse/partner 11. Equal amounts in R/spouse/partner names
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(only use for CDs) 50. Trust account 51. Personal business account -7. *Other 0. Inap.
What type of account is this? (Is it a traditional savings account, a Coverdell or 529 educa-
tional account, a money market account, or some other type of account?)
1. *TRADITIONAL SAVINGS ACCOUNT; “passbook account”; “statement account”
2. *COVERDELL/EDUCATION IRA 3. *529/STATE-SPONSORED EDUCATION AC-
COUNT 4. *MONEY MARKET ACCOUNT 5. Christmas club account; other account for
designated saving purpose (e.g., vacation) 6. Share account 7. *HEALTH SAVINGS AC-
COUNT; medical savings account 12. *OTHER FLOATING-RATE SAVINGS ACCOUNT
(other than those coded 4) 14. Informal group saving arrangement 20. Foreign account type
30. *SWEEP ACCOUNT n.e.c.; cash management account -7. *OTHER 0. Inap.
How is the money in this account invested? Is it all in stocks, all in interest-earning assets,
is it split between these, or something else?
IF R SAYS ”MUTUAL FUND”, PROBE FOR WHETHER IT IS A STOCK FUND, A
BOND FUND, OR ONE SPLIT OVER BOTH TYPES
1. *ALL IN STOCKS 2. *ALL IN INTEREST EARNING ASSETS/BONDS 3. *SPLIT
4. Real estate 5. Hedge fund 6. Annuities 8. Mineral rights 9. GIC/Guaranteed Income
Contract 12. Business investment n.e.c. 15. Life insurance 25. Non publicly traded business
or other such investment 30. Mutual fund (not a preferred response) -1. None -7. *OTHER
0. Inap.
How much is in all your (family’s) remaining savings accounts? (What was the average over
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the last month?)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
MUTUAL FUNDS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Do you (or anyone in your family living here) have any mutual funds or hedge funds?
IF YES: Please do not include assets you have already told me about or any pension or
401(k) accounts.
INCLUDE OPEN-END AND CLOSED-END FUNDS, UNIT TRUSTS, EQUITY TRUSTS,
LOAD AND NO-LOAD FUNDS, COMMODITY POOLS, REITs (REAL ESTATE IN-
VESTMENT TRUSTS), MORTGAGE TRUSTS, AND ALL OTHER TYPES OF MU-
TUAL FUNDS.
I need to know what types of funds you have. Do you have. . .
stock mutual funds?
(IF R ASKS, STOCK FUNDS INCLUDE DOMESTIC STOCK FUNDS, GROWTH FUNDS,
INDEX FUNDS, GLOBAL STOCK FUNDS, SECTOR FUNDS, AND ANY OTHER TYPE
OF FUND PRIMARILY INVESTED IN STOCK.)
What is the total market value of all of the stock mutual funds that you (and your family
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living here) have?
Do you have. . .
tax-free bond mutual funds?
THESE FUNDS INCLUDE MUNICIPAL BONDS (’MUNIs’) AND OTHER TAX-EXEMPT
BONDS
What is the total market value of all of the tax-free bond mutual funds that you (and your
family living here) have?
Do you have. . .
U.S. government or government backed bond mutual funds?
THESE FUNDS INCLUDE U.S. TREASURY BILLS AND BONDS AND OTHER U.S.
GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED BONDS.
What is the total market value of all of the U.S. government or government backed bond
mutual funds that you (and your family living here) have?
Do you have. . .
other bond mutual funds?
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THESE FUNDS INCLUDE CORPORATE BONDS, COMMERCIAL PAPER, JUNK BONDS,
FOREIGN AND ALL REMAINING TYPES OF BONDS
What is the total market value of all of the other bond mutual funds that you (and your
family living here) have?
Do you have. . .
combination funds?
COMBINATION FUNDS (’BALANCED FUNDS’) HOLD BOTH STOCK AND BONDS.
What is the total market value of all of the combination funds that you (and your family
living here) have?
Do you have. . .
any other mutual funds, hedge funds, or REITs?
REITs (”reetz”) ARE REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS.
What is the total market value of all of these other funds that you (and your family living
here) have?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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SAVINGS BONDS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Do you (or your family here) have any U.S. government savings bonds?
DO NOT INCLUDE T-BILLS OR TREASURY BONDS: THESE WILL BE COLLECTED
IN THE NEXT SET OF QUESTIONS.
OLDER SAVINGS BONDS MAY BE SERIES E AND H.
MORE RECENT SAVINGS BONDS INCLUDE SERIES EE, HH, AND I.
What is the total face value of all the savings bonds that you (and your family) have?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BONDS OTHER THAN SAVINGS BONDS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Do you (or anyone in your family living here) have any other corporate, municipal, govern-
ment, or other type of bonds or bills?
IF YES: Please do not include bonds or bills held in pension accounts, or any other accounts
I have already recorded.
I need to know what types of bonds or bills you have.
Do you have. . .
mortgage-backed bonds such as those from ’Ginnie-Mae’, ’Fannie-Mae’ or ’Freddie-Mac’?
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What is the face value of all of the mortgage-backed bonds that you (and your family living
here) have?
Do you have. . .
state or municipal bonds, or other tax free bonds?
ALSO INCLUDE ’REVENUE BONDS,’ ’INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BONDS,’ AND
OTHER BONDS ISSUED BY STATE AND LOAN GOVERNMENTS
What is the face value of all of the state or municipal bonds, or other tax free bonds that
you (and your family living here) have?
Do you have. . .
U.S. Government bonds or Treasury bills?
INCLUDE U.S. GOVERNMENT BILLS AND BONDS AS WELL AS ALL U.S. GOVERN-
MENT AGENCY BONDS
What is the face value of all of the U.S. Government bonds or Treasury bills that you (and
your family living here) have?
Do you have. . .
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foreign bonds?
INCLUDE BONDS ISSUED BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS OR COMPANIES
What is the face value of all of the foreign bonds that you (and your family living here) have?
Do you have. . .
corporate or any other type of bonds?
INCLUDE CORPORATE BONDS, COMMERCIAL PAPER, JUNK BONDS, AND MISC.
BONDS NOT ALREADY MENTIONED
What is the face value of all of the corporate or any other type of bonds that you (and your
family living here) have?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
PUBLICLY TRADED STOCK
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Do you (or anyone in your family living here) own any stock which is publicly traded?
IF YES: Please do not include stock held through pension accounts, or assets that I have
already recorded.
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What is the total market value of this stock?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BROKERAGE ACCOUNTS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Do you (or anyone in your family living here) have a brokerage account that you can use for
your purchase, or sale, of stocks and other securities?
Not including any accounts you’ve told me about, do you (or anyone in your family living
here) have a ’cash’ or ’call money’ account at a stock brokerage?
(IF R ASKS: CASH OR CALL MONEY ACCOUNTS HOLD MONEY RECEIVED FROM
THE SALE OF SECURITIES UNTIL THE MONEY IS REINVESTED.)
What is the total dollar value of all the cash or call money accounts that you (and your
family living here) have?
Do you (or anyone in your family living here) currently have any margin loans at a stock
brokerage?
IF YES, SAY: Please do not include any loans I have already recorded.
Altogether, what is the current balance on these margin loans?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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ANNUITIES, TRUSTS, AND MANAGED INVESTMENT ACCOUNTS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Do you (or anyone in your family here) receive income from or have assets in an annuity?
Please do not include job pensions.
Could you (or your family living here) cash in any of these annuities if you wanted to? That
is, do you have any equity interest in any of the annuities?
How much would you receive if you cashed in these annuities?
How is the money in these annuities invested? Is it all in stocks, all in interest-earning assets,
is it split between these, or something else?
IF R SAYS ”MUTUAL FUND”, PROBE FOR WHETHER IT IS A STOCK FUND, A
BOND FUND, OR ONE SPLIT OVER BOTH TYPES
1. *ALL IN STOCKS 2. *ALL IN INTEREST EARNING ASSETS/BONDS 3. *SPLIT
4. Real estate 5. Hedge fund 6. Annuities 8. Mineral rights 9. GIC/Guaranteed Income
Contract 12. Business investment n.e.c. 15. Life insurance 25. Non publicly traded business
or other such investment 30. Mutual fund (not a preferred response) -1. None -7. *OTHER
0. Inap.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
LIFE INSURANCE
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Do you (or anyone in your family living here) have any life insurance? Please include indi-
vidual and group policies, but not accident insurance.
DO NOT INCLUDE INSURANCE THAT ONLY PAYS IN SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
(FOR EXAMPLE, ACCIDENT LIFE INSURANCE).
The two major types of life insurance are term and cash-value policies. Term policies pay
a benefit if the insured person dies, but otherwise have no value. They are often provided
through an employer or union, but may also be bought by individuals. Cash-value policies
also pay a death benefit, but differ in that they build up a value as premiums are paid.
Do you have any policies that build up a cash value or that you can borrow on? These are
sometimes called ’whole life’, ’straight life’, or ’universal life’ policies.
DO NOT INCLUDE ANY INSURANCE ANNUITIES ALREADY RECORDED.
If you cancelled these policies now, how much would you receive from the insurance company
for the payments you have made up to now? That is, what is the current ’cash value’ of the
policies?
Are you (or your family) borrowing against these policies?
Is the cash value you just gave me the net cash value, that is the total cash value minus the
loan, or is it the gross cash value?
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Did I record these loans earlier in the interview?
How much is currently borrowed?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
MISCELLANEOUS ASSETS AND DEBTS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
We have talked about various types of savings, investments, and loans. Other than what I
have already recorded, are you (or anyone in your family living here) owed any money by
friends, businesses, or others?
(WE DO NOT WANT TO INCLUDE LOANS BETWEEN FINANCIALLY DEPENDENT
FAMILY MEMBERS.)
Altogether, how much are you owed?
Other than pension assets and other such retirement assets, do you (or anyone in your family
living here) have any other substantial assets that I haven’t already recorded – for example,
artwork, precious metals, antiques, oil and gas leases, futures contracts, future proceeds from
a lawsuit or estate that is being settled, royalties, or something else?
(DO NOT INCLUDE PENSION-TYPE OR EMPLOYER PROFIT- SHARING ACCOUNTS
HERE.)
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(About the most valuable of these ...)
What kind of asset is it?
1. Gold 2. Silver (incl. silverware) 3. Other metals or metals NA type 10. Jewelry; gem
stones (incl. antique) 11. Cars (antique or classic) (with rare exception [generally when the
vehicle is not in running condition, but still has significant value], these should be reclas-
sified in Section G) 12. Antiques; furniture 13. Art objects; paintings, sculpture, textile
art, ceramic art, photographs 14. (Rare) books 15. Coin/currency collections 16. Stamp
collections 17. Guns 18. Misc. real estate (except cemetery); deposit on real estate; boat
dock (with rare exception, these should be reclassified in Section E) 19. Cemetery plots
20. China; figurines; crystal/glassware 21. Musical instruments 22. Livestock; horses; crops
23. Oriental rugs 24. Furs; high-end clothes and accessories 25. Other collections, incl.
baseball cards, records, wine 61. Loans to friends/relatives 62. Other loans/debts owed to
R 63. Cash, n.e.c. 64. Future proceeds from a lawsuit (includes expected settlement from a
divorce) 65. Future proceeds from an estate 66. Deferred compensation 67. Insurance Settle-
ment 68. Other deferred income (other than 66) 70. Commodities n.f.s. 71. Oil/gas/mineral
leases or other land leases 72. Futures contracts, stock options, derivatives (include CDOs,
reinsurance, debt guarantees, etc.) 73. Royalties; patents 74. Non-publicly traded stock,
n.e.c.; stock with restricted trading rights, n.e.c. 75. Computer 76. Equipment/tools, n.e.c.
77. Future lottery/prize receipts 78. Association, club, or exchange membership 79. Other
obligations to R 80. Child support owed to R 81. Remaining payment from sale of an asset;
other cash due from dissolution of business 82. PayPal or other online cash account; include
online gambling accounts 83. Tax credit 84. Stored-value card -7. *Other 0. Inap. (no misc.
assets: X4019ˆ=1/ no second asset: X4023ˆ=1/ no third asset: X4027ˆ=1)
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********************************************************************************
FOR THE PUBLIC DATA SET, CODES 1 AND 2 ARE COMBINED WITH CODE 3;
CODES 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 23, AND 25 ARE COMBINED WITH CODE 12; CODE 61 IS
COMBINED WITH CODE 62; CODE 68 IS COMBINED WITH CODE 66; CODE 72 IS
COMBINED WITH CODE 71; CODE 78 IS COMBINED WITH CODE 74; CODES 82
AND 84 ARE COMBINED WITH CODE 63; CODES 64, 65, 67, 77, 79, 80, AND 83 ARE
COMBINED WITH CODE -7
*********************************************************************************
What is the total dollar value that you (and your family living here) have in this asset?
Do you (or anyone in your family living here) owe any other money not recorded earlier?
WE DO NOT WANT TO INCLUDE LOANS BETWEEN FINANCIALLY DEPENDENT
FAMILY MEMBERS.
DO NOT INCLUDE LOANS AGAINST PENSION ACCOUNTS BELONGING TO R OR
SPOUSE/PARTNER.
How much is owed?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
PRINCIPAL RESIDENCE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Do you live on a farm or ranch, in a mobile home, in a house or apartment, or in some other
type of home?
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
R LIVES ON A FARM
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
What part of this property is used for (farm/ranch)ing?
What is the legal ownership status of this (farm/ranch)?
Do you (or your family living here) own this (farm/ranch), do you own part of it, do you
rent it, is it all owned by a business, or another arrangement?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
R LIVES IN MOBILE HOME
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Do you (or your family living here) own both this mobile home and site or lot, do you own
only the mobile home, do you own only the site, do you rent both the home and site, or
another arrangement?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
R LIVES IN HU OTHER THAN FARM/RANCH OR MOBILE HOME
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Do you (and your family living here) own this (house and lot/apartment/ranch/farm), do you
pay rent, do you own it as a part of a condo, co-op, townhouse association, or something else?
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
INVESTMENT REAL ESTATE AND VACATION PROPERTIES
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Do you (or anyone in your family living here) own any (other) real estate such as a lot,
vacation home, timeshare, apartment building, commercial property, or other investment
property, including properties owned in partnership with other people?
What type of property is this?
10. Farm/Ranch – any mention 11. Land only: Lot, tract, acreage; building lots; ”farmland”
12. Substantial land and seasonal or other residence (except 14) 13. Substantial land and
some other type of structure 14. Substantial land and trailer/mobile home 15. Recreational
property; sports field; golf course 21. Seasonal/vacation house (winter/summer home; cot-
tage; etc.); other additional home 22. Trailer/Mobile Home 24. Mobile home park 25.
Time-share ownership – any 40. One single family house 41. Multiple single family houses
42. Duplex 2 unit residence 43. Triplex - 3 unit residence 44. Fourplex - 4 unit residence
45. 5 or more unit residence 46. ”Apartment house” – number of units unknown; ”rental
units” or ”property”, n.f.s. 47. Other business/commercial property (exc. 41-46, 48) 48.
Business/commercial and residential combination 49. Condominium; co-op 50. Residential,
n.e.c. 51. Garage 52. Burial lot 999. Misc. vacation property mapped from mopup question
-7. Other, including combination of types on one property (except for code 48) 0. Inap.
(no properties: X1700=5; no properties not owned by a business: X1701=-1/fewer than 2
properties: X1701¡2)
What percentage of the property do you (and your family living here) own?
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How much in total is this (timeshare/property) worth?
I mean, without taking any outstanding loans into account, what would it bring if it were
sold today?
Are there any outstanding loans or mortgages on this (property/timeshare)?
DO NOT INCLUDE ANY LOANS AGAINST THE PROPERTY RECORDED EARLIER
(In total, how/How) much is still owed?
For the remaining properties that you own, about how much in total is your (family’s) share
worth? I mean, what could you sell them for?
Are there mortgages or loans outstanding against these properties?
Altogether, about how much is owed on your (family’s) share of these mortgages or loans?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
OTHER CONSUMER LOANS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Do you (or anyone in your family living here) owe any money or have any other loans for
any reason? (These may be loans for household appliances, furniture, hobby or recreational
equipment, medical bills, loans from friends or relatives, loans for a business or investment,
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or other loans.)
IF YES, SAY: Please do not include credit cards or other loans I have already recorded in
detail.
DO NOT INCLUDE GIFTS/LOANS R IS NOT EXPECTED TO REPAY
DO NOT INCLUDE OUTSTANDING BILLS UNLESS THEY ARE MORE THAN 30
DAYS PAST DUE
DO NOT INCLUDE MARGIN LOANS OR LOANS AGAINST LIFE INSURANCE OR
PENSIONS
How many such loans do you have?
What was the loan for?
MASTER LOAN PURPOSE LIST
1. Own home purchase/construction 3. Home improvements or additions (incl. assessments
for sewer/sidewalk, etc.) 4. Home repairs/maintenance/upkeep 10. Car, including repos-
sessed car 11. Refrigerator 12. Stove/range; microwave oven 13. Dishwasher 14. Freezer
15. Air conditioner; furnace 16. Washing machine (incl. washer/dryer combination) 17.
Dryer 18. Furniture (excluding pianos and organs – see code 34); lamps; mattress and
spring combinations; rug and/or carpet; other household furnishings 20. Vacuum clean-
ers 23. Home computer; calculator; computer terminal 24. Truck/jeep/utility vehicle 25.
Combination of appliances (incl. TV); ”appliances” – NA type 26. Combination of furni-
ture and appliances 29. Other appliances or durable goods; sewing machine; typewriter 31.
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Stereo; phonograph (may include radio); include sound equipment; amplifiers here; radio
(AM or FM); tuner; CB equipment; tape recorder, tape player (cassette or reel-to-reel);
CD player 34. Piano; Organ 35. Musical instruments (excl. piano and organ) 36. TV –
color or black and white; ”home entertainment center” (including combination TV, radio,
phonograph); video cassette recorder/player (VCR); video camera (Cam-corder); satellite
dish 49. Other small/indoor hobby, recreation, and entertainment items (incl. pool tables
and regular cameras) 50. Power tools and yard equipment 61. Boat; boating equipment
(incl. trailer), airplane, airplane equipment 63. Motorcycles; bicycle; moped; snowmobiles;
off-road vehicles 65. Camper-trailers; RV, n.f.s. 67. Cottage; vacation property; mobile
homes – seasonal residence (if current residence, code 01); ”motor home”; second home 69.
Other outdoor recreation items; horse 74. Invest in own business 75. ”Business investment”
(exc. 74), incl. businesses now defunct 76. Other asset investment; bought stocks/bonds;
IRA deposit; gold; ”investment”, n.f.s. 78. Investment real estate (incl. cemetery plots
and additions and repairs to investment property); farmland (exc. 74); vacation property
79. To have cash reserve 80. Divorce/separation expenses 81. Travel/vacation expenses 82.
Medical/dental/veterinary expenses; attorney’s fees 83. Education/school expenses 84. Tax
and insurance expenses (exc. vehicle, code 93) 85. Weddings/funerals/other ”occasions” 86.
Legal judgment against R; money owed on overpayment of benefits 88. Moving expenses 89.
Other special expenses; encyclopedia; health membership 90. ”Personal loan”–NA what for
91. Bill/debt consolidation; ”bills” 92. Personal items, incl. clothing, jewelry 93. Vehicle
repair/upkeep (incl. insurance) 94. Gifts; goods or gifts of money; ”Christmas” 95. Liv-
ing/general expenses 96. Loans made to others; ”loaned friend/son money for a house” 97.
Charitable or political contributions -7. Other (including combinations) 0. Inap. (does not
own any part of HU or owns only mobile home and not site: X508ˆ=(1, 2) and X601ˆ=(1, 2)
and X701ˆ=(1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8) and X7133ˆ=1; land contact: X723=2; no mortgage: X723=5;
year of mortgage same as year of purchase: X802= one of X606, X611, X616, X630, X634,
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or X720; additional money not taken out on loan: X7137ˆ=(2, 3, 4);)
How much is still owed on this loan?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BUSINESSES
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
DOES R OPERATE A FARM/RANCH BUSINESS ON THEIR PROPERTY?
Now I would like to ask you about businesses you may own. Do you (and your family living
here) own or share ownership in any privately-held businesses, including farms, professional
practices, limited partnerships, private equity, or any other business investments that are
not publicly traded?
Do not include corporations with publicly-traded stock or any partnerships that have
already been recorded earlier.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
ACTIVELY MANAGED BUSINESSES
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Is it a partnership, a sole-proprietorship, an LLC, a subchapter S corporation, another type
of corporation, or something else?
These next few questions are about the relationship between your (family’s) personal finances
and the finances of your (family’s) business.
Are you (or your family living here) using personal assets as collateral or have you cosigned
or guaranteed any loans for this business?
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COLLATERAL: A SPECIFIC ASSET PLEDGED AGAINST A LOAN.
GUARANTEE: A PROMISE TO PAY A LOAN IF THE BORROWER DEFAULTS.
How much is currently (collateralized/guaranteed/guaranteed or collateralized)?
CODE ZERO IF NOTHING OWED NOW.
INCLUDE WHAT IS OWED NOW, NOT THE ORIGINAL AMOUNT OR THE VALUE
OF COLLATERAL
Did I record this earlier?
(Other than guarantees, does/Does) the business owe you (or your family living here) any
money?
THIS SHOULD INCLUDE LOANS TO THE BUSINESS, NOT INVESTMENTS THE PEU
HAS MADE IN THE BUSINESS
How much is owed?
Do you (or your family living here) owe the business any money?
How much do you owe?
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Did I record this earlier in the interview?
What is the net worth of the share owned by you and your family living here?
PROBE: What could you sell it for?
IF R SAYS THE BUSINESS IS WORTH NOTHING OR CANNOT BE SOLD, ASK:
About how much much would it cost to buy a similar asset?
THE VALUE SHOULD BE NET OF ALL LOANS.
DO NOT INCLUDE THE VALUE OF FARM LAND, STRUCTURES OR LOANS RECORDED
EARLIER.
INCLUDE THE VALUE OF CROPS, ANIMALS, IMPLEMENTS AND MATERIALS
For the remaining businesses you (and your family living here) own and actively manage,
what could you sell your share for?
PROBE: What is your share worth?
THE VALUE SHOULD BE NET OF ALL LOANS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
NON-ACTIVELY MANAGED BUSINESSES
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Do you (or anyone in your family living here) own or share ownership in any other businesses,
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business investments or other private equity that are not publicly traded and where you do
NOT have an active management role?
IF YES: Please do not include any assets reported earlier.
Is it a limited partnership, another type of partnership, an LLC, a subchapter S corporation,
another type of corporation, or something else?
What could you sell your (family’s) share for?
Indicative Questions from the 2013 SCF
Related to Retirement Assets
Questions regarding retirement assets are scattered in several sections of the SCF. Indica-
tively, questions referring to IRAs and Keogh accounts, as extracted from the “FINANCIAL
ASSETS” section of the SCF, as well as questions referring to other employer-sponsored ac-
counts, as extracted from the“PENSION FOR HEAD AND SPOUSE /PARTNER FROM
CURRENT MAIN JOB” section are given below.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
FINANCIAL ASSETS (ALSO INCLUDES SOME MISC. ASSETS AND DEBTS)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
As we continue through the interview, I will be asking you about several types of retirement
assets you may have, such as IRAs, annuities, and pensions and retirement accounts you may
have through a current or past job. Here I would like to ask just about IRAs and Keogh
accounts. These may include accounts that you ’rolled over’ into an IRA after leaving a
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previous job as well as Roth IRAs, or any other type of IRA or Keogh account that is not
part of a retirement plan on a current or past job.
Do you (or anyone in your family living here) have any Keoghs or IRAs?
IF YES, SAY: Please do not include IRA-SEP or IRA-SIMPLE accounts, which we treat as
job pensions.
”EDUCATION IRAs” ARE SAVINGS ACCOUNTS.
How much (in total) is in your Roth IRA account(s)?
How much (in total) is in your (wife’s/partner’s) Roth IRA accounts(s)?
How much (in total) is in your roll-over IRA account(s)?
How much (in total) is in your (husband/wife/partner)’s roll-over IRA accounts(s)?
How much (in total) is in your regular or other IRA account(s)?
How much (in total) is in your (husband/wife/partner)’s other IRA account(s)?
How much (in total) is in your Keogh account(s)?
How much (in total) is in your (husband/wife/partner)’s Keogh account(s)?
How is the money in (this/these) account(s) invested? Is it all in stocks, all in interest-
earning assets, is it split between these, or something else?
IF R SAYS ”MUTUAL FUND”, PROBE FOR WHETHER IT IS A STOCK FUND, A
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BOND FUND, OR ONE SPLIT OVER BOTH TYPES
1. *ALL IN STOCKS






9. *GIC/guaranteed income contract
12. Business investment n.e.c.
13. Commodities
15. Life insurance
25. Non publicly traded business or other such investment




FOR THE PUBLIC DATA SET, CODES 4, 5, 6, 8, 12, 15, AND 25 ARE COMBINED
WITH CODE -7; CODE 9 IS COMBINED WITH CODE 2
********************************************************************************
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
PENSION FOR HEAD AND SPOUSE/PARTNER FROM CURRENT MAIN JOB
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Aside from the IRA or Keogh plans reported earlier, (are you/is he/is she/is he or she)
included in any pension, retirement, or tax-deferred savings plans connected with the job
you just told me about?
INCLUDE PLANS THROUGH A UNION.
DO NOT INCLUDE SOCIAL SECURITY OR PLANS CONNECTED ONLY WITH EAR-
LIER JOBS. THERE ARE RECORDED LATER IN THE INTERVIEW
In some plans, such as 401(k)s and profit sharing plans, money accumulates in an account
designated for the worker and the worker or the employer may make contributions to the
account.
About (your/his/her/his or her pension plan/the most important of your/his/her/his or her
pension plans/your/his/her/his or her second pension plan), is there any type of account
balance associated with it?
Is it a traditional pension plan that provides regular benefits at retirement based on years
of work and pay, or is it some of other type of plan?
IF R SAYS ”SOME OTHER TYPE OF PLAN”, ASK: What does (your/his/her/his or her)
employer call it?
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IF R SAYS ”DEFINED-BENEFIT PLAN,” CODE ”TRADITIONAL PENSION”.
Is it a 401(k) or 403(b) account, a profits sharing plan, a supplemental retirement annuity,
a thrift/savings plan, a ”cash balance” plan, a SEP, or something?





5. *PROFIT SHARING PLAN
6. *SUPPLEMENTAL RETIREMENT ANNUITY
7. *”CASH BALANCE” PLAN
8. *”PORTABLE CASH OPTION” PLAN
20. Deferred-compensation plan, n.e.c.
21. *SEP (Simplified Employee Pension)/SIMPLE (Simplified Incentive Match Plan For
Employers)
22. Money purchase plan
25. Stock purchase plan; ESOP
26. 457 plan
30. Plan originally reported as TRADITIONAL PENSION for which the R later reported





FOR THE PUBLIC DATA SET, CODES 3, 4, AND 26 ARE COMBINED WITH CODE 2
********************************************************************************
(Are you/Is he/Is she/Is he or she) allowed to borrow against (your/his/her/his or her)
holdings in this plan?
(Do you/Does he/Does she/Does he or she) currently have a loan against the plan?
Did I record this loan earlier in the interview?
What is the current loan balance?
If (you/he/she/he or she) needed money in an emergency, could (you/he/she/he or she)
withdraw funds, even though there may be a penalty for doing so?
What is the balance of (your/his/her/his or her) pension account now?
Is this amount net of the loan you told me about?
(Do you/Does he/Does she/Does he or she) have any choices about how (your/his/her/his
or her) plan is invested?
(Do you/Does he/Does she/Does he or she) know how it is invested?
How is it invested? Is it all in stocks, all in interest-earning assets, is it split between these,
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or something else? ...
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
CURRENT BENEFITS FROM PENSIONS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Are you (or your husband/wife/partner/spouse) *currently receiving* any (other) type of
retirement, pension, or disability payments, or are you making withdrawals from a pension
or retirement account I have not already recorded?
INCLUDE WITHDRAWALS FROM DEFERRED-COMPENSATION ACCOUNTS
DO NOT INCLUDE WORKER’S COMPENSATION OR SSI (SUPPLEMENTAL SECU-
RITY INCOME) PAYMENTS.
Including the benefits you told me about earlier that you (or your [husband/wife/partner])
are receiving from a pension plan on a current job, from how many plans in total are you
(and your husband/wife/spouse/partner) currently receiving retirement, pension, or disabil-
ity payments, or making withdrawals from a pension or retirement account I have not already
recorded? Please do not include Social Security benefits.
(Please do not include withdrawals from the IRAs and Keogh accounts I have already
recorded.)
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For (this benefit/the first benefit), who is receiving these payments, you or your (hus-
band/wife/partner/spouse)?
Is this a payment or account from a (current job,) past job, a disability or military benefit,
former spouse’s pension, or something else?
1. *Current job pension of R or spouse/partner 2. *Past job pension of R or spouse/partner;
(except military) 3. *Disability 4. *Military; (includes military retirement or disability) 5.
*Pension of former spouse 10. Pension through other family member; included inherited
IRA 11. Union pension 15. Foreign government pension -7. *Other 0. Inap.
Is this pension currently an account plan, such as a 401(k), where you could take the whole
balance as one payment if you wanted to?
IF R SAYS THAT IT IS AN ACCOUNT THAT WAS CONVERTED TO AN ANNUITY
AT RETIREMENT, CODE ”NO.”
IF R SAYS THE PLAN MAKES PAYMENTS ONLY FOR A SET NUMBER OF YEARS,
ANSWER YES HERE.
What is the current balance in this account?
How is the account invested? Is it all in stocks, all in interest earning assets, is it split
between these, or something else?...
Whose plan(s) (is this/are these) – yours, (or) your husband’s/ wife’s/partner’s/spouse’s(,
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or both)?
Thinking about the type of plans that accumulate a balance, what is the total balance you
(or your husband/wife/partner/spouse) have in all other such plans from which you make
withdrawals?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
FUTURE PENSION BENEFITS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
During the interview, we have covered retirement assets including Keoghs and IRAs, annu-
ities, current job pensions, and benefits that may currently be received from Social Security
or pensions from past work.
To complete the picture now, please tell me, have you (and your husband/wife/partner/spouse)
earned rights to any other pensions or retirement accounts from a previous employer that
you (or your husband/wife/partner/spouse) will receive or draw on in the future.
INCLUDE ANY DEFERRED-COMPENSATION ACCOUNTS NOT RECORDED EAR-
LIER.
DO NOT INCLUDE PENSIONS R MIGHT GET FROM FUTURE JOBS UNLESS RIGHTS
TO THE PENSION ARE ALREADY EARNED.
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DO NOT INCLUDE FUTURE SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS.
Who expects to receive (this/the largest) benefit?
Is this benefit from a past job, the military, a former spouse’s pension, or something else?
1. *Past job pension of R or spouse/partner 2. *Military 3. *Pension of former spouse 5.
Union pension 10. Non-account-type pension moved from the mopup for current-job pen-
sions of R or S/P 11. Pension from a current second job -7. *Other 0. Inap.
How much is in the account now?
How is the money in this account invested? Is it all in stocks, all in interest-earning assets,
is it split between these, or something else?...
Whose plan(s) (is this/are these) – yours, (or) your husband’s/ wife’s/partner’s/spouse’s(,
or both)?
Thinking about all remaining plans that accumulate a balance, what is the total current
balance in those plans?
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